780.5/1–954
No. 169
Memorandum of Conversation, by the
Officer in Charge of Turkish Affairs(Wright)
Subject:
- Plans for Middle Eastern Defense Arrangements
Participants:
- Turkish Ambassador
- Mr. Jernegan—NEA
- Mr. Wright—GTI
The Ambassador called, at his request, to be brought up to date on developments. I gave him a rather full summary of our thinking and action in regard to the provision of military aid to Pakistan and the creation of a defense planning arrangement composed of Turkey, Pakistan, and possibly other countries in the area. I concluded by saying that we had still not arrived at a firm decision on military aid to Pakistan and did not intend to do so until we have received a definitive expression of the Turkish Government’s views. I thought, however, that the balance presently was in favor of such a program and that the ultimate decision would be favorable if Turkey was in agreement.
The Ambassador asked whether we had talked to the British about this. I said that we had done so,1 but not until after we had made our first approach to the Turks. The British did not seem to be especially happy but had raised no objections to our proposed plan of action. The Ambassador smiled and observed he was sure the British were irritated because the scheme did not provide a lead role for them to play.
While indicating his general approval of the proposed course of action, the Ambassador suggested two possible difficulties. 1. In trying to bring Iraq into a pact, we would have to reckon with the fact that the Iraqi people, as distinguished from their Government, would probably be opposed. 2. Afghanistan would be very much upset and might adopt an unfavorable attitude toward the US and Turkey if she were not at least offered the opportunity to join any arrangement which might be forthcoming.
With respect to Iraq I said we fully appreciated the delicacy of the Iraqi Government’s position and did not intend to exert any pressure. We would not make American military aid to Iraq in any way contingent upon Iraqi participation in a defense arrangement. [Page 448] We would leave it to the Iraqi leaders themselves to assess the advantages and disadvantages of joining such an arrangement.
With respect to Afghanistan, I expressed the hope that Turkish influence could be exerted to reassure the Afghans. Turkey could promise Afghanistan that it would see to it that the pact was not used in any way against Afghan interests. The Ambassador suggested that the pact itself should contain some language to show that it would not be directed against states of the area, such as Afghanistan and India, and that it should be open to Afghan adherence. He appeared to think that Turkey and Pakistan should even make an affirmative effort to obtain Afghan participation. I suggested that if this were done at the very beginning it might provide premature Soviet reaction, but the Ambassador did not seem to think this such a serious objection.
The Ambassador and I agreed that the Pushtanistan issue would have to be at least tacitly shelved if Afghanistan were to join in any group with Pakistan. In this connection he said the Iraqi Ambassador in Washington was optimistic that Iraq could play an effective role in adjusting the Afghan–Pakistan difficulties.