780.5/1–654
No. 168
Memorandum of Conversation, by the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South
Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan)
Subject:
- British Queries Regarding Proposed Middle Eastern Defense Pact
Participants:
- Mr. Harold Beeley, Counselor, British Embassy
- Mr. J.C. Crawley, First Secretary, British Embassy
- NEA: Mr. John D. Jernegan
Mr. Beeley had a telegram from London (which he thought had probably been drafted by Mr. Eden himself) requesting the State Department’s “considered opinion” regarding certain aspects of the proposal to bring about a defense arrangement among Turkey, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq. They were as follows:
1. Does the Department consider that the defense arrangement between Turkey and Pakistan would have any military value, the two countries being so far apart?
I suggested this was a question which might better be directed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I could only say that the Joint Chiefs, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense, had proposed that we attempt to bring about a defense arrangement including [Page 445] Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq and Iran and had indicated that even if Iraq and Iran were not included, an arrangement between Turkey and Pakistan would still have value. I thought the Defense Department considered that some coordination between Turkey and Pakistan would be useful because of their position at opposite ends of Iran. I also thought the Joint Chiefs had in mind that an arrangement between Turkey and Pakistan would make it easier to secure the eventual adherence of Iraq and Iran and it was my clear understanding that Pakistan was considered an important base for the defense of the Persian Gulf area.
Mr. Beeley then asked whether we thought the existence of a Turkish–Pakistani pact would in fact attract Iraq and Iran. I said we had several indications which lead us to think the Iraqis were definitely interested.1 I cited the reported favorable reaction of the Iraqi leaders with whom the Governor General of Pakistan had talked during his visit to Baghdad. I also mentioned the frequently expressed concern of the Iraqis at the Russion threat and the recent inquiry of their Ambassador in Ankara regarding possible developments in the formation of a four-power pact. I reminded Mr. Beeley that Prime Minister Mohammed Ali of Pakistan evidently expected to have the Iraqis discuss this subject with him when Prince Faisal and Prime Minister Jamali visit Pakistan later this month. We also thought Iran would be prepared to join eventually, although its Government would not be ready to do so for perhaps another year or two.
2. What reaction does the Department expect from other countries in the area? (Mr. Beeley said he thought this had reference to the Arab States and possibly Afghanistan.)
With regard to Afghanistan, I said we anticipated an unfavorable reaction but thought it would not be too serious. If anything, it would be my guess that putting military aid to Pakistan in the context of a pact with Turkey would be helpful since the Afghans looked on the Turks as their friends and might reasonably be expected to count on Turkey to restrain any Pakistani moves against Afghanistan. So far as the Arab States, other than Iraq, were concerned, we thought the chances were better than even that the pact would exert a favorable influence, creating a desire to joint it.
3. What was our view of the effect on the area of the omission of the Western Powers from the Pact?
I said we thought this should make it easier for the States in the area, except for Turkey, to participate. We thought Iran, Iraq and even Pakistan would be more hesitant to join an organization which had a direct and public link with the West. One of the reasons that MEDO had never gotten off the ground was that there was so large a Western participation in that proposed organization. We thought, therefore, that it would be better this time to let the Middle Eastern States start out alone. It seemed pretty certain to me that in due course British and American military advisers [Page 446] would be sitting in with any planning group which might be formed and that this in turn could easily lead to a spontaneous request for formal participation of the Western Powers.
4. What would he the effect of the pact on Turkey’s position in NATO and how would the other NATO powers regard it?
I said this was getting a bit outside my field, but we had proceeded on the assumption that whatever pact was created would be of the nature which would not conflict with Turkey’s NATO obligation. It would go no further than had been contemplated under the MEDO proposal. There would be no binding commitments of any kind, merely arrangements for planning against contingencies, such as were now in effect between Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia.
Mr. Beeley remarked that he gathered there was some concern in London lest the Pact increase rather than diminish Indian concern over American military aid to Pakistan. The Foreign Office appeared to think Nehru would be especially unhappy at having a defense arrangement which was directed against the Soviet Union brought right to his doorstep. I said we had thought of this possibility but believed that on balance the pact idea should make it easier for Nehru by clearly showing that our military aid was intended for use against the threat from the North and West and not for use against India.
Mr. Beeley then read me the final sentence from his telegram which was to the effect that Mr. Eden looked forward to discussing this whole question with Secretary Dulles when they meet in Berlin. I asked whether this meant that Mr. Eden did not wish us to take any further action until that time. Mr. Beeleysaid he had no direct information on that point but he felt sure this was not the case. He believed Mr. Eden realized that we could not now hold up our decision provided the first step we have already taken (the approach to Turkey) worked out as anticipated. He thought, however, that if any unexpected developments caused us to reconsider our plan, Mr. Eden would like to be consulted before we launched a new line of action.
At no time did Mr. Beeley or Mr. Crawley register any protest or objection to the plan we had adopted, although from the nature of Mr. Eden’s questions and from occasional implications in their remarks, I sensed that the Foreign Office was not altogether happy.
- See telegram 686 to Ankara, Document 164.↩