The Secretary of
State to the Embassy in
483. For Ambassador. Agree PM should be informed (Embtel 473)2 but prefer you not yet request his views. On basis that you see PM privately and that he understands and agrees fully with need for complete secrecy you may speak to him along following lines:
- Turkish Government being informed we considering military aid program for Pakistan.
- We believe it desirable minimize political repercussions (India and Afghanistan) and maximize Pakistan contribution area defense. One way do this would be to link US aid to initiation of mutual defense understanding between Turkey and Pakistan. Such an arrangement might be open-ended permitting addition of others if agreed to.
- We are telling Turks we would be glad to know whether they are disposed to consider an arrangement with Pakistan seriously. Sort of agreement in mind would not envisage binding military alliance but rather a loose arrangement for consultation and joint defense planning. We would not become a partner but would assist members.
- If PM asks whether this means we will not extend aid unless Turkey goes along you may say that this is not necessarily so but that you are sure the US. will wish to look at the problem in light of Turkish reaction.
- When final position reached we will of course wish to consult him further.
- You may assure PM our awareness embarrassment because of delay and express regrets. Decision will be made soon as possible.
- Please emphasize we are giving him this advance notice because he is leaving Karachi before we can expect Turk reaction. Would be embarrassing if Turks learned we had spoken to him at this time. You may assure him it is unlikely final US position will be reached before his return on the 12th.
FYI we are awaiting return of President and Admiral Radford to Washington and we hope to have matter taken up for early decision then.
Also FYI British Embassy informed substance Deptel 475 to Karachi and 686 to Ankara.3
- Repeated to Ankara and London.↩
- Telegram 473 from Karachi, Dec. 29, not printed, informed the Department of State that the Prime Minister of Pakistan was leaving for Dacca on Jan. 1 and was not expected back until Jan. 12. Referring to the next to last paragraph of telegram 686 to Ankara (repeated to Karachi as telegram 475), supra, it suggested that in view of the imminence of important decisions in Washington the Prime Minister should be advised of the substance of telegram 475 before his departure. (780.5/12–2953)↩