Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

780.5/12–253: Telegram

No. 162
The Ambassador in Turkey (Warren) to the Department of State¹

top secret

Ankara, December 2, 1953—5 p.m.

566. Reference: Deptel 591, November 30.² Believe Turk attitude peripheral defense arrangements reported Embtel 557, November 30,³ not only sound but sets practical limit to present possibilities along this line. I assume that in speaking of “Turk willingness to enter immediately into defense pact with Pakistan” Bayar was thinking in terms of limited arrangement consistent with NATO and along lines Greco-Yugo-Turk pact.

While Joint Chiefs four-power concept, eventually extendable, provides desirable target, efforts to secure early formalization would in my opinion jeopardize accomplishment our purpose. This seems obvious case in which to make haste slowly, starting with encouragement to Turks and Pakistanis to proceed with consultative pact and initiate joint planning, with view inclusion Iran when developments warrant. Arrival this stage clearly largely dependent ability Iranian regime establish control and stability and effectiveness US support in developing strength.

This course would unavoidably involve preparedness to move toward Pakistan in near future, at least to extent survey team requested by Ghulam Mohammed, and to contemplate later program direct aid, notably in provision sea transport essential to provide mobility Pakistan armed forces. It would also require consultation with British, though I would hope we could take lead and avoid active planning collaboration, in view Turk attitude. Meanwhile, small aid program to Iraq should soon indicate possibilities of:

(1) Developing some local strength there; and

(2) Loosening ACSP bonds now frustrating our efforts with Arabs.

Think we must realize that in long run peripheral defense arrangements would require some support in depth, especially Suez base. However believe this not presently urgent and if we do not show too much anxiety, eventual arrangements may well be facilitated by pursuit of line suggested.

Warren

1. Repeated to Baghdad, Cairo, Tehran, and Karachi.
2. Not printed; it reported the Department of State had received a formal request from the Department of Defense for comments on possible Middle East security arrangements along the lines described in Jernegans letters of Nov. 9 and 19, Documents 157 and 160, and asked for the Embassys views to aid in drafting a reply to Defense. (780.5/11–3053)
3. Supra.