Office of the Historian

780.5/5–453

No. 132
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs (Burdett)

secret
[Washington,] May 4, 1953.

Subject:

  • Call of Egyptian Ambassador

Participants:

  • Dr. Ahmed Hussein, Egyptian Ambassador Designate
  • NEA—Mr. Byroade
  • NE—Mr. Burdett

The Egyptian Ambassador Designate called on Mr. Byroade for a discussion of the current talks with the U.K. and Middle East defense. The Ambassador stated he held a five-hour conference with General Naguib and leading members of the Revolutionary Command Council immediately before departing from Cairo, and since has had several telephone conversations with his Government. He intends to leave for Cairo May 7 and will report on his discussions with U.S. officials.

Dr. Hussein made the following points:

1.
The Naguib Government has the support of the overwhelming majority of the Egyptian people. Opponents consist only of communists and disgruntled landlords. There is no possible alternative. Only the Army is capable of effecting a change and another coup would lead to a series of unstable military governments. General Naguib is now accused of taking too conciliatory a stand in his relations with the West and of being pro-American.
2.
MEDO or a similar organization is completely unacceptable to Egypt. General Naguib instructed him to stress the above point. MEDO was originally presented at a bad psychological moment. The Revolutionary Command Council cannot afford to appear before the Egyptian public less intent on achieving Egypt’s national aspirations than previous governments. The Revolutionary Command Council is convinced that acceptance of any type of MEDO would be “suicide”. Any arrangement replacing British forces by those of other Western countries would be merely a continuation of occupation in another form.
3.
Egypt hates communism and realizes it would never be attacked by the West. In its own self interest it would resist any aggression on its territory. Egypt would welcome assistance from the West in building up its military strength to increase its defense capabilities.
4.
Arrangement on the following lines could be worked out:
a.
Unconditional evacuation of the Suez Canal Zone Base.
b.
Immediate talks concerning Middle East defense involving building up the strength of the area both militarily and economically.
c.
Defense of the area to be based on the Arab League Collective Security Pact.
d.
The Western Powers to be linked to this Pact through the British treaties with Iraq, Jordan and Libya and through the U.S. “treaty” with Saudi Arabia. (Really air base agreement.)
e.
No additional direct defense commitments between the Western Powers and Arab States.
5.
By adopting this procedure, the West would gain the good will of Egypt and through Egypt the good will of the other Arab States. The British forces in the Suez Canal would be replaced by a much larger Egyptian contingent, equipped and trained to assume responsibility for defense of the area. No formal defense arrangement is necessary since in its own interest Egypt is bound to cooperate against the only possible aggressor. The present Canal Zone Base is not usable while surrounded by a hostile population. The only approach for the West is to have confidence in Egypt, and, after the evacuation of British forces, to build up local defense forces without requiring firm commitments. Reliance should be placed on the statements of General Naguib and the self interests of Egypt in defending its own territory.
6.
The discussions with the British are not going well. Although before the start of the talks, the U.K. accepted evacuation, it is now unwilling to agree in principle to methods of carrying this out. Egypt considers such agreement essential, before referring the different issues to sub-committees.
7.
Egypt is most grateful for U.S. assistance in solving the Sudan problem. She intends to keep the discussions in Cairo going until the Secretary arrives, confident that he will accord Egypt the necessary support to assure their successful conclusion in accordance with the formula outlined under 4 above.
8.
He will telephone Lt. Colonel Abdel Nasir after the meeting scheduled for May 5 to report this conversation stressing Mr. Byroade’s views on:
a.
The importance of referring the questions under discussion with the U.K. to sub-committees immediately without attempting to obtain agreement in principle at this stage.
b.
The importance of tangible defense commitments by the Arab States.

Mr. Byroade made the following observations:

1.
The U.S. has the utmost faith in General Naguib, recognizes the leadership of Egypt in the Arab world, and the great desirability of assuring the willing cooperation of the peoples of the Arab States.
2.
However, U.S. objectives in the Middle East are not dissimilar from those of the British, although it disagrees sometimes with respect to tactics.
3.
Britain, as well as Egypt, has an acute public opinion question with which to contend. The agreement on the Sudan shook the Conservative Government and unconditional evacuation would be unacceptable to the British people.
4.
The U.S. does not question that evacuation should take place, but believes the present situation should be replaced by some form of defense arrangement. It does not insist upon any specific type, such as MEDO.
5.
The installations in the Canal Zone are of vital importance to the U.S., perhaps more so than to the British.
6.
Without a definite defense commitment by Egypt and the other Arab States, it would be very difficult to justify to Congress the expenditure of funds for economic and military assistance.
7.
During present discussions with the U.K. the issues should be referred to sub-committees instead of attempting to obtain agreement on principle at this stage. Once the practice questions involved are thoroughly understood, it should be easier to reach a meeting of minds on the broad question of principles.
8.
Although this does not apply to General Naguib, himself, the U.S. has received lately disquieting reports that persons surrounding Naguib actually believe a policy of “neutrality” would best serve Egypt’s interests. (The Ambassador denied this.)