Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

780.5/4–2253

No. 128
The British Embassy to the Department of State¹

confidential

Iraq

Her Majesty’s Government welcome the Iraqi approach insofar as it indicates an increasing realisation by Iraq of the need to strengthen her forces and to increase her contribution to the defence of the Middle East.

2. Her Majesty’s Government have already, in conjunction with the Iraqis, prepared plans for increasing the size of their army, building up a modern air force and equipping their forces throughout. The proposed programme for the army has been divided into three phases:—

(a) Phase I covers the equipment of the first two Iraqi Divisions, a third “cadre” division, two training brigades and a mechanised force. This is practically complete.

(b) Phase II covers the re-equipment of the third Iraqi division, and the equipment of an armoured brigade and a motor brigade, and additional artillery units. General Robertson, during a recent visit to Iraq, gave renewed assurances that we would fulfil phase II within 4 years. (Provided that the Iraqis place the necessary orders, the equipment could be provided in 2 to 3 years).

(c) Phase III covers the equipment of a fourth infantry division after the completion of Phase II.

It is clear that the present Iraqi approach amounts to a request for assistance to speed up the programme outlined above. We should of course wish to continue to assist in directing the expansion of the Iraqi forces as already planned.

3. Her Majesty’s Government suggest for the consideration of the United States Government and hope they will agree as follows:

(a) That we might both reply welcoming the Iraqi’s desire to strengthen their own military forces, both for their own needs and as a contribution to the defence of Middle East.²

(b) There is no indication in the reports from Baghdad that the Iraqis have made up their minds about the political framework within which the defence of the Middle East is to be organised. They wish to wait and see what progress is made in the proposed Anglo-Egyptian negotiations before deciding their attitude towards the proposed Middle East Defence Organisation. In these circumstances there seems little to be gained by pursuing the idea of creating a new regional defence scheme under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Her Majesty’s Government consider that it is therefore in their interest, and that of their allies, for the present Anglo–Iraqi Treaty to remain in force. The Treaty gives to the United Kingdom, as the Western Power primarily concerned at present with Middle East Defence, the greatest extent of military facilities which Her Majesty’s Government can expect from Iraq. It is important that the United Kingdom should retain these facilities until new arrangements are made, so that in the event of the Middle East becoming a major theatre of war these facilities (and in particular the air bases) would be at the disposal of the West from the outset. In the light of the above Her Majesty’s Government feel that Middle East defence should be discussed with the Iraqis as far as possible on the military rather than the political plane, at any rate until the progress of negotiations with Egypt enables it to be seen more clearly how a regional defence organization can be set up.

(c) In the light of the paragraph (b) above, we should both make it clear to the Iraqis that we can only help them to build up their military strength as a means of defending the Middle East area as a whole from a possible Soviet attack. We should explain that the countries of the Middle East, either alone or in concert, will in our view be unable in the foreseeable future to defend the area without powerful support from the West. The Western Powers have so far considered that this support should be given through their cooperation with the states of the area in a common defence arrangement, and it is hoped that some such organisation may shortly be set up. Until such an organisation for defence of the Middle East becomes a reality, it will be unwise to tamper with existing defence arrangements.

(d) The United Kingdom should not be supplanted as the principal source for Iraq’s arms and military equipment. The Iraqis are bound by the terms of the Anglo–Iraqi Treaty of 1930 to ensure that the equipment of their forces shall not differ in type from those of British forces. Moreover the Iraqi forces are equipped with British material and it would be militarily undesirable to introduce new patterns now. Her Majesty’s Government would also wish to keep any drain of dollars from the sterling area pool to a minimum. (Please see in this connexion the aide-mémoire left with the State Department on the 7th November 1952.)³

(e) Her Majesty’s Government doubt whether the expanding oil revenues of Iraq will on closer examination be found to be inadequate to meet the proposed programme of expansion in addition to existing development plans. Development is necessarily carried out gradually, and a planned expansion of the Iraqi army would take time. Present indications are that the Iraqi Development Board is not using all the revenue assigned to it. Even if it adheres to its planned programme, there would, if the Board continues as planned to receive 70% of estimated oil revenues, be a surplus for the years 1953 to 1956 in the region of 27m. pounds. It will in any case be necessary to assess the cost of the expansion proposed by the Iraqis before we can see how much, if any, assistance is required. For this purpose the services of the British military experts who are already in Iraq and working out the orders which the Iraqis need to place in this country to carry through Phase II of the re-equipment might be used.

Washington, 22nd April, 1953.

1. Handed on Apr. 22, 1953 to Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs Jernegan by Harold Beeley, British Counselor of Embassy.
2. Marginal notation: “Done”. Presumably this refers to the démarche of Nov. 12, 1952.
3. Not found in Department of State files.