Office of the Historian

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 141

No. 127
United States Minutes of the Third United States-French Foreign Ministers Meeting, Washington, March 27, 1953, 9 a.m.1

secret
FPT MIN-3
[Washington,] April 6, 1953.

Participants

  • U.S.
    • Secretary of State Dulles
    • Mr. Matthews
    • Mr. MacArthur
    • Ambassador Dillon
    • Mr. Merchant
    • Mr. Byroade
    • Mr. McCardle
    • Mr. Knight
    • Mr. Wolf
    • Mr. McBride
    • Mr. Young
    • Mr. O’Connor
    • Mr. Kitchen
    • Mr. Van Hollen
    • General Beebe
    • Mr. Tomlinson
  • French
    • Minister of Foreign Affairs Bidault
    • Ambassador Bonnet
    • M. Alphand
    • M. de la Tournelle
    • M. Falaize
    • M. Roux
    • M. Burin des Roziers
    • M. Boegner
    • M. Laley
    • M. Sauvagnargues
    • M. de Folin
    • M. de Nanteuil
    • M. Seydoux
    • M. de Juniac
    • M. Berard
    • M. Andronikoff
    • M. Vaurs

Organization of Defense in the Middle East—[FPT Agenda 2, item C]2

Mr. Bidault opened the discussion on the Middle East by pointing out that in this area as in others the Western Powers should present a united force. Here this front was not only against the enemy but also vis-à-vis the Arab states in the area. The psychology of the countries in this area was to obtain the highest possible price for their cooperation. While France was generally on excellent terms with the individual states in this area, tensions had been created in the U.N. He characterized the Arab League as purely a propaganda agency.

With reference to the Suez,3 Mr. Bidault said that no matter what type of arrangements were finally worked out, the presence of European powers in the Suez Canal area was needed. Some type of planning body should be established to organize the defense of the Canal. This defense organization should later be broadened to admit Greece and Italy. The freedom of transit through the Canal must be insured, and Egypt must be made to understand that this security requirement was a basic principle of the Western Powers, since otherwise a jugular vein of the free world could be severed. An Egyptian diplomat has recently made it known that Egypt would not look with disfavor upon a meeting of those countries which have signed the 1888 Agreement.

[Page 360]

Secretary Dulles replied that, before asking Mr. Byroade to answer certain of the points in detail, he would like to stress the great importance which the U.S. placed upon the need to maintain free transit through the Suez Canal, both in time of peace and during war, and of the importance of having a base available in the Canal area in time of need. Secretary Dulles pointed out that the U.K. planned to open discussions with Egypt about the status of the Suez and that the U.K. had suggested that the U.S. might take an active part in such discussions. The participation of the U.S. had, however, been declined by the Egyptians, and discussions were now planned solely between the U.K. and Egypt. It was hoped that the British would report on the progress of these discussions both to the U.S. and to France.

Replying to Mr. Bidault’s request for united action in the Middle East, Mr. Byroade said that while the U.S. recognized the importance of complete cooperation between the U.S. and France, the U.S. found that in certain cases, for tactical purposes, better results could be achieved by not openly presenting a solid front on all issues. As to the Arab League, it had sometimes presented a problem to the U.S. in the past, but there was hope that the situation might improve because of the appointment of a new Secretary General and because of indications that the new Egyptian leadership in the area might lead to the League’s adopting a more constructive policy.

With reference to the Suez Canal, Mr. Byroade said that while the U.S. had not opposed the principle of having the U.S., France and the U.K. discuss ways to insure that the waterway remain international, the U.S. did not feel that the present time was appropriate to begin such talks because of the possibility of press leaks to the Egyptians. It seemed preferable to have the British and Egyptians begin bilateral discussions with the hope that later it would be possible to get General Naguib to provide some assurance with regard to the international status of the Canal. While it would be best to await some progress in the British-Egyptian talks before beginning formal discussions, Mr. Byroade felt that, within the near future, it might be possible to begin consultation about the status of the Canal at a low level, thus reducing the possibility of leaks.

Mr. Byroade said that the problem of timing also came up in connection with the entrance of Greece and Italy into MEDO. In addition, a question of principle was involved. The U.S. conception of MEDO was that its membership should be limited to states in the area and those states from outside which could help in the common defense. Since it was felt that this concept would be changed by extending MEDO to Italy and Greece, the U.S. wished to delay its decision [Page 361] until some of the complications connected with MEDO were resolved.

Mr. Bidault answered that the establishment of a body to discuss the question of freedom of transit through the Suez could be done without great fanfare or publicity. The French Government was not thinking in terms of informing Egypt and was quite willing to begin discussion at whatever level the U.S. desired, including at the level of experts. However, it was important to decide this question as soon as possible so that, if the countries involved were taken by surprise, they would be able to act in concert. Secretary Dulles suggested that, if the opportunity arose, some members of the French delegation present in Washington might discuss with Mr. Byroade the possibility of setting up a future meeting of experts.

[Here follows discussion of Item D, Organization of Defense in the Balkans: Yugoslavia and Trieste; Item E, U.S. Policy in South America; and Item F, Status of American Forces in France and Morocco.]

  1. A complete set of minutes of the Meyer-Bidault talks in March 1953, is scheduled for publication in volume vi.

    FPT Special No. 4, dated Mar. 24, 1953, not printed, is a talking paper entitled “Special Political and Military Subjects,” on the topics covered at this meeting. (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 141)

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  2. Item A on the agenda was Korea, but Secretary Dulles and Foreign Minister Bidault agreed that since that topic had been discussed at the first plenary session there was no need for further discussion. Item B was a study of USSR policies following the death of Stalin. Brackets in the source text.↩
  3. On Mar. 18, Ambassador Bonnet had called at the Department of State to inform the Under Secretary of State of the great importance France placed on the question of freedom of transit through the Suez Canal. He stressed its importance to the war in Indochina and remarked that previous U.S. replies to French proposals for tripartite talks on the subject had not been helpful. (Memorandum of conversation, Mar. 18, 1953; Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 141)↩