Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

780.5/10–2852: Telegram

No. 111
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France¹

secret

Washington, December 4, 1952—5:21 p.m.

3184. Embtel 2611. Fol reply to Fr note of Oct 25² re MEDO shld be presented FonOff by Emb:³

US Govt pleased its recent exchange of views with Fr Govt concerning relations proposed MEDO with NATO has shown two govts to be in full agreement as to importance of assuring that work of MEDO Planning Group shld be conducted with proper regard for NATO strategic objectives and plans. This govt also pleased at progress made in bringing together views of the two govts as to arrangements for serving this objective.

US Govt regrets however it is unable accept proposal put forward by Fr Govt in its aide-mémoire of Oct 25, 1952 for establishment of formal liaison mission to represent NATO Standing Group at headquarters of MEDO Planning Group. US Govt considers that this proposal is open to the fol objections:

A. Estab of a Standing Group liaison mission in manner proposed wld require approval of North Atlantic Council and might be cause of concern to some member govts. Creation of such a mission wld emphasize Western aspects of MEDO and might make more difficult task of negotiating with Arab States for their entry into org. At the least, it might well justify Arab States in demanding similar mission to represent Arab League.

B. Proposal to add Turkish representation to Standing Group when that body considered MEDO matters wld have effect of destroying principle of three-power Standing Group to which US Govt attaches greatest importance.⁴ If Turkish representation were added to Standing Group for ME matters it wld be difficult reject requests of other NATO members for representation when matters of particular concern to them considered. It is recognized that this proposal was made in deference US views as to importance including Turkey in any MEDO directing organ, but MEDO arrangements shld not be allowed impair NATO structure.

C. Since MEDO Planning Group is body out of which Command org for ME is expected evolve, any liaison arrangements with NATO required in early stages of MEDO’s development shld properly be made with corresponding NATO bodies—i.e., the Eur Command, or appropriate subordinate commands, and not with Standing Group which provides guidance and direction to SACEUR. As US, UK and Fr tentatively agreed at Rome Nov 1951,⁵ such liaison arrangements can best be worked out after MEDO is established.

D. It is recognized that liaison arrangements of character described in C above wld not result in bringing to bear on work of MEDO Planning Group the informed knowledge of NATO strategic objectives and plans which both US Govt and Fr Govt consider essential. In view this govt however this objective can best be served, not by means of intermediary organ for transmitting communications between NATO Standing Group and MEDO Planning Group, but by placing MEDO Planning Group reps of US, Fr, UK and Turkey in position to receive authoritative guidance on NATO objectives and plans from their govts.

In its aide-mémoire of Oct 14, 1952,⁶ US Govt proposed that arrangement shld be made outside formal MEDO and NATO orgs and without formal status, whereby mil reps of US, Fr, UK and Turk might coordinate their views on appropriate MEDO matters and communicate these views to reps of the four powers on MEDO Planning Group. US Govt hopeful that fuller explanation of this proposed arrangement set forth below will persuade Fr Govt that objective of effectively coordinating the work of MEDO during its prelim phase with that of NATO can be accomplished by this means.

The arrangement envisaged by US Govt wld be informal and flexible. Each of four govts mentioned above wld designate a mil officer to represent it at discussions to be conducted in Washington at such intervals as appeared desirable. The object of these discussions wld be develop a coordinated four-power view on problems of major concern to MEDO Planning Group. Adequate coordination with NATO wld be assured by each govt designating as its rep an officer thoroughly conversant NATO plans and objectives, and, in case of US, France and UK, with work of Standing Group. As indicated above, US Govt considers it important avoid identification of proposed group with NATO Standing Group, and US rep in these discussions wld probably be officer not directly assigned to Standing Group or Standing Group Staff.

As to methods of operation, group might be apprised of problem on initiative of any one of four member govts. Issues on which reps of four govts on MEDO Planning Group required guidance cld be formulated by them and forwarded to one or all of four country reps in Washington through governmental channels. Coordinated views developed in four-power discussions cld be transmitted to each of country reps on MEDO Planning Group through same channels. By this means, it wld be possible supply MEDO Planning Group with continuing advice informed by thorough knowledge of NATO plans and objectives. NATO Standing Group, correspondingly, cld be kept currently informed of MEDO developments and wld be in position to cause consideration of a problem by ad hoc group if it appeared desirable.

As US Govt stated in its note of Oct 14, 1952 more formal arrangements will no doubt be required as MEDO develops. However, this govt unable give assurances concerning ultimate form of these arrangements which Fr Govt requested in aide-mémoire of Oct. 25, 1952. As stated in aide-mémoire of Oct 14 referred to above, Standing Group paper “Command in the Medit and ME” (S.G. 80/4)⁷ was prelim study. It was of illustrative character, outlining an org into which Greece and Turk “might fit”, and was presented to mil reps “for info”. MEDO arrangements since agreed to have in several instances been markedly at variance with those suggested Standing Group study. This Govt has no record of having made any commitment at Ottawa, or elsewhere, on basis doc S.G.80/4 to extend auth of Standing Group to ME. Moreover, for reasons set forth in aide-mémoire of Oct 14, 1952, US Govt wld consider it unwise attempt at this time fix structure of Command org which may ultimately be developed.

Dept is prepared discuss arrangements proposed above with reps of Fr Govt in Washington if the Fr Govt shld so desire. US Govt will also be prepared at an appropriate time discuss with Fr, UK and Turk Govts problems involved implementing these proposals. In view this govt, such discussions might best take place after initial approach to Arab States has been made.⁸

Acheson

1. Drafted by Daspit on Nov. 28; cleared by NEA, EUR, RA, BNA, S/P, S/S-CR, WE, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Repeated for information to London as telegram 3756.
2. Not printed, but see the editorial note, supra.
3. Despatch 1263 from Paris, Dec. 10, informed the Department of State that a copy of this telegram dated Dec. 6, had been handed to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Dec. 6; a copy of the note was enclosed. (780.5/12–1052)
4. See the editorial note, supra.
5. For documentation on the November 1951 talks, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. III, Part 1, pp. 693 ff.
6. See telegram 2155 to Paris, Document 94.
7. See footnote 4, Document 94.
8. In connection with the December NAC meeting in Paris, NEA drafted a paper for Secretary Acheson, PBT D–2/1, dated Dec. 9, not printed, which gave a résumé of the situation regarding the French proposal for liaison between MEDO and NATO, in the event that French Foreign Minister Schuman might raise the subject. (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 129)