Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

780.5/10–1552: Telegram

No. 94
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France¹

secret
priority

Washington, October 15, 1952—11:30 a.m.

2155. Fol is abbreviated text Note delivered Fr Emb Oct 14 commenting on Fraide-mémoire to UK dated Aug 15.²

The Secretary presents his compliments His Excellency Amb Fr and refers to his Note No. 461 Aug 15 transmitting text aide-mémoire of Fr Govt to Brit Emb in Paris in reply UK memo Aug 7 with respect proposals estab MEDO.

USG studied with care aide-mémoire of Fr Govt on UK proposals. Although aide-mémoire presented Dept for info, it concluded with suggestion certain pts shld be made subj exchange of views through dipl channels among USG, Fr and UK. Subsequently, FrFonOffproposed to US Emb in Paris these pts shld be considered at mtg in Lon of reps three Govts.³

USG wishes explain to Fr Govt reasons why it does not favor three-power mtg subj MEDO and considers it might be appropriate same time to indicate its position several important pts developed in aide-mémoire Aug 15.

This Govt appreciates considerations which have moved Fr Govt propose that pts involving NATO Standing Grp and NE Arms CoordComite shld be discussed initially on three-power basis. Difficulty holding such mtg in secret has, however, been demonstrated by experience. In opinion this Govt, reactions other sponsoring powers and Arab States as well, in event they learned such a mtg had occurred, wld be extremely adverse. It wld probably be felt three powers were assuming right determine important issues gen concern in advance consultation other interested states. USG considers it wld be unwise to take steps which wld thus risk impairing principles coop and equality membership on which it is agreed proposed org shld be based.

The USG shares conviction Fr Govt that close liaison must be maintained between proposed MEDO and NATO. This Govt, however, does not consider such liaison shld be effected by means of identical Standing Grp functioning in both orgs. It is true this solution was proposed in Standing Grp study ‘Command in the Mediterranean and ME’ (S.G. 80/4)⁴ but as Fr Govt is aware, this paper was presented merely as preliminary study. Moreover, necessity for modifying proposals put forward therein was recognized in North Atlantic Milit Comite Nov 20, 1951, (M.C. 38).⁵

As Fr Govt aware, some of member Govts NATO wld be most reluctant agree at present time formal association NATO with MEDO through device common Standing Grp. This arrangement, which wld tend emphasize Western character MEDO, wld also obviously have undesirable effects Arab States, whose participation org it must be prime object policy to effect. Moreover, in view this Govt, it wld be unwise estab in MEDO Steering Grp from which Turkey excluded. Obvious Turkey’s contribution ME defense will be greatest importance and this Govt feels strongly no action shld be taken which might diminish willingness Turk Govt to make this contribution full and effective.

Coord of work and plans MEDO with those of NATO, concerning necessity which USG in full agreement with Fr Govt, cld, in view this Govt be effectively served by estab for MEDO some form ad hoc arrangement on milit level,⁶ outside formal org, whereby views US, Fr, UK and Turkey might be coord on continuing basis prior being brought to bear on operations Planning Grp.

It is view this Govt such ad hoc arrangement cld satisfactorily provide coord of work MEDO with that of NATO, and such continuing milit guidance as MEDO Planning Grp may require during initial phase MEDO with which Brit memo concerned. In fact, this Govt believes there wld be particular merit in such arrangement, which wld make possible organic growth MEDO in response demands of developing experience. As org develops and moves closer to stage where it is ready to assume actual Command responsibilities, modifications in structure, including estab some formal Steering Grp, will no doubt be required. It will probably also be necessary to provide some more formal means for maintaining liaison with NATO. It is view this Govt that it will be possible more clearly judge form such arrangements should assume when time arrives and meantime liaison with NATO and guidance to MEDO Planning Grp shld be provided on informal basis suggested.

USG has also given careful consideration question source of direction and guidance to proposed Planning Grp and agrees with view of Govt Fr that it wld be logical and desirable for Planning Grp to work under authority and supervision Milit Reps Comite. It is view USG that latter comite alone shld receive its instructions from Govts concerned.⁷

With respect function of coord requests of States of ME for arms and equipment, USG in agreement with position of Fr Govt that for time being no change shld be made in present procedures under which this task is performed by three-power comite sitting in Wash. However, it is clear this is field in which MEDO will have substantial interest and three powers will have to decide later, on basis experience, how operations NE Arms Coordinating Comite can best be coordinated with defense plans of MEDO. This Govt does not consider use of language of para 4C of UK memo will embarrass work of NE Arms Coordinating Comite or increase difficulty effecting coord of this work with plans MEDO.

USG fully shares view of Fr Govt that Govt Israel shld be informed of any discussions looking toward estab MEDO and of work of org, once it is estab.”

FYI only. Gen Bradley is informally making known to Fr and UK reps Standing Grp milit view re Fr proposed tripartite mtg and Standing Grp question.

Bruce

1. Also sent to London priority as 2666.

2. This text is substantially the same as the draft transmitted to the Department of Defense under cover of the Secretary of State’s letter (signed by Byroade) of Sept. 22, Document 88.

   The Department of Defense response was made in a letter of Oct. 13 from Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Foster to the Secretary of State, under which was transmitted a Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum of Oct. 6, neither printed. (780.5/10–1352)

   Two substantive revisions were recommended by the Joint Chiefs in their Oct. 6 memorandum, which were concurred in by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense in his letter of Oct. 13 with the request that the JCS views be incorporated into the reply to the French aide-mémoire. These revisions are noted in footnotes below.

3. Telegram 1394 from Paris, Sept. 4, not printed. (780.5/9–452)
4. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. III, Part 1, p. 573.
5. Not found in Department of State files. Entitled “Progress on Command Arrangements for Mediterranean and Middle East,” this paper was considered at the Eighth Session of the North Atlantic Council, which met in Rome, Nov. 24–28, 1951. For documentation, see ibid., pp. 693 ff.
6. The words “on the military level” were recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their memorandum of Oct. 6.
7. The substance of this paragraph was entirely new and was inserted by the Department of State in pursuance of a recommendation made by the Joint Chiefs in their Oct. 6 memorandum.