Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417

No. 109
Department of State Minutes of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting¹

top secret

[Washington,] November 28, 1952.

Present

• General Bradley
• General Vandenberg
• General Collins
• General Lemnitzer
• General Lee
• General Slaton Bradley
• General Cabell
• General Shepherd (Marine)
• Mr. Nash
• Mr. Hoopes
• Adm. Wooldridge
• Mr. Bruce
• Mr. Matthews
• Mr. Bohlen
• Mr. Nitze
• Mr. Byroade
• Mr. Jernegan
• Mr. Bonbright
• Mr. Ferguson Daspit
• Mr. Stelle
• [Mr. Bissell]

General Bradley explained that the JCS had arranged this briefing session for the State Department in reply to the Department’s request for an appreciation of the problem of holding the Middle East and the force requirements involved. He said that the Joint Chiefs had not as yet made a detailed study of the Middle East and that for purposes of this presentation, principal reliance would have to be placed on British estimates. The estimates presented were based on a joint US–UK field study and were the best currently available. Undoubtedly they would be further improved as we secured better intelligence on the capabilities of the Near Eastern countries, concerning which as yet we have relatively little first hand information. They will also be subject to change on the basis of such further information on enemy capabilities as may be afforded by intelligence operations and reconnaissance. The basic strategic concept in this appreciation—the holding of the “outer ring”—was British. It involved the holding of a line based on the Taurus Mountains in Southern Turkey and the Zagros Mountains in Iraq and Iran, and would thus safeguard the major oil production areas of the Middle East. The nature of the terrain was such that, to carry beyond the mountain line, a Russian offensive would have to funnel through mountain defiles or passes; thus the ground defense of the area would involve primarily the task of holding these passes.

The estimated threat and the forces in terms of US divisions needed to meet the threat were shown in a table reproduced below:

	The Threat	Needed To meet threat
	Ground		Reserves
Cilician Gates	2 divs. D+5 5 Divs. D+7	3 Divs.	2 inf.
Malatya Pass	2 divs. D+5 6 Divs. D+7	4 Divs.	1 armored
Ruwandiz Pass	1⅓ divs. D+I-D+4	1⅓ Div.
Senna Pass	⅔ divs. D+I-D+4
Partak Pass	5 divs. D+I-D+4	3 div.	2 inf.
Khurammabad Pass	2 divs. D+I-D+4	1 div.	1 armored
Bandar Abbas	⅓ divs. D+I-D+4	⅔ div.
Total	20⅓ divs.	17 inf., Air	2 armored
1,400 Tactical A/C		1,200 A/C

Aircraft requirments shown are exclusive of assistance which might be provided by aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean.

In addition to the ground forces shown in the table, the Soviets might also drop up to three airborne brigades at any place behind the line. One could get some idea of the scope of the operations involved in this plan by comparing the length of the line, which was approximately 1,780 miles, with the 150 mile length presently held by the United Nations in Korea.

The Soviets’ principal naval effort would be directed at the disruption of sealines. In the Mediterranean, the threat would be minor at first but would increase as the Soviets conquered Mediterranean ports. The principal Soviet effort in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf would be mine laying from the air.

The following forces are presently available to meet a Soviet offensive:

Now Available to Meet Requirements

	Ground	Air	Sea
Turkey	9 inf. 1 armd. div.
UK	1 inf.	UK 250 A/C
Jordan	⅓ inf.
Iraq	⅔ inf.
Total	11 inf. 1 armd. div.
Deficit	6 inf. 1 armd. div.	950	30—40 AMS

Necessary logistical and support troops represent an additional ground deficiency, not shown in the table. Of the 1200 aircraft required, the UK has only about 136 presently available, but these might be built up to 250 within a relatively short period. The Turkish Air Force could be utilized for limited support of ground forces but no other assistance is in sight and the net deficit would stand at around 950 aircraft. Naval air strength in the Mediterranean might provide some assistance, but this would be necessarily limited. The only Naval deficits would be approximately 30 to 40 coastal craft and mine sweepers.

By 1955 it might be possible to build up the following defensive strength in the area.

Possibly available by 1955 to Meet Requirements

	Ground	Air		Sea
Turkey	9 inf. 1 armd.
UK	1 inf. 1 armd.	UK	465
Iraq	2 inf.	Turkey	75
Iran	1 inf.	Israel	80
		Total	620
Israel	2 inf.
	16 inf. 2 armed. div.
Deficit	1 inf.		580	3040 AMS

On the basis of the build-up assumed in the above table there would be in 1955 a ground deficit of one infantry division plus the necessary supporting troops and an air deficit of about 580 planes, the equivalent of eight US wings. It was possible that Australia and New Zealand might assist in meeting the ground force deficiencies and the aircraft deficit might be reduced somewhat by the use of carrier planes.

General Bradley emphasized that the figures for potential ground strength were based on the most optimistic assumptions. It was also necessary to make clear that the sources of equipment for the additional ground forces shown had not been determined and that UK build-up capabilities were not known. The requirements for troop transport and logistic support were omitted because these must depend on the detailed plans adopted.

General Bradley concluded his presentation by emphasizing the need for the early establishment of a Middle East Defense Organization which would do the military planning required and urged that the maximum effort be made to solve as much of the Middle East political problem as possible.

Mr. Bruce: Does the estimate of the net build-up required by 1955 imply no increase in U.S.S.R. strength available for a Middle East attack?

General Bradley: That is correct. The Soviets have had the same total number of divisions for the last several years. Although they are constantly improving the quality of existing forces there has been no increase in quantity.

General Collins: The estimates assume that the attack on the Middle East would be part of a world war and the forces shown are those which it is estimated the Soviets could support in the Middle East.

Mr. Bruce: The estimates also reflect our knowledge of present Soviet troop dispositions, do they not?

General Bradley: Yes. And they also take into account lines of communication and the forces which could be supported over these lines.

Mr. Bruce: Is it assumed that the attacking forces would be exclusively Russian?

General Bradley: No. We must take into account the possibility that some satellite forces would be used in an attack against Western Turkey.

General Collins: What we have here is an estimate of what the U.S.S.R. and its satellites could do against the Middle East while moving simultaneously against Europe and the Far East. G–2 estimates that they would have 23 to 24 divisions available out of a grand total of 175.

General Bradley: The estimates assume that after the Turkish retreat to the Taurus Mountain line, there would be 10 Turkish divisions left. Naturally, we hope that the Turks would be able to hold a line farther forward. We cannot assume however that the Turks will provide any portion of the estimated force deficiency outside of Turkey.

General Collins: The nature and direction of the Russian threat will depend on what they consider to be the most important strategic objective. Is it the Suez or Persian-Iraqi oil? If it is the oil, they might succeed in taking this objective without attacking Turkey at all.

Mr. Matthews: Would there not be an advantage in attempting to create the six additional Turkish divisions which have been discussed from time to time?

General Collins: There is no doubt but what six mobile Turkish divisions would constitute a potent threat on the flank of a Russian advance. However, if the objective is the oil fields of Iran and Iraq, they could reach these while by-passing Turkey entirely.

Mr. Byroade: What are our estimates as to the speed of the UK build-up?

General Bradley: By D+6 months they would expect to have a total of 5 divisions in the area. The 2 divisions shown in the table would be in the area on D-day. There will be some problem as to where to station these forces if the British evacuate the Suez. Some of them could be placed in Cyprus, of course.

General Collins: It will also be a problem to find a place to stockpile the necessary ammunition and equipment. As far as troops are concerned, we might have a very useful addition if we could bring Pakistan to cooperate. Of course, we realize a settlement with India will be necessary before this is possible.

Mr. Byroade: We have received a pretty clear indication that the Pakistanis would join with us provided that sufficient equipment was promised to make possible a really substantial build-up of Pakistani forces. Any such move as this would of course run directly into the Kashmir problem² but we may have to meet this one head on, sooner or later.

Mr. Matthews: The table shows no contribution from the Commonwealth. Isn’t it possible to get some forces from Australia, New Zealand and South Africa?

General Bradley: None of these countries has any peace-time military establishment so that forces must be raised, trained, organized and equipped. It would be a good performance to have any forces from these countries in action in the Middle East inside a year after hostilities begin.

Mr. Nitze: The air deficiency looks very serious.

General Vandenberg: That is largely a question of equipment and what can be made available.

General Bradley: The difficulty is the great expense of maintaining airforces. Even when we have promising personnel with which to build up indigenous forces, this can only be done at the cost of a substantial contribution from the United States. We are discovering this in Turkey.

General Collins: The Turks can barely maintain the ground forces they have now. Air strength comes at our expense.

Mr. Jernegan: Must we also consider the possibility of a Soviet attack on Afghanistan and Pakistan simultaneously with a thrust through Iran?

General Bradley: Yes, that must be considered a definite possibility. The U.S.S.R. would be very concerned about the airfields in these countries which are very close to important Russian strategic targets. Unless there is sufficient strength in being to serve as a deterrent, the U.S.S.R. would probably move to eliminate this threat.

General Vandenberg: When I was in India recently I found that in spite of the official line of the Indian political leaders, the military officials are very concerned about the Communist threat. The Chinese Communists are building important airfields in the area just North of India and Communist intentions do not appear as peaceful as Nehru asserts.

Mr. Byroade: Should we now make plans with the British to attempt to hold a piece of the area before 1955?

General Collins: Before we answer that we have got to decide what our main interest is. Is it oil, the gate-way to Africa, or the Arab States? What you decide will affect substantially what you do. I think we could probably hold the Suez, but there is no chance to hold the Persian Gulf. In the event of war, no one is going to get refined oil products out of the Middle East. The refineries can be readily put out of commission by air attacks. As for unrefined products, the Soviets won’t get much. There is only one railroad from the oil producing areas into Russia and this is highly vulnerable. There is also one highway over which the oil could be trucked but the Russians lack tank cars. The West will not get much oil either. The pipelines to the Mediterranean could be easily broken while the entry to the Persian Gulf is so narrow that passage by ship could be interdicted by land forces moving to the Bandar Abbas area. We should make plans now to fight without Middle East oil and should take the steps necessary to develop adequate alternative sources in Canada, Mexico and elsewhere.

Mr. Matthews: But we are agreed that MEDO should be established and that the Arabs should be included in the organization. If we bring them in, we must do something to convince them that we are interested in their defense.

General Bradley: As I see it, the MEDO objectives will be largely political. From the military point of view, it would be enormously easier to hold the inner ring which would involve pulling back to the Malatya Pass and maintaining a line Southward parallel to the Mediterranean Coast. …

Mr. Nitze: Wouldn’t the air requirements be as great for the inner ring as the outer ring?

General Bradley: The requirements for support aviation would certainly be less.

Mr. Byroade: If we get Congressional authority in line with the State-Defense request for Middle East military funds, should we begin to shoot next year at meeting 1955 requirements?

General Bradley: Anything we do on the basis of the authority requested will necessarily be of a token character. The funds involved will not permit anything larger. Actually, before we start any large-scale effort to build up indigenous forces I think we would want more evidence of the willingness of the Middle East states to cooperate. We will want to have the Middle East Defense Organization a going concern. This would parallel NATO development, where the organization was established and the foundation laid before any substantial programs were begun.

Mr. Bissell: In the table of force contributions by 1955, only certain Middle East states are included. Why are Egypt and Syria, for example, omitted?

General Bradley: You must remember this is a UK estimate. Possibly the British expected to secure smaller units from Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. One of the factors considered was certainly the difficulties of the supply situation.

General Collins: You have got to remember there is only one railroad line on the outer ring and, properly speaking, only one road. There is no provision in this estimate for logistical support and the whole thing is constructed on the most optimistic assumptions possible. For example, Iraq and Jordanian divisions are equated with those of the UK and Turkey.

Mr. Bissell: If we decided to support more air forces in the area, what would be the best way? Should we attempt to build up indigenous forces as in Turkey?

General Bradley: If we move forward with the MEDO and plan in terms of a forward line we must count on the use of some indigenous forces.

General Vandenberg: Air strength for the area must be US and Turkey. We might be able to teach the nationals of some of the other states to fly but to teach proper maintenance of equipment would be impossible inside of 4 or 5 years. The Turks, on the other hand, have made considerable progress in learning to maintain equipment.

Mr. Nitze: Should we try to do anything about building up air fields in the area?

General Vanderberg: We should always bear in mind the danger involved in constructing air fields in areas which we are unable to defend. They are easy to capture and to operate and unless we have air units to defend them we will be making a present to the enemy.

General Collins: To hold air fields you have got to have ground forces and anti-aircraft. There is no use to build up air fields unless you provide for their defense.

Mr. Nitze: What about air fields for the defense of the Suez?

General Vandenberg: There is already in Egypt and the Mediterranean littoral a fair complex of fields which could be used by modern aircraft.

General Collins: We have talked about the difficulties involved in our attempt to hold the outer ring. By the same token it would be very difficult for Russia to support forces for an attack on the Canal.

General Bradley: Some think it would be impossible for the Russians to launch a substantial attack on the Canal until they captured some Mediterranean ports and moved down the coast.

1. The meeting was held in the Pentagon at 3:45 p.m. A notation on the first page of the minutes reads: “Draft not cleared by any participants.”
2. For documentation, see vol. XI, Part 2, pp. 1162 ff.