Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

780.5/11–2052: Telegram

No. 108
The Ambassador in India (Bowles) to the Department of State¹

secret

New Delhi, November 20, 1952—7 p.m.

2119. Ref cirtel 544, Nov 13.² Organizations such as UN, NATO, MEDO, ANZUS and bilateral arrangements are beginning of effective collective security system which is vital to world security and therefore to US security.

On these grounds no sensible person cld question creation of MEDO or eventual inclusion of Pak in its orbit. For reason of geography, history, politics, economics and religion, future Pak is closely linked with that of countries to its immed west and they with Pak. In face of threat of Sov aggression all of them must sooner or later hang together or assuredly they may hang separately.

I wld however raise two serious points regarding recent agreement to invite Pak to participate in MEDO at this time. These points relate to effect on other ME countries such as Iran, Afghan and India and to concept of participation itself. I, of course, speak without authority of intimate knowledge of Iran and Afghan.

I wonder, however, if Pak participation MEDO at this time may not increase Sov pressures on these two countries, and if Afghans and Iranians will not resent any move to strengthen org in which they do not participate. Wld welcome views of Ambs Henderson and Ward.

On India’s reaction I can speak with far more knowledge and assurance. There is no doubt whatsoever that India will be deeply resentful and fol developments appear inevitable.

1. GOI and public opinion leaders will accept move as confirmation London rumored US deal for a Pak base.

2. It will be assumed that US–UK res on Kashmir which everyone here both in and out of govt considers strongly pro-Pak and anti-India is down payment for these bases.

3. Fact that UK, France and South Africa, all of which are regarded in Asia as colonial powers are assoc with move will be accepted as evidence that US is party to an effort to perpetuate a dying colonial order in name of collective security.

4. Timing of this move following election of new US admin will indicate that a basic change of US fon policy with greater emphasis on military is already under way.

5. Effect on US-Indian relations will certainly include extreme coolness and increasing tendency to reject sincerity of our views on such broader issues as Korea, NATO and disarmament. Bitter statements will surely be made here by Nehru and others which will stimulate similar responses in US. As a result Indian economic aid situation will face new difficulties. Much of the ground gained in them last several months will be lost.

6. Soviet and Commie Chi will be given a shiny new propaganda weapon with which to “prove” that US has at long last “shown its true imperialistic colors”.

7. Ind–Pak relations will become far more explosive and any hope of settling Kashmir dispute will be greatly reduced. Although these reactions may appear both ridiculous and unrealistic to Dept they are almost certain to materialize and they will come from many sincere Indians ardently anti-Commie and pro-US. It wld be the worst kind of folly for us to brush them aside.

I hope that the Dept will consider carefully my October 28 letter to the Secy³ on what we believe to be the danger India’s slipping behind the Iron Curtain in next few years and direct and indirect results of such a disaster. Whatever mil benefits may be derived from participation of Pak in MEDO must be carefully weighed against the certain reaction here.

The dangers to US-Ind relations cld be lessened somewhat by broadening concept of MEDO participation to include Iran, Afghan, India and even Ceylon as well as Pak. If that were done—even with certainty of refusal by one or all, at least India wld have less basis for imagining participation were directed against her. But regardless of how the cloth is cut Dept must understand that this proposal will have serious repercussions here.⁴

Bowles

1. Repeated to Karachi, Kabul, Tehran, and London.
2. Supra.
3. For text, see vol. XI, Part 2, p. 1668.
4. Telegram 1595 to New Delhi, Nov. 28, not printed, informed the Embassy the Department of State was keenly aware of the possibility of an adverse Indian reaction and desired to minimize that reaction in every way. It added that continuing consideration was being given to the problem, and no approach had yet been made to Pakistan. (780.5/11–2052)