Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

760.5/11–1654: Telegram

No. 714
The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Riddleberger) to the Department of State¹

secret

Belgrade, November 16, 1954—7 p.m.

397. For Hensel.

1. Following my consultation in Washington and Paris, I asked for an interview with Tito upon return to Belgrade. This was promptly accorded and I spent over an hour with him today. I had in mind, of course, both Deptel 2523 to London and Rome’s 1844 to Department² as well as previous telegrams re Yugoslav association to Western Defense Organizations, and therefore did not urge any action on Tito but rather tried to ascertain his thinking.

2. I opened discussion by expressing our gratification at Trieste settlement and hope that it will lead to closer Italo-Yugo collaboration in many fields. I expressed thanks for the cordial reception given Stassen here, and offered some general comment on the Tempo visit. Re latter Tito said that corn crop had not been as good as expected and that, as we knew, the wheat situation was serious. Tempo would give comprehensive explanation in Washington.

3. On normalization, I informed Tito of nature of press comment in US, said that some had been adverse, but it was also recognized that Soviet overtures represented a back-down of anti-Yugoslav campaign and is thus a tribute to Yugoslav policy. I recalled what Tito had said to Murphy and me at Brioni re long-term Soviet policy (Embtel 222, September 18³) asked what his present opinion was. Tito replied that Soviet possibly would like to give normalization another connotation and imply Yugoslavia was returning to where it formerly was. That was by no means Yugoslav conception of normalization which wanted no such relationship and there should be no apprehensions that Yugoslavia would return to former status. Yugoslav Government is realistic in dealing with Soviets and has received several painful lessons in course of its earlier relationship, including such matters as trade. Furthermore, in response to my inquiry of effect of normalization on Balkan military alliance, Tito said Yugoslav policy would not waver. He thought that Yugoslav determination to resist any return to an earlier relationship might cause USSR to react unfavorably but Yugoslav Government had no sentimentality in dealing with Soviets and fully intended to maintain its independence and security.

4. This brought us to latest Soviet note proposing a conference and Tito jocularly characterized it as a “hurried job”. He said Yugoslav Government had not yet received an official text but from reading it in the newspapers he was struck by fashion in which all the ingredients were spelled out as in a recipe and the only thing to do was to cook the dish in accordance with Soviet ideas. Furthermore anyone could see that such a conference would be impossible to convoke on such short notice. But there was a change in USSR and West should not refuse proposals without considering every aspect of them. I recalled here what Secretary had said on November 9 about how Soviet would regard conference. Tito thought that correct but said he was convinced that internal conditions were having their effect on Soviet foreign policy. He added somewhat wryly that Yugoslavia from its own experience knew some of the bills that were now coming in for past mistakes.

. . . With reference to possibility of informal liaison arrangements, he was planning to discuss this with his military chiefs and consequently had no immediate suggestions. When I asked about possibility of low-level military changes between Yugoslavia and Italy, he laughed and said let’s keep this to cultural affairs at present.

6. Tito then volunteered information that there will shortly be important meeting of Defense Council where discussion of defense budget will come up. He said I was no doubt aware of the pressures to cut defense spending in view of Yugoslav economic difficulties, but that he was not ready to cede. I replied this news would be welcomed in Washington. He then referred briefly to military conversations in Washington in summer of 1953 and said this question was also coming up in Defense Council and Yugoslav Government would be in touch with us later.

Riddleberger

1. Repeated for information to Ankara, Athens, London, Paris (for USRO and Gruenther), and Rome.
2. Neither printed.
3. Document 702.