Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

768.00/10–2654

No. 708
Memorandum by Raymond L. Thurston of the Office of Eastern European Affairs to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Elbrick)¹

secret

[Washington,] October 26, 1954.

Subject:

• “Normalization” of Yugoslav-Soviet relations.

problem:

To evaluate the significance for US policy-making purposes of the recently accelerated pace of “normalization” of relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet orbit.

[Here follow a recapitulation of recent developments, background of the Yugoslav-Soviet split, and a “Discussion” section.]

conclusions:

1. Nothing that has occurred to date gives any real indication that the assumption on which American policy vis-à-vis Yugoslavia is based is no longer valid. On practical matters involving Yugoslavia’s security and regional defense against possible aggression, Tito’s cooperation with the West is likely to be undiminished.

2. Yugoslavia will probably continue to respond favorably to Soviet bloc overtures in the economic, diplomatic and cultural fields as long as this is in Yugoslavia’s own interest, does not jeopardize Yugoslavia’s economic, cultural and military ties with Western nations, and does not interfere with the continued receipt of essential economic and military aid from the U.S. Cooperation with the Soviet orbit beyond this point could only be induced by a fundamental shift of Moscow’s policy of dominating its satellites.

3. In Western European and world (including United Nations) diplomatic and political affairs, Yugoslavia will attempt to play a more vigorous role which may not be responsive to specific United States foreign policy goals. This is not particularly disturbing since US policy has never bargained on (and has frequently not received) Yugoslav political or diplomatic support in these questions.

4. To determine the extent to which Tito’s re-evaluation of Soviet intentions and of the changed East-West cold war situation will affect Yugoslavia’s actual collaboration with the West on the pragmatic basis evolved since 1949, US approaches to Belgrade with new proposals in the economic and military cooperation spheres might draw out the Yugoslav position on that country’s prospective relations with the West during the next few years.

5. In the unlikely event that the foregoing approaches indicate the existence of Yugoslav tendencies for excessive free-wheeling between East and West or for a desire to sacrifice ties with the West in order to cultivate links with the Soviet bloc, US programs involving aid for Yugoslavia, if continued at all in these circumstances, might produce more results if applied on a discreet short-term, short-tether basis which intentionally aimed at preventing complete Yugoslav viability in the economic and military fields.

1. Drafted by Mark. Copies were sent to Belgrade and Moscow and distributed to various offices and bureaus within the Department of State. This memorandum is also presumably the one referred to by Merchant in his brief letter of Oct. 29 to Allen Dulles, in which he wrote that the attached memorandum, dated Oct. 26, concerning the present situation in Yugoslavia, was the one he had mentioned to Dulles in the Secretary of State’s office that noon and that it seemed to coincide closely with CIA’s estimate. (EUR files, lot 59 D 233, “Yugoslavia”)