Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 5406 Series

No. 688
Statement of Policy by the National Security Council¹

top secret
NSC 5406/1

[Washington, February 6, 1954.]

United States Policy Towards Yugoslavia

(U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia may be seriously affected by the future course of the Trieste controversy. However, the following statement of policy was prepared on the assumption that its implementation would not be precluded by developments connected with Trieste.)

general considerations

1. The continued denial of Yugoslavia to the Soviet bloc is of great strategic importance to the security of the Free World. Because of its geographic position and potentially strong army, an independent Yugoslavia denies important assets to the Soviet bloc and reduces the Soviet threat to the internal and external security of Greece and Italy. . . .

2. Politically and psychologically, the “Tito heresy” has provided the West with an important asset. It represented the first defection of a Communist Government from the Soviet orbit, challenging Kremlin control of world communism as an instrument of Soviet imperialism. The continued independence of Yugoslavia offers a standing example of successful defiance of the Kremlin and is proof that there exists, for nationalist Communist leaders, a possible alternative to submission to Soviet Control.

3. The United States, and to a lesser degree the United Kingdom and France, have extended military and economic aid to Yugoslavia in order to insure the retention of the foregoing benefits through strengthening the will and ability of the Yugoslav nation to defend its independence. With short term objectives in mind, U.S. aid programs have been continuously reviewed on a year-to-year basis, thereby enabling the United States to influence the policies of the Tito regime in some degree. Retention of Yugoslav cooperation with the West, and maintenance and improvement of the Yugoslav armed forces, can be expected to require further outside assistance. Continued drought may further aggravate the Yugoslav economic situation.

4. Yugoslavia remains a Communist dictatorship with the strength and stability of the regime due in large measure to Tito’s dominant position. In the event of Tito’s death, a successor regime would probably attempt to continue the main outlines of his internal and external policies. However, it is possible that a struggle for power would develop, with results which cannot now be estimated.

5. The nature of the regime makes full exploitation of Yugoslav potentialities in the Western system of defense difficult to achieve. Nevertheless, under present conditions it is in the security interest of the United States to support Yugoslavia, despite its Communist regime and U.S. opposition in principle to such a regime. The balance of probability is that Yugoslavia, even if not initially attacked, would cooperate with the West in the event of general war.

6. The majority of the people of Yugoslavia are opposed to the principle and domestic policy of their Communist dictatorship, under which they perceive little hope of obtaining political and economic freedom. Nevertheless, on issues which arouse nationalist feelings the regime can count on widespread support. In the event of a Soviet or satellite invasion, there is little doubt that the Yugoslav people initially would rally to the support of Tito, and that the Yugoslav forces would offer vigorous resistance. However, under the impact of military defeats or the pressure of a long war, the possibility exists of the breakdown of organized military resistance under the Tito regime. This possibility must be regarded as an acceptable risk.

7. The death of Stalin and the apparent shift in tactics by his successors raise the possibility of a Yugoslav rapprochement with Moscow. While it would be unwise to exclude such an eventuality, it is considered unlikely as long as the Tito regime remains in power. The Kremlin may be expected to continue its efforts to undermine Tito’s domestic position and to weaken his ties with the West.

8. Although the Tito regime appears to be increasingly inclined toward greater participation in over-all European defense arrangements, the extent of Yugoslav participation is limited by such factors as Tito’s fear of alienating doctrinaire Yugoslav Communists and by his unwillingness to have Yugoslav forces serve under non-Yugoslav command. On the Western side, some non-Communist nations are reluctant to deal with Tito as an equal and an ally. Current strained relations between Italy and Yugoslavia, aggravated as they are by the Trieste issue and by Yugoslav fear and distrust of Italy’s ambitions in the Balkans, constitute a major stumbling block to realization of the full benefits of Yugoslavia’s association with Western defense. . . .

9. An attack on Yugoslavia by organized Soviet or satellite forces would probably result in general war. . . .

basic objectives

Immediate Objectives

10. Continued denial of Yugoslavia to the Soviet bloc.

11. Maximum utilization of Yugoslav potentialities on behalf of U.S. and free world objectives.

12. Without jeopardizing the objectives in paragraphs 10 and 11 above, reorientation of the Tito regime in the direction of political and economic liberalization, in order to improve the basis of popular support necessary for an effective defense effort.

Long-term Objective

13. Eventual fulfillment of the right of the Yugoslav people to live under a government of their own choosing, which maintains peaceful and stable relations with neighboring states, and participates fully in the free world community.

courses of action

14. Continue to provide military aid to Yugoslavia, where possible and appropriate in concert with the U.K. and France, to assist in creating military forces which will:

. . . . . . .

16. Continue to furnish economic and technical assistance, where possible and appropriate in concert with the UK and France, to the minimum extent necessary to accomplish U.S. objectives. In extending this assistance:

a. Avoid actions which could be interpreted as unreserved endorsement of the Tito regime or which would undermine that regime.

. . . . . . .

d. Consider Yugoslavia as an allied European nation in evaluating requests for export licenses.

e. Continue to deny to Yugoslavia, materials and equipment judged to be for use in an advanced atomic energy program. However, give the Atomic Energy Commission discretionary authority as regards the licensing for export to Yugoslavia of reasonable quantities of materials and equipment on the AEC list obviously intended for (1) basic research and instruction in the atomic energy field, (2) source material (e.g., uranium) exploration, or (3) medical use or normal industrial use.

17. Continue current efforts to negotiate a settlement of the Trieste problem.

. . . . . . .

20. As a means of strengthening Western defense and influencing the Tito regime, encourage closer ties between Yugoslavia and the nations of the free world, particularly those of Western Europe.

. . . . . . .

22. Exploit the existence, and encourage the development, of the Yugoslav-Greek-Turkish Entente as a means of weakening Soviet power in the Balkan satellites, and as an example of free association of independent Balkan nations serving as a potential alternative to Soviet rule.

23. Direct informational policy toward building Yugoslavia’s will to combat Soviet encroachment, while:

a. Avoiding endorsement of the internal policies of the Tito regime and taking account of the Yugoslav people’s hope for eventual attainment of greater political and economic freedom.

b. Avoiding antagonizing the Tito regime to the point of jeopardizing realization of our immediate objectives or inducing political aspirations among the Yugoslav peoples likely to produce disorder or unrest.

24. Encourage broader cultural contacts between Americans and Yugoslavs in the interest of building up influences within Yugoslavia favorable to the attainment of U.S. objectives, including both official and privately sponsored programs for an expanded exchange of students, intellectual leaders, military and technical personnel and private individuals.

25. In the event of attack against Yugoslavia by organized Soviet or satellite forces, the United States, in common prudence, should proceed on the assumption that global war is probably imminent. Accordingly, the United States should immediately:

a. Place itself in the best possible position to meet the increased threat of global war.

b. Consider a direct approach to the highest Soviet leaders.

c. Support action in the United Nations calling for the withdrawal of the invading forces and recommending appropriate action by member states against the aggressor.

d. Implement such of the plans prepared under paragraph 15 above as the situation may require and as may be decided in the light of the circumstances existing at the time. Insofar as there are combined plans for this contingency, action should be coordinated with the other governments concerned.

1. This Statement of Policy was one of several parts of NSC 5406/1. The other parts, were a 2-page Financial Appendix; a 32-page Staff Study; a cover sheet; and a memorandum of Feb. 6 from Gleason, in which he noted that the President that day had approved the Statement of Policy, had directed its implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies, and had designated the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency. He also noted that NSC 5406/1 accordingly superseded the existing NSC policy papers on Yugoslavia, NSC 18/2, “Economic Relations Between the United States and Yugoslavia,” Feb. 17, 1949, and NSC 18/6, “The Position of the U.S. With Respect to Yugoslavia,” Mar. 7, 1951, neither printed.