Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

PPS files, lot 65 D 101, “Yugoslavia”

No. 685
Paper Prepared in the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Intelligence (Armstrong)¹

secret

[Washington, January 18, 1954.]

The Djilas Affair

The first public ideological dispute within the ranks of the Federation of Yugoslav Communists (FCY) came to a head on January 17 when a full plenum of the Central Committee (CC) stripped Milovan Djilas, No. 3 man on the Executive Committee (old Politburo) of all of his Party positions. Djilas was also forced to resign as President of the National Assembly, a post to which he was elected on December 25, 1953.

In a recent series of articles in the FCY organ Borba, Djilas attacked the organization and work of the FCY. He suggested that the FCY should “wither away” and become a corps of ideological leaders. He criticized the Leninist concept of party dictatorship and argued that “remnants of bureaucratic tendencies” must disappear and that the state apparatus, including the secret police, should operate under the law. Most striking, he condemned as “of petty bourgeois mentality” and “cliquish” the actions of wives of high party leaders who snubbed the young wife of a Yugoslav general because she did not participate in the revolution, implying that these leaders formed a new caste or aristocracy. To this he added condemnation of party operations as outmoded and proposed the elimination of cell meetings.

Djilas’ ouster came after his stand had been criticized by Tito himself who charged that Djilas sought to bring Western democracy to Yugoslavia “at any price.” He labelled Djilas’ views as “revisionist” and “reformist opportunism.” He said that Djilas sought (1) the liquidation of the FCY; (2) the restoration of capitalist forms; and (3) the shattering of party discipline. He said Djilas had caused enormous harm to the party and the country and had brought confusion to the ranks of the Communists.

While not retracting the essence of anything he wrote, Djilas did acknowledge that he might have put things too strongly and that on some points he might not have been too clear. He admitted guilt in provoking a split within the FCY and in his “undisciplined” behavior in publishing his articles without at least discussion with some members of the Executive Committee, especially when he knew they disagreed with his views. He denied that he could ever join the “class enemy” but he did admit that “if I had continued on the same road I would have arrived at a point indicated by the comrades, that is a point in opposition to Tito’s Yugoslavia.”

The Djilas controversy has brought into the open a conflict that has apparently been raging in the Yugoslav Party for some time. This conflict has been between the strongly orthodox on the one hand and those who favored a departure from Soviet-type Party operations on the other. Tito and certain of the other top leaders themselves seemed to lean toward the latter group. Their swift reaction to Djilas’ articles was due to the fact that these went further than anything previously said and struck at the power and prestige of the entire ruling clique. Tito and his cohorts are obviously no more interested in surrendering their power to Western democracy than to Sovietism.

The disgrace of Djilas will almost certainly not end the basic conflict in the party, although it will undoubtedly lead to greater caution on the part of those advocating change. Many Yugoslav Communists, particularly those added since the end of the war (more than 80 percent of the total) are probably sympathetic to Djilas’ views. Djilas is also personally popular with the youth and with certain intellectual circles. As the No. 1 Montenegrin Communist he seems to have had a large following in that area of the country. Many Montenegrins, including a number of close associates of Djilas, have important positions in the army and security forces.

It thus appears that there are involved in the affair factors that make for instability in the Yugoslav set-up, particularly in case of Tito’s death. Tito’s own position will probably not be threatened, at least so long as peace is maintained. He will almost certainly take steps to insure tighter control, including far closer supervision over the activities of party and non-party people alike, new restrictions on the movement of Yugoslavs abroad, and increased utilization of the secret police. He probably will also slow down the trend toward de-Sovietizing Yugoslav Party and governmental practices. The basic cleavage will remain, however, and in case of a crisis will be a factor to be reckoned with.

While the question of relations with the West was an important element in the basic conflict underlying the Djilas affair, and while Djilas’ principal crime was said to be advocacy of western type democracy, it seems highly unlikely that the move against Djilas involved a decision to modify Yugoslavia’s relations with either the West or the East. Tito pointedly asserted that “it is correct that Yugoslavia is drawing closer to western democracy, not on the question of the internal system, but on the question of cooperation on the foreign political plane.” He also warned that although through the Djilas incident “we suffered a huge loss, we must not make new mistakes in going to the other extreme.” He said that Djilas’ case should not serve as an alarm that “we must again change our course because we have made an error in following it . . .² we should be much more vigilant in pursuing it.”

In the long run, however, and again particularly in case of Tito’s death, it would seem that the issue of western or eastern orientation will have to be decided more definitively. Despite Tito’s effort to brush the issue aside, the entire discussion connected with the Djilas affair indicates not only that the question of orientation remains very much alive but also that without a more thorough commitment one way or the other it will make for increasing instability.³

1. Transmitted to Bowie under cover of a memorandum of Jan. 18 from Armstrong, which stated that the paper provided more in the way of an analysis of implications than normally would be included in an intelligence report on an incident of this type. Armstrong added that he understood that this was what Bowie was principally interested in.
2. Ellipsis in the source text.

3. In a memorandum of Jan. 18 to Merchant, Barbour commented on the Djilas affair as follows:

   “There is good evidence that the substance of Djilas’ position has been a hot issue within the Yugoslav Communist Party for some time: to some degree it reflects the inevitable impact upon the Party of the relations developed with the west over the past four years. The fact that the conflict broke out publicly at such a high level, and that Tito himself found it necessary to deal severely with Djilas can, we fear, only have a negative result on the liberalization process around which so much of our policy towards Yugoslavia revolves. We can now anticipate a reassertion and solidification of communist party control over its membership, with consequent retrogressive effects on the momentum already generated towards acceptance of Western influences.” (768.00/1–1854)