761.00/8–1053: Telegram

No. 607
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State1

confidential

188. Malenkov’s speech before Supreme Soviet2 is certainly the most important and realistic statement of current Soviet policy since Stalin’s death, especially on internal affairs and should be studied most carefully by research and analysis sections US Government. It contains considerably more statistical material and realism on future internal economic and agricultural policy than has appeared for some years. Before adding Embassy’s interpretive comments to this speech I would like to mention certain personal impressions of recent session Supreme Soviet as affecting top leadership.

It was apparent from all proceedings at Supreme Soviet and attitude of his associates that Malenkov is unquestionably dominant figure in present Soviet leadership. In addition Malenkov is by far the best Soviet orator that any foreigner present in Moscow can recall. He is extremely clear and forceful speaker and creates impression of great realism and self-confidence. Malenkov’s speech and measures adopted by Supreme Soviet make it clear that Beria removal has not brought about a reversal in any major policy lines that have been emerging since Stalin’s death.

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As to speech itself, section on internal economic policy is in Embassy’s opinion more interesting than that devoted to foreign affairs. It is apparent that present leadership and particularly Malenkov himself is in considerably closer touch with Soviet economic reality than in time of Stalin. His account of economic situation, deficiencies and requirements was sober and factual. It is especially significant that it lays down a new emphasis for Soviet economic development. As is well known and as Malenkov himself said, Soviet Government has, since end NEP, concentrated its attention on expansion heavy industry and largely neglected consumers’ goods supply. Now Malenkov says USSR is able to and intends to devote great efforts to production and distribution consumers’ goods. Heavy industry will not be neglected but Malenkov deeply committed Soviet Government to devote an increased portion its economic effort to light industry and to bring about in next two to three years radical increase in supply consumers’ goods. Moreover, it is clear that government is also adopting fiscal policies and issuing directives which will provide other increased advantages, e.g., housing and hospitals to people of this country.

As an important adjunct to this plan for improving low living standards, Soviet Government is making a shift in its attitude towards peasantry. Since collectivization drive first began over 20 years ago government’s efforts have been unceasingly directed toward increasing, improving and encouraging collective sector of agriculture and toward reducing and discouraging private sector. Now Malenkov says private sector will be assisted and encouraged. Although Soviet Government has no intention of changing its basic collectivization policy, past ability of private agriculture to survive even in face of official hostility makes conceivable that line announced by Malenkov may have far reaching effects in countryside and involve regime in future difficulties with the peasantry. The reduction in agricultural taxes on private sector adopted by Supreme Soviet which is published in detail today in press will be analyzed and reported by despatch.

In section on foreign affairs, aside from implied claim on hydrogen bomb, Malenkov followed with somewhat different emphasis line which has been developing since Stalin’s death. While attacks on US somewhat sharper, this had been forecast by Soviet press in recent weeks. Malenkov seemed primarily to be expressing chronic fear of dictatorship against any appearance weakness before foreign pressure together with standard Soviet line that threats et cetera, do not work against Soviets. He was obviously attempting to paint picture of international scene in which all countries except US are interested in reducing international tension while US is solely interested in “cold war”. In this he was shrewd enough to [Page 1212] pick out incidents such as chess players and statements which lend themselves to this interpretation. While maintaining Soviet adherence to principles of settlement of disputes by negotiation, including those at issue between USA and Soviet Union, Malenkov avoided any specific mention of Four-Power conference and merely stated that “negotiations between the great powers could of course play a considerable role. Naturally the appropriate premises must be created for this”. The brevity and vagueness of Malenkov’s remarks on this portion increases Embassy’s belief that USSR not particularly eager for highly publicized conference at this time but seems to favor other forms diplomatic negotiation. Reference to China’s right to UN seat has become obligatory gesture to China in present Soviet statements but on Germany Malenkov was somewhat more specific in his flat opposition to German rearmament and his attempt to establish identity Soviet-French interests on this point. In passing over relations with UK with one brief phrase Malenkov may be attempting to contrast unfavorably present British policy with that expressed by Churchill in May.3

In general, with exception noted, Malenkov’s speech in foreign section as well represents continuance and emphasis main line of Soviet policy since Stalin’s death which tend to bear out view that these changes stem from sources deeper than simple maneuver or even function of palace intrigues.4

Bohlen
  1. Repeated for information to Paris, London, and Bonn.
  2. For extensive extracts from this address, delivered on Aug. 8, see Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1953, pp. 22–33.
  3. Reference is presumably to Churchill’s foreign policy address to the House of Commons on May 11; see Document 595.
  4. Secretary Dulles offered his own extensive analysis of Malenkov’s address during his press and radio news conference on Aug. 12; for text of the statement, see Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 24, 1953, p. 236.