Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

State–PSB files, lot 62 D 333, “PSB Documents”

No. 570
Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright) to the Under Secretary of State (Smith)¹

top secret

[Washington,] March 18, 1953.

• Subject:
• Agenda Item No. 1, PSB Meeting March 19, Draft Outline Plan for Psychological Exploitation of Stalin’s Death, draft of March 13, 1953.

Background

This is a revision of the paper of the same title discussed at a meeting of the National Security Council on March 11² and referred to the Special Assistant to the President for Cold War Operations for revision in the light of comments made at the time.

Discussion

The present version of March 13 follows in large part the earlier version on which the Department commented in your memorandum to Mr. George A. Morgan, Acting Director of the PSB, on March 10.³ The new version does, however, contain several alternative readings and suggested revisions concerning which detailed comment at the meeting of the Board probably would not be profitable.

Recommendations

1. That with regard to Part I, which establishes the framework of the plan you express the view that, the need for taking prompt and effective psychological action is acknowledged, although the real limitations imposed upon our psychological capabilities at the time are not sufficiently taken into account. Further, you might express the view that the Department believes that the paper fails to indicate with sufficient clarity and emphasis the longer-range aspects of the situation created by the death of Stalin and the succession of Malenkov. Some time may elapse before the divisive forces inherent in the power situation in the USSR mature into a severe strain on the new regime. The initial and immediate actions called for should therefore be so taken as not to compromise successful action that may be required in the future. This view is supported by the conclusions reached in Special Estimate No. 39 of March 12 entitled “Probable Consequences of the Death of Stalin and of the Elevation of Malenkov to Leadership in the USSR.” You might add that the Department prefers version A rather than version B of the aims set forth in the section on “Strategic Concept” on page 6 of Part I. Recommendations for changes in the language of the revised paper of March 13 are being transmitted under separate cover to Mr. Morgan and members of the PSB.

2. With regard to Part II of the paper “Plans for Psychological Operations,” you might recommend that discussion of overt and covert psychological operations be completely separate in order to facilitate ready handling and appropriate declassification of sections of the paper. This can readily be accomplished by a slight rearrangement of the order. The specific tasks set forth for the overt media have been refined, sharpened and elaborated on the basis of recommendations made in the document and of the views of the geographic bureaus in the Department. Proposed revisions of Part II referred to above are set forth in the paper being transmitted under separate cover to Mr. Morgan and members of the PSB.

3. As for Part III, “Recommendations for Political, Military and Economic Substantive Actions”, you might say that the Department reaffirms the position taken in its memorandum to Mr. Morgan of March 10. The Department recognizes the need for coordinated political, military and economic action in taking advantage of the situation that now exists but the Department continues to believe that Part III should be dropped from the paper and decisions along the lines suggested should be considered at such time as heightened pressure is determined to be desirable.

1. Phillips (P) and Nitze (S/P) concurred in this memorandum.
2. See Document 566. The draft plan referred to is not printed.
3. Document 562.