Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

No. 563
Memorandum by the Administrative Assistant to the President (Hughes) to the President

top secret

Washington, March 10, 1953.

Subject:

• Diplomatic and Propaganda Situation Created by Stalin’s Death

As you know, the opportunities and problems in this situation have been lengthily explored by all agencies concerned for the last several days.

This report briefly summarizes the division of opinion now clearly apparent and certain to be expressed in detail at tomorrow’s NSC meeting.¹ It has been reflected in conferences with C. D. Jackson and his special task force,² with Mr. Bohlen, and in a report the latter has sent me of his and General Smith’s attitude.³

The debate turns on the proposition that: (1) the U.S. should propose in a message to the Soviet Union a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, France, Great Britain and the U.S. (2) this should be made public in a short speech by you, stating the proposal and the underlying purposes in making it.

This line of political warfare is urged by Mr. Jackson, and the report prepared by his special committee—elaborating propaganda techniques to be exploited at this time—is virtually predicated entirely on this action. It is favored with the contentions that:

(1) The present offers a unique opportunity to exploit all stresses and strains within the Soviet system.

(2) A substantial speech and proposal by you is necessary to seize the political initiative, to get and keep the Soviets on the defensive.

(3) The concrete proposal for a Foreign Ministers’ meeting would (a) probably present the new Soviet leadership with a sudden problem which it is unprepared to handle (b) if rejected, give the U.S. a huge propaganda advantage and (c) if accepted, give us the opportunity to press our case on a variety of points—from Germany to Korea—against an opponent who has not had time to collect his wits.

(4) It would be political folly to allow the new Soviet leadership time to compose itself, assure domestic order and resume the foreign initiative.

This approach was quite fully explored in a meeting Mr. Jackson and I had with “Chip” Bohlen and Paul Nitze, head of State’s Policy Planning Board.⁴

The latter have reviewed the whole scene with General Smith and the top officers of the Department of State. Mr. Bohlen has reported to me their disagreement with the above. Their reasons can be summarized:

(1) The immediate present is probably not the time of maximum opportunity in dealing with the new Soviet leadership. For the present, this leadership is bound into unity by a forced sense of urgency—a we-must-hang-together-or-we-shall-hang-separately state of mind. Stress and dissension will take time, some weeks or months, to manifest themselves.

(2) Any serious proposal of the nature of a Foreign Ministers meeting would demand careful prior consultation with the British and French—demanding at least some delay before it could be made.

(3) Without the content of such a proposal, a Presidential speech would have neither substance nor clearly defined purpose.

(4) The announcement of a proposed or agreed-upon Foreign Ministers meeting would tend to throw into low gear all the work on the EDC—whose acceleration has just been urged so strongly on Mr. Eden.

As you can see, all this resolves itself into a clear, simple conflict between two propositions:

a. Presented a unique opportunity to exploit the deep and inherent weaknesses of the Soviet system, we cannot afford to fail to act affirmatively and quickly.

b. Presented a situation of unknown potentialities, we can well afford to give the internal stresses of the Soviet system time to become acute—and, in the meanwhile, nothing is better calculated to increase Soviet nervous strain than studied American silence.

Emmet J. Hughes

1. See Document 566.
2. Presumably reference is to the ad hocPSB Working Party which prepared the “Draft Outline of Plan for Psychological Exploitation of Stalin’s Death”, not printed. Regarding the final version of the plan, see footnote 2, supra.
3. Presumably reference is to a letter of Mar. 9 from Bohlen to Hughes. (Bohlen files, lot 74 D 349, “PSB Meetings”)
4. No record of such a meeting has been found.