Office of the Historian

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “USSR”

No. 560
Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze) to the Secretary of State1

top secret
[Washington,] March 10, 1953.

Subject:

  • Exploitation of Stalin’s Death

In the event that it is decided that the next few days are not the best time to exploit the situation created by Stalin’s death, it is possible that a real possibility may arise in the next few months. The following program is suggested for your consideration to exploit such a possibility:

a.
That we make a settlement of the Korean armistice issue the principal immediate target. A settlement of this issue would be important (1) in improving our military strategic flexibility; (2) in removing a point of potential danger to the Western alliance and thus increasing our political flexibility; and (3) in creating a situation in which the possibilities of developing rifts between Mao and Malenkov, and possibly within the Soviet regime, would be enhanced.
b.
That we make this effort in a serious, therefore covert, way rather than as part of a propaganda program.
c.
That we be prepared to take substantial risks and pay substantial costs in order to achieve success.

A more detailed spelling out of the above might include the following elements:

a.
Getting Bohlen to Moscow within the next week or two.
b.
Dropping exploratory hints in Moscow or to Soviet or satellite diplomats at the U.N. or elsewhere that serious negotiations on non-Korean matters could be held if, but only if, the Korean armistice issue could be settled and then seeing what reaction we get.
c.
Following General Clark’s recommendation, release to the ROK economy the 35,000 North Korean POW non-returnees now held by us, but not the 15,000 Chinese non-returnees.
d.
Bohlen to approach Molotov to initiate negotiations regarding a Korean settlement. Our position should contain an overtone of really significant military action in the event the negotiations were unsuccessful. This overtone should be no mere bluff.2
e.
We should be prepared to offer an all for all exchange of prisoners except for the 15,000 Chinese non-repatriates whose disposition would be the subject of the subsequent political discussion contemplated by the Armistice Agreement.
f.
At an appropriate time, the President might make a speech somewhat along the lines of the Hughes’ draft,3 but making a highlevel meeting contingent on the prior settlement of the Korean armistice issue.

Paul H. Nitze

  1. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “Used at NSC Briefing, 3–10–53.” Such a briefing, presumably held in the Department of State in advance of the NSC meeting of Mar. 11 (see Document 566), has not been further identified.

    An earlier version of this memorandum, dated Mar. 9, virtually identical to the text printed here, is in Bohlen files, lot 74 D 349, “PSB Meetings.”

    ↩
  2. The entire paragraph “d.” in the source text was circled in pencil and a handwritten notation on the margin reads: “No. W. B. Smith.”↩
  3. Not found in Department of State files or the Eisenhower Library.↩