Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

INR–NIE files

No. 552
Special Estimate¹

top secret
SE–36

[Washington,] 5 March 1953.

Soviet Capabilities for Attack on the US Through Mid-1955

the problem

To estimate the capabilities of the USSR to attack the continental US by open or clandestine means, through mid-1955.

scope

This estimate is concerned solely with Soviet gross capabilities for attack on the continental US during the period mid-1953 to mid-1955. It does not attempt to assess whether the USSR intends to attack the US during that period or what courses of action the USSR would adopt before, along with, or after such an attack. Furthermore, the paper estimates Soviet gross capabilities for attack on the US without reference to any commitments of military forces which the USSR might make elsewhere and without reference to any advantages which the USSR might gain for an attack on the US by previously occupying territory that is not now within the Soviet Bloc.

part i

Soviet Gross Capabilities

[Here follow approximately 6 pages of the pages 8¼ of the source text. The omitted portion includes sections headed “Soviet Mass Destruction Weapons”, “Delivery of Conventional and Mass Destruction Weapons by Aircraft”, “Delivery of Conventional and Mass Destruction Weapons by Other Means”, and “Attack on the US with Conventional Naval and Airborne Forces”.]

part ii

Certain Factors Affecting Soviet Employment of the Foregoing Capabilities Assuming a Soviet Decision To Attack the U.S.

33. The Soviet rulers would expect a direct attack on the United States to precipitate general war. In such a war the Soviet rulers would expect to have an initial preponderance of military power on the Eurasian continent, but in their attack upon the continental US would be concerned to prevent: (a) US retaliatory air attack on the Soviet Union with weapons of mass destruction; (b) mobilization of the superior war potential of the Western allies, particularly that of the United States; and (c) US reinforcement of anti-Soviet forces in Eurasia.

34. The Soviet rulers have demonstrated their sensitivity to the danger of US air attack with weapons of mass destruction by the high priority which they have given to the development of defenses against such an attack. Despite the substantial progress already achieved in building up their defenses, it is unlikely that they would regard their defensive capabilities as adequate to prevent substantial numbers of attacking aircraft from reaching strategic targets in the USSR. It is likely, therefore, that in initiating atomic warfare the USSR would be concerned: (a) swiftly to destroy or cripple US capabilities for retaliation in kind, with particular reference to SAC continental and overseas bases; (b) to deliver such an attack on industrial and psychological targets in the United States as would prevent, or at least hinder, the mobilization of the US war potential; and (c) to retain the means to counter any US reinforcement of Eurasia.

35. As among the available forces and weapons for attacking the continental US, the USSR’s highest capability lies in open military attack with atomic bombs delivered by TU–4 type aircraft, for the following reasons:

a. The low capabilities of conventional naval forces and airborne forces.

b. The security and technical difficulties inherent in the delivery of large numbers of atomic weapons by clandestine means, particularly in inland areas.

c. Other methods of delivery of atomic weapons are insufficiently developed for large-scale use.

d. Other mass destruction weapons are insufficiently developed or subject to other handicaps in their large-scale use.

36. The Soviet rulers might, however, employ other methods of attacking the US concurrently with or immediately following an open and direct atomic attack. In the cases of guided missiles, airborne attack, submarine bombardment, and biological warfare, Soviet capabilities at best appear to be severely limited. They have a greater capability for chemical attack in connection with, or subsequent to, atomic bombing.

37. Large-scale clandestine attack, because of the security difficulties inherent in such action and because of the obstacles to coordinating its timing with that of overt attack from the outside, is unlikely to be used immediately preceding or concurrent with an overt attack. Clandestine attack on a small scale, in the form of sabotage or biological warfare, might occur at any time, and even without an overt attack ever being launched. Subsequent to an overt attack, clandestine attack in any form could be expected to the maximum practicable extent.

38. We believe that the considerations affecting Soviet employment of their capabilities will remain throughout this period essentially the same as those outlined above.

1. Special Estimates (SEs) were high-level interdepartmental reports presenting authoritative appraisals of vital foreign policy problems on an immediate or crisis basis. SEs were drafted by officers from those agencies represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), discussed and revised by interdepartmental working groups coordinated by the Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), approved by the IAC, and circulated under the aegis of the CIA to the President, appropriate officers of cabinet level, and the National Security Council. The Department of State provided political portions of SEs.

   According to a note on the cover sheet of this SE, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated with the CIA in the preparation of this estimate. The note further indicates that all members of the IAC concurred in this estimate on Mar. 3, 1953.