Attached is a paper setting forth the Department’s suggestions regarding
the nature of stand-by instructions to be issued to all United States
official information media for use in the period immediately following
the death of Stalin. These are the
instructions the preparation of which is recommended in Paragraph 6c of
PSB document No. D–24, November 1,
1952.1
I am also authorized to inform you that Mr. Edward P.
Montgomery of the Office of Policy and Plans, IIA, and myself have been designated as the
Department’s representatives to participate in any activities which may
be undertaken to carry out recommendations 6b and 6d of the same
paper.
[Attachment]
Paper Prepared in the Department of
State2
PSB Paper No. D–24 of November 1,
1952 entitled “Psychological Preparation for Stalin’s Passing from Power” includes
the following recommendation:
6c. To avoid uncoordinated action in case of sudden death, an
agreed Government position should be prepared at once, as a
basis for stand-by instructions for the period immediately
following this contingency.
There is general agreement among those who have given consideration
to this problem that the exact conditions which will exist at the
time of Stalin’s death, be it
on the international scene or within the Soviet power structure,
cannot be foreseen. In the absence of such information, it is
impossible to issue intelligent stand-by instructions to information
media for the period immediately following Stalin’s death except in the most general terms. The
aim of such instructions should be not the immediate most effective
exploitation
[Page 1072]
of the
factors in the situation favorable to the advancement of United
States objectives, but the avoidance of blunders which will prevent
or complicate the exploitation of such factors after the situation
can be thoroughly assessed. It is believed, therefore, that all
information media under United States Government control, both overt
and covert, should be given standing instructions that in the event
of Stalin’s death they should
limit themselves to strictly factual reporting pending the receipt
of specific guidance. Such guidance should be forthcoming with a
minimum of delay in order to take maximum advantage of the situation
in the United States interest.
The reaction of the Soviet people to Stalin’s death is not easy to predict. Certainly
there will be those who will feel that a heavy yoke has been lifted
from the Russian people and that Stalin’s passing affords the opportunity for
beneficial change. Available evidence, however, seems to indicate
that the great mass of the population has been sufficiently drugged
by years of public adulation of Stalin and sufficiently impressed by the growth of
Soviet power under his leadership to ensure a widespread feeling of
genuine regret at his passing. It is important that in our eagerness
to capitalize on the situation our information media do nothing
which would do violence to this feeling if it indeed materializes.
Nor is there any valid reason to believe that the security
authorities will not be able to cope with the situation; premature
appeals for violence or resistance are therefore also to be
avoided.
One question which should be susceptible to advance determination is
that of the course to be followed by this Government with respect to
extending the customary official condolences. Three possible
variations suggest themselves: (1) the despatch of a routine message
to the Soviet Government; (2) the deliberate omission of such a
message; (3) the omission of an official message while transmitting
through United States information media a message to the Soviet
people taking note of Stalin’s
death, extending to them the hand of friendship and inviting their
cooperation in seeking a peaceful and secure world.
The first course is probably one which will be followed by most
governments maintaining diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union
unless the United States Government takes the initiative in securing
advance agreement to some other proposal. Should we follow this
course, strong adverse criticism of the Government may be
anticipated both from anti-communist circles in the United States
and from all émigré groups, Soviet and
satellite. Furthermore, an opportunity would be lost to give
encouragement to any potential resistance elements within the Soviet
Union which might
[Page 1073]
consider Stalin’s death a
favorable occasion to expand their activities.
Complete silence on the part of the United States might be exploited
by Soviet propaganda in one of two ways. It might be played down, in
which event it would probably go unnoticed by the mass of the
population; the absence of formal messages from one or another
government in the long list of published communications spread over
several days requires careful reading to be detected. Or our silence
might be interpreted as a deliberate affront to the Soviet people
and a further example of American hostility; if the feelings of
grief at Stalin’s death are
genuine, this line might be not without effect.
The third alternative steers a middle course; it forestalls the
criticism and resentment which would be occasioned by a formal
message to the Soviet Government, while at the same time offering
reassurances to the Soviet people. More importantly, it enables the
United States to seize the psychological initiative and thereafter
to exploit the developing situation as our interests may dictate. It
is recommended that plans be developed to enable us to pursue this
course. When such plans are completed they should be discussed with
other governments, particularly the NATO countries, in an effort to obtain widespread
adherence to this course of action.
