611.82/6–454

No. 488
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade)1

secret

Subject:

  • Meeting of Prime Minister of Turkey with the Secretary

Participants:

  • The Secretary
  • Prime Minister of Turkey Adnan Menderes
  • Fatin Rustu Zorlu, Deputy Prime Minister
  • Etem Menderes, Minister of Defense
  • Mr. Nuri Birgi, Under Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  • Mr. Orhan Eralp, Director General, Second Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  • Ambassador Avra Warren
  • Mr. Henry Byroade
[Page 947]

The Prime Minister of Turkey, accompanied as above, called upon the Secretary in his office at 2:35 p.m. on Friday, June 4th. The purpose of the meeting was to continue, at the Secretary’s request, a previous conversation in the Secretary’s office on June 2.2

The Secretary opened the conversation by expressing our gratitude at the initiative taken by Turkey in making the Turkish-Pakistan Pact a reality. He stated the United States looked upon this as an extremely important development which we hoped would draw other adherents.

There followed a general discussion on the possible adherence of Iraq and Iran. The Prime Minister and the Secretary both agreed upon the importance of the inclusion of these two countries as quickly as this is politically feasible. Aside from the military implications, it was agreed that the weaning away of a state such as Iraq from the negative Arab League was a good goal in itself. The Secretary mentioned the first problem in Iran is, of course, that of an oil settlement on which we were somewhat hopeful. The Prime Minister stated he felt the situation in both Iran and Iraq had improved over the past year and hoped that the United States would not hesitate to use pressure to gain these two adherents. The Secretary indicated we would not hesitate to do so when and if we thought such methods would be productive. We would, of course, wish to lean heavily upon the Prime Minister’s advice as to the timing of any such moves.

During the above general discussion it was agreed that consideration at this point of Israel’s adherence to the Pact was premature.

The Prime Minister mentioned his concern over difficulties between Afghanistan and Pakistan and their desire to see these two countries move closer to each other. The Secretary asked if they were considering becoming openly a mediator on the problems between Afghanistan and Pakistan and after some discussion it was indicated we should both attempt to be as effective as possible by working individually and confidentially with the two parties.

The Prime Minister then turned to the subject of the Balkan Pact. He felt there was no misunderstanding on basic policy. He was concerned with the question of timing. He was now afraid that both Athens and Belgrade would come to look upon Turkey as holding back on this matter. He asked the Secretary for any further views he might have. The Secretary replied he did not believe the Balkan Pact arrangement should advance further at the present time, at least until we get the Italian reaction to the latest [Page 948] proposals on the Trieste problem. He was afraid if this new element were introduced it might cause Italy to refuse a Trieste settlement. He emphasized strongly his feeling that the Balkan Pact would be more valuable if the Trieste problem were settled previously and that this should be kept in mind by the parties concerned.

The Prime Minister agreed we should allow a period of time but he did not want to agree that the furtherance of a military alliance in the Balkans should be conditioned upon a Trieste settlement. He stated that they had now gone so far that it would be disastrous to attempt to turn back. He was afraid the Yugos may even now feel that the other two members are backing down. He referred to the fact that he would talk further on this subject to the Greeks at Athens en route to Turkey.

During the course of this conversation the Prime Minister twice used the phrase “waiting for 30 days”. The Secretary’s reply to such specific phrases was his reiteration that in his view the value of a Balkan military alliance would be much greater if a Trieste settlement can be achieved. The position of the United States towards Yugoslavia in particular would be quite different. He mentioned the view of our military that a “sore” spot in the Northern Adriatic would be a great defect to effective military cooperation. The Prime Minister agreed with this thesis, provided they did not have to wait indefinitely.

The Prime Minister concluded this subject by indicating that he thought perhaps the desire to move forward on the Balkan Pact could be used effectively with the Yugos to get them to be more forthcoming regarding a Trieste settlement. The Secretary indicated complete agreement with that approach.

Turning to the subject of the Geneva Conference, the Prime Minister indicated the concern of Turkey that differences had arisen between major powers of the Western world. He indicated his keen disappointment that the United States should find itself alone on any issue and wanted the Secretary to know that he had the moral support of Turkey. Turkey felt that the loss of Asia would be a most serious blow, that the Soviets were relentlessly following a set program to reach that goal. He said that the time would come when there must be a forced halt to their plans. The Secretary expressed his gratification for the Prime Minister’s support. It appeared to us that there might come a time when a line would have to be drawn and we would have to fight. He mentioned that many of our friends were reluctant to consider such an alternative. The Secretary stated in view of certain complexities there were issues where it would be very difficult for the United States to make the effort alone but in the last analysis we would do just that if we had [Page 949] to. We felt otherwise step by step we might reach a situation where we were all dangerously jeopardized. The Secretary said he recalled times in the past when the Turks had said they would fight if necessary and he felt Turkey had gained the respect and confidence of the free world because of such stands. The Secretary said it was easier to talk of these methods to the Turks who had this background than with some other nations who seemed doubtful they could ever take such a strong line.

  1. The source text bears a handwritten notation which indicates that Secretary Dulles approved Byroade’s record of the conversation for distribution.
  2. A memorandum of this conversation is supra.