711.56382/1–2154: Telegram
No. 482
The Ambassador in Turkey (Warren) to the Department of State
priority
742. It is clear that the Turks confidence in us has been disturbed by the apparently vagarious nature of some recent aspects of our dealings with them. While I have tried to reassure them as to our steadfastness and consistency of purpose, my reassurances have had a somewhat hollow ring in the face of facts. And I must say that I have myself been unable to avoid an uneasy feeling that we are asking them to accept commitments and make decisions which may well determine the course of their foreign policy for the foreseeable future, without having made the corresponding decisions on our side and being willing to accept the corresponding commitments.
For several years, we have tried to organize some kind of regional defense for the vulnerable southern periphery of the Soviet Union. It might be said that we have had the opportunity to make these attempts in peace thanks largely to the existence of the Turkish deterrent against Soviet aggression in the area. Having failed in our direct efforts, we are now asking the Turks to take the initiative and accept the primary responsibility for organizing the security of the region, and to “bell the Indian cat” in the process. What are we offering in return?
At the same time, we are asking the Turks to allow us to establish additional military targets in their own territory in the form of a forward strategic air-base and widespread electronic installations, together with over 3,000 personnel to man them.1 Under my instructions in these negotiations, I have firmly refused to accept any US commitment for the defense of these facilities, or even to promise US support for any upward revision of Turkish level of forces in NATO. Since it is equally clear to the Turks and to us that they do not and will not have the capability to defend these installations, they must obviously conclude that: [Page 941]
- (1)
- We do not trust them enough to give them an indication of our defense plans in the event of hostilities; or
- (2)
- We have no such plans; or
- (3)
- We regard our installations here and Turkey itself as expendable.
But not only are we currently asking the Turks to assume considerable additional risks and responsibilities without compensatory protection. At the very same time, we actually seem to be avoiding a commitment to sustain even the presently projected levels of Turkish forces. The impending decision to provide budgetary support during this fiscal year of course carries the implication of continued support of the agreed level in succeeding years. However, the fact that this year’s decision may involve a slow-down in the Turkish military build-up leaves a doubt which can only be dispelled by a firm for-war decision on the subject and corresponding reassurances to the Turks. From their point of view this is certainly the irreducible minimum of their expectations.
Though the Turks have been cooperative in the Pakistan matter,2 they are already showing considerable hesitation in connection with the facilities and related agreements. I believe they want nothing more than a completely confident collaboration with us and that they are both able and willing in principle to undertake the active role in Balkan and southern periphery affairs which we would like them to play in the security interests of us all. However, they are likely to show increasing reluctance to extend themselves until we are prepared to give them more concrete evidence of the consistency and dependability of our support.
- Further documentation on the negotiation for various facilities in Turkey is in file 711.56382.↩
- For documentation on the negotiations between Turkey and Pakistan which led to the signing of a treaty on Apr. 2, 1954, see vol. ix, Part 1, pp. 433 ff.↩