Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

611.82/7–3053: Despatch

No. 480
The Chargé in Turkey (Rountree) to the Department of State

secret
No. 60

Ankara, July 30, 1953.

Subject:

• United States-Turkish Relations.

Limit distribution. In its circular telegram 53 of July 23,¹ the Department requested my frank confidential estimate as to how the United States is regarded both by the Government and public of Turkey. This question was asked within the context of recent reports indicating possible confusion on the part of our allies as to United States policy and perhaps a lessening of confidence in United States leadership.

Public and official attitudes in Turkey concerning the position of the United States in world affairs are, of course, determined largely by Turkey’s own position and the extent to which the policies and objectives of the two Governments appear to be similar. They are also related to the Turkish estimate of the United States’ determination and ability to meet its responsibilities of leadership in pursuing those policies and objectives.

There is virtual unanimity of opinion in this country as between the Government and opposition parties, and the public in general, on matters of foreign affairs. Communists are practically non-existent, and there are relatively few extremists. In this situation, the very basis of Turkey’s policy lies in its relationship with the NAT, and particularly with the United States as the center of strength of the Western world. Turkey’s understanding of the dangers posed by the Communist threat is strikingly similar to the Administration’s, and its leaders have shown every determination to play their full part in meeting that menace. Unlike many of our friends, the Turks consider the present Russian peace offensive to be no more than the employment of new tactics, and not representative of any basic change in Soviet policy. Accordingly, they, unlike many other countries, share the view of the United States that Soviet words must be accompanied by actions before they are to be believed. They have viewed with concern, for example, the possibility of four-power discussions with the Soviet Union since they fear that such a meeting at this time and in the absence of more direct evidence of a change in Soviet policy would only lead to confusion and would serve no useful purpose in solving basic problems. Leaders of the Turkish Government, in discussions with American officials, have criticized Prime Minister Churchill for proposing such a meeting.²

The Turks welcome United States leadership, and fully support our efforts to strengthen the unity and security of the free nations, as evidenced in all major issues such as Korea, NATO, the EDC, and Middle East defense. The Turks have aligned themselves with us in every major item before the United Nations. They are prepared to go even further in measures of collective security than at present. While, as indicated above, there is no distrust of United States motives underlying our policy toward the USSR, there has been evidence of both Turkish official and non-official concern lest the United States should too rapidly curtail or discontinue adequate military and financial support to its allies in measures designed to strengthen free world security. Although Turkish leaders and the press have shown reticence in discussing this matter, it is possible that their failure openly to criticize or question the United States on this score is due to calculated Governmental influence to play down issues which might affect the remarkable American-Turkish solidarity. Moreover, the Turks themselves are not satisfied that the substantial American aid which has been rendered to certain European countries has been effectively utilized in terms of building up defensive strength, and would welcome any measures which might encourage greater relative effort on the part of those recipients.

The Turks feel, and have been told many times by American leaders and the American press, that the United States’ investment in Turkey has shown more results in terms of increased military strength than in the case of any other country receiving American aid. They have, rightly or wrongly, gained the impression from NATO representatives that even greater military aid will be forthcoming to support additional Turk efforts in the military field. There is no doubt that the Turks fully expect continued substantial American aid to Turkey, particularly military end-item assistance, even though that to other countries might be greatly reduced. A sharp reduction in the Turkish aid program, particularly in the present fiscal year, would undoubtedly be a severe shock to the Turkish Government and the Turkish public in general.

There has been no substantial evidence that the Turks feel that the United States is not living up to its leadership responsibilities. However, the Turks are fully aware of the cross-currents in domestic American politics and the apparent wide diversity of views upon many important issues, and appear occasionally to be baffled by inconsistencies reported among American political leaders.

The greatest fear in this country is not so much of the Soviet Union per se as of the possibility that the free world will become disunited and thus weakened. Differences between the United States and Great Britain are particularly regretted, and the impression that these are often aggravated by internal political motivations in the two countries has a particularly bad effect. The Turks feel that disunity can be prevented only if the United States continues to exercise its strong leadership and to employ the vision that has marked many aspects of our relations with the European countries in the post-war years. If internal disagreements and domestic considerations, such as demands for cessation of foreign aid, should result in a lessening either of the exercise of United States leadership or of the tools with which to implement it, Turkish confidence in the future would be very seriously affected. They would naturally view with alarm any evidence that such a development might occur, although at present, in this country at least, this does not appear to be a matter of critical concern.

One particular subject concerning which the Turks appear now to think that American leadership has not been effectively utilized is the integration of Germany into the NATO defense system. The Turks have an extremely high regard for the Germans generally and particularly for German soldiers, and they have strongly favored measures designed to accomplish the objectives of the EDC. I believe that the Turks consider that France, which they regard as one of the weakest and least reliable members of NATO, has been permitted unduly to frustrate these objectives. I must emphasize, however, that this observation is based upon formal conversations between the Ambassador and other Embassy officials and Turkish leaders, and occasional press comment, rather than upon official expression by the Turkish Government. The Turks have not indicated how United States leadership might in their opinion be utilized more effectively in this matter. They would, I am sure, warmly welcome the exercise of United States leadership in obtaining more direct participation by Yugoslavia and Spain the NATO defense system, either by direct membership or by some suitable association. They would also welcome a more affirmative American policy designed to fill the security gap in the Middle East.

In connection with this general evaluation of United States-Turkish relations, the Department’s attention is directed to the Embassy’s telegram no. 1509 of June 18th.³ In that message Ambassador McGhee reviewed a number of factors involved in the Embassy’s concern that the extremely close relations between the two countries might be adversely affected. A particular point which he stressed concerned our failure to consult adequately with the Turks on matters of common interest. It was pointed out that the Turks have sought our views on all important issues as they arose, usually before the Turkish position was taken, and that they have almost invariably followed our lead when it has been given.

Whenever matters of international importance are taken up with Turkish representatives it is almost automatic for them to say that they share our views. This derives from two factors: first, as stated above, the Turkish evaluation of the world situation and how to deal with it is remarkably similar to our own and the Turkish leaders are extremely anxious that the western countries operate insofar as possible with unity; and, secondly, the Turks recognize United States leadership and only under unusual circumstances would they decline to follow that leadership. However, the Turks have reason to feel that we have not been adequately forthcoming with them. They resented the fact that all substantive information which they received upon the results of the recent quadripartite talks with Yugoslavia⁴ was obtained from the Yugoslavs rather than from us, particularly considering the fact that the Turks (and Greeks) were then engaged in a series of simultaneous talks with Yugoslavia on political and military matters and had kept us fully informed.⁵ The Turkish Government felt that we did not take a sufficient interest in their own negotiations leading to the conclusion of the tripartite pact between Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia, or give them the benefit of our views upon this matter which was of such vital concern to them. Also, they undoubtedly now believe that they are not being consulted adequately on Middle Eastern questions.

Although the Embassy is fully aware of the great problem with which the Department is confronted in connection generally with consultations with our allies, it must be pointed out that unless some method can be found of taking the Turks more into our confidence in matters of common interest, our relations with them will inevitably suffer.

The conclusions which might be drawn from the foregoing as to the major factors to be borne in mind in determining United States lines of action in the coming months would, in most cases, concern general United States policies rather than those specifically related to Turkey. Within this context the Turks, for example, should have no doubts as to the firm determination of the United States to continue to build American strength and assist in the development of the defense capacity of other friendly countries, so long as there is no clear evidence of a reversal in Soviet aggressive policies and in the build-up of Communist military capabilities. In other words, every effort should be made to make clear that this United States bi-partisan policy is in no way affected by what might appear to be contradictory and conflicting statements of individual American leaders. Turkey, as all of our allies, should see clearly the line of American policy in the face of the continuing Communist threat.

It is also evident that the problem of consultation must be considered on a basis broader than with specific reference to Turkey. However, relating this to a single country, it is most important that we institute a policy of adequate consultation with the Turkish Government on matters of mutual interest. We should make the Turks feel that we not only seek Turkish support for lines of action proposed by the United States, but that we solicit Turkish views upon international developments and will take them fully into account.

Such advance consultation will, it is believed, be equally beneficial in relation to matters of bilateral as well as multilateral interest, particularly where the United States is likely to decide upon a course of action which might prove distasteful to the Turkish Government. For example, if it should become evident that circumstances will render it absolutely necessary to reduce economic and military assistance to Turkey below levels which present plans indicate the Turks will need, a full and frank explanation of the reasons therefor in advance of the actual decision will make it more palatable to the Turkish Government and far easier for it to adjust its plans accordingly.

There are several specific subjects concerning which consultations with the Turkish Government during the forthcoming months would appear highly desirable. These include the results of any international conversations concerning Yugoslavia; United States views concerning Middle East developments and particularly the proposed Middle East Defense Organization; and the Korean Armistice. In the latter connection Turkey, one of the first countries to volunteer forces for Korea, suffered extremely heavy casualties and yet bore its responsibilities in this collective defense measure with unwavering determination. The Turks undoubtedly would resent it greatly if they were not asked to play as much of a role in the matter of the Armistice as other countries whose relative sacrifice was not as great.

One point which might appear incidental but the importance of which has been emphasized by the Embassy in a number of communications (see particularly despatch no. 16 of July 10, 1953⁶) is the question of an invitation to the President or Prime Minister of Turkey to visit the United States. The Turks strongly desire that such a visit take place and will be disappointed if an invitation is not forthcoming in the near future, particularly in light of the fact that the King and Queen of Greece have now been invited.⁷ It is believed that such a visit will have substantial advantages, particularly with respect to the substance of this communication, and would provide an excellent opportunity for the Administration to give the Turkish leaders the benefit of its views on world problems and the methods proposed to cope with them. In this way the confidence of the Turks in the United States and in American leadership could be materially enhanced.

William M. Rountree

1. In circular telegram 53, the Secretary of State asked Ambassadors in 11 NATO countries and Austria and Germany for their frank confidential estimate and views on how the United States was regarded by the public and governments in the countries to which they were accredited. (611.00/7–2353)
2. See Document 595.
3. Document 479.
4. Reference is presumably to General Handy’s talks with the Yugoslavs in November 1952; see Documents 659 ff.
5. For documentation on these talks which led to the signing of the Balkan Pact, see Documents 306 ff.
6. Not printed. (782.11/7–1053)
7. The King and Queen of Greece were scheduled to visit the United States for about a month beginning Oct. 28.