Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

782.5/3–753

No. 473
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in Turkey (McGhee)¹

secret

Ankara, March 4, 1953.

Participants:

• Foreign Minister Köprülü
• Ambassador McGhee

I called on the Foreign Minister today at my request. There was present in addition only the interpreter. The meeting lasted forty-five minutes.

I stated to the Foreign Minister that I had wished to call prior to his departure for Paris to see what was on his mind. I myself had no particular subjects of importance to bring up. I was, however, leaving tomorrow evening at five for Zonguldak with Mr. Sayre and wanted to be sure that I was correct in my assumption that he and the Prime Minister had not wished to discuss with me further before their departure the important question which I had recently raised with them and which was the subject of a memorandum which we had presented to the Turkish Government.² I did not wish to press the matter, since I realized it was of such importance as to require careful consideration on their part. However, I wanted to be available in the event they wished to discuss it further before their departure.

The Foreign Minister said that both he and the Prime Minister had been quite occupied and had not given the subject the full consideration they desired. However, he would call the Prime Minister to see if he wished to discuss it. After talking to the Prime Minister over the telephone, the Foreign Minister advised me that they preferred to wait until they had returned from Paris to discuss the matter further.

The Minister stated that he was happy to advise me of certain decisions which had been taken only that morning by the Council of Ministers, and which would satisfy all requests which General Arnold had recently made with respect to manpower in the Turkish Army. The decision had been taken to increase the number of men, officers and NCO’s in the Army. The number of officers would be increased by lengthening the service of reserve officers called back to duty from one to one-and-a-half years. The number of NCO’s would be increased and new schools created for officers at the lower level. The number of men in the Army would be increased by cancelling the leaves which now, as a matter of policy, have been granted to some 20 per cent of enlisted personnel.

I expressed satisfaction with these steps. I pointed out that General Arnold had long felt the need for increasing the number of officers and NCO’s in the Turkish Army. In addition, the General felt that many units were not up to required strength. I asked what decision had been taken on the question of orderlies, which I knew had been under discussion, what the total increase in personnel would be in the various categories, and whether the additional personnel had been provided for in the defense budget.

The Foreign Minister replied that there had been no decision on the question of orderlies. Following debate in the Assembly the Government proposal had been withdrawn and would be resubmitted later. Because of social and economic conditions, some compromise would be necessary. The number of orderlies would be reduced; however, some would be kept.

The Foreign Minister said that he was not able to give me precise figures as to the actual increase in the armed forces which would result from the decisions taken. The Minister of Defense had promised to have an estimate available for the Prime Minister upon his return from Paris. He said that the financial basis for the increase had “partly” been provided for in the budget just approved by the GNA. (In discussion with the Minister of Defense on this point later at luncheon, he assured me that there was an adequate amount in the defense budget to pay for the increase and more. He expected to make considerable savings through the further unification of the three services.)

I then asked the Foreign Minister if he would give me his estimate of the results achieved by the recent Greek-Turkish-Yugoslav military talks in Ankara,³ and what the next step would be for continuing such talks.

The Minister replied that he had read the minutes of the recent meeting and could report that the discussions had been very general in nature. The two important things which had come out at the discussions were recognition of: (1) The necessity to organize the defense of Thrace and (2) The necessity to organize the defense of the common boundary of Yugoslavia and Greece. The Foreign Minister said that Greece and Turkey would report on the results of the meeting to the NATO Command, and would ask for their suggestions. Greece and Turkey could in this way act as liaison between the NATO Command and Yugoslavia.

The Foreign Minister said that he hoped that the United States military representatives in Belgrade could work more closely with the Yugoslav military. He referred to General Harmony’s⁴ discussion with him during the Minister’s visit to Belgrade in which General Harmony had pointed out the fact that the Yugoslavs were reserved in showing him military installations and units. He referred also to his previous suggestion that since the United States had military representatives in all three countries, we were in a good position to assist in the military cooperation between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia. The Turks would, as he felt the Yugoslavs would also, welcome a NATO representative in their discussion. However, he understood that the small NATO members would probably object to any direct NATO participation. He pointed out that he had heard of no objection up to now on the part of the smaller NATO nations to the tripartite pact recently signed in Ankara.⁵ He also pointed out the satisfaction expressed with respect to the pact by the French, by Mr. Eden and by the United States.

I replied that the problem of relating the tripartite military discussions to the NATO was one which my Government was considering, but that we were not ready yet to consider United States participation in the discussions, which the Minister had been kind enough to suggest.

I asked the Foreign Minister if he had any objection to Mr. Rountree’s looking over the minutes of the recent tripartite military discussions in Ankara, which he had said would be furnished to the NATO. The more complete information we had on this subject the better able we would be to report on it to our Government. The Minister replied that they had no secrets from us, and they would be delighted to show the minutes to us.

The Foreign Minister advised me that he and the Prime Minister would probably depart Ankara on Sunday, March 8, for Paris. He said that there were no specific topics for discussion in Paris and no prepared agenda. The talks would be quite general. He said that in light of my knowledge of his attitude toward the French policy, I could probably guess some of the things he would say. He said that he intended to be very frank with the French along the lines of some of his discussions with me.

I wished him a pleasant and successful trip.

1. Transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 552 from Ankara, Mar. 7.
2. On Feb. 17, McGhee reported that he had transmitted to Köprülü a draft military requirements agreement based on telegram 891 (see footnote 3, supra). (Telegram 1038 from Ankara; 711.56382/2–1753) This draft agreement is the memorandum under reference here.
3. Regarding the tripartite talks held at Ankara, Feb. 17–20, 1953, see Document 327.
4. Brig. Gen. John W. Harmony, Chief of the U.S. Military Assistance Staff in Yugoslavia.
5. For documentation on the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed by representatives of Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia at Ankara on Feb. 28, see Documents 328 ff.