Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

848.49/10–1753: Telegram

No. 47
The Ambassador in Czechoslovakia (Wadsworth) to the Department of State

top secret

Prague,¹ October 17, 1953—3 p.m.

148. Re Deptel 83, October 13.²

While prices are exorbitant, variety limited and distribution uneven (resulting in temporary shortages individual items), Czechoslovakia is far from being on a bare subsistence basis so far as food is concerned (Embtel 111, September 24³). While population would appreciate anything which would interrupt even temporarily constant struggle with personal budget, there are no indications any consequential malnutrition.

Suggested balloon barrage could be expected get food into hands only tiny segment Czechoslovak people and consequently can not constitute serious effort augment diet population as whole. Proposal thus becomes obvious propaganda scheme of questionable value, especially in absence destitution. If propaganda is real objective suggest that forthright offer foodstuffs would be equally effective.

In our opinion proposed balloon operation not only has no advantages but has serious disadvantages. In essence proposal is that if Czechoslovakia will not waive its laws and regulations to permit importation CARE packages US Government will then proceed in effect, to sanction smuggling of such packages into this country. The introduction of such packages by air contrary to Czechoslovak law is just as illegal as if they were brought across the border clandestinely. At least such is the US concept of its own customs laws. If proposal carried out, US Government could not take position it is not involved because CARE is private organization, as it did in recent RFE balloon episode (Deptel 22, July 29⁴) since the request of this private group has now been sponsored officially in aide-mémoire delivered yesterday (Embtel 147, October 17⁵). MSA label also would belie protestations official innocence.

Suggest also effects implementation proposed balloon operation be weighed against US objectives here. As far as population concerned, majority of people this country are opposed to present regime and to Soviet Union and are basically friendly to West.

They are not starving and in any event only a few would benefit from the food-drop. Furthermore, individuals found in possession dropped package food would ipso facto be guilty of possessing goods illegally introduced into country, i.e. contraband. Thus those sufficiently daring overcome natural reluctance take parcels, if caught, would be subjected severe punishment.

More important at this juncture we are apprehensive effect implementation this scheme might have on solution of outstanding issues between the US and Czechoslovakia, e.g. Hvasta⁶ and nationalization claims. Department will recall that Prime Minister Siroky alluded to last balloon barrage as a “hostile act” by US (Embtel 60, August 15⁷).

Wadsworth

1. The change in designation from “Praha” to “Prague” in Department of State telegrams took place on Oct. 1.
2. See footnote 2, supra.
3. Telegram 111 reported that supplies of food, clothing, and other essentials were short, but the shortages were not critical. (849.49/9–2453)
4. Telegram 22 transmitted the U.S. reply to a Czechoslovak protest of July 20 concerning a balloon operation launched from West German soil. It rejected the protest on the grounds that the operation was carried out by the Crusade for Freedom, a private U.S. organization. (511.49/7–2153)
5. Not printed. (849.49/10–1753)
6. Jan Hvasta was an American citizen who had been convicted of espionage in Czechoslovakia in 1948 and imprisoned since then.
7. Document 42.