Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

611.81/10–3053

No. 454
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Baxter)¹

top secret

[Washington,] October 30, 1953.

Subject:

• Call of Greek Foreign Minister on the Secretary

Participants:

• Mr. Stefanos Stefanopoulos, Minister of Foreign Affairs
• Mr. John D. Kalergis, Minister Counselor, Greek Embassy
• The Secretary
• Mr. William O. Baxter, GTI

The Greek Foreign Minister, who accompanied the King and Queen of Greece to Washington,² called on the Secretary this afternoon to discuss problems of mutual interest.

Trieste

The Foreign Minister opened the conversation by saying that he was optimistic about the Trieste situation. He had just talked to Ambassador Kyrou, Greek representative to the United Nations, and believed that, if the implementation of the October 8 decision were postponed,³ Italy and Yugoslavia could work out an acceptable solution.

The Secretary echoed the same hope and referred to a suggestion made by Mr. Stefanopoulos at dinner the night before that the Trieste situation might be eased by a declaration to be signed by 15 of the 20 signatories of the Italian Peace Treaty, which events have proved is an unworkable document. (The Secretary indicated that he wished to have this suggestion explored.) In commenting on the gravity of the Trieste situation and the importance which he knew Greece attached to it, the Secretary expressed the hope that Greece and Turkey, because of their new treaty relationship with Yugoslavia, would continue to use their good offices with Tito to effect a peaceful settlement.

Yugoslav Military Talks

In this connection, the Secretary referred to the Talks held last August between military representatives of Yugoslavia, and of the United Kingdom, France and the United States.⁴ Knowing the eagerness with which the Greek Government awaited a report on these talks, he regretted the delay occasioned not only by the somewhat cumbersome procedure for military clearance, but also by the unfavorable political climate resulting from the tension over Trieste. The Secretary said he wished to take this occasion to give the Minister more detailed information, on a personal and informal basis, concerning the outcome of these talks. He was confident that the Minister would treat this with utmost discretion, knowing that the Italians had not yet been informed; it should also be understood that this did not constitute official notification to the Greek Government, which would be made at a later date probably through military channels.

The Secretary then paraphrased the following summary, which Mr. Kalergis translated for the Minister carefully, sentence by sentence.

The talks took place on the military level and were without political commitments on either side. They were held in an atmosphere of great frankness and cordiality and were very useful in clarifying the Yugoslav position. The Yugoslav’s main object seemed to be to get Western agreement to modernize their forces. The conference started with an exchange of intelligence regarding the Soviet-Satellite threat to Yugoslavia; the Yugoslav appreciation did not significantly differ from that of the three Powers. The conference then turned to strategic matters. No NATO plans were revealed to the Yugoslavs but they were told that, militarily speaking, an attack on Yugoslavia would be unlikely to remain isolated. The value of the defense of Yugoslavia for the security of southeastern Europe was acknowledged. We discussed with the Yugoslavs the strategic concept to be adopted for the defense of Yugoslavia, and we found that their ideas were in very close accord with our own, particularly as regards the need to defend the Ljubljana Gap and to tie up with the Greek and Turkish forces in the south.

The Yugoslavs presented lists of material that would be necessary to equip Yugoslav armed forces on modern lines and estimates of logistics involved in supporting the Yugoslav armed forces in a time of war. No opinion was expressed on the Yugoslav figures and no undertakings were given that their requirements would be met, but the conference decided to recommend to the governments that the next stage should be a meeting of Tripartite-Yugoslav experts to examine the material and logistic problems involved. The conference also recommended that further operational studies should take place with the appropriate NATO commanders. The tripartite representatives stressed to the Yugoslavs that inevitably future military planning would be unrealistic unless the Trieste problem were first stabilized. The report of the conference is at present being studied by the various Chiefs of Staff.

The Foreign Minister interrupted the Secretary once in connection with the statement: “The value of the defense of Yugoslavia for the security of southeastern Europe was acknowledged.” He asked if this were also the position of the United States Government. The Secretary explained that this was a military point of view which had not yet been given consideration on the political level. It was, he thought, in the process of being appraised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Bulgaria

The Minister stated that, as the Secretary knew, Greece had responded affirmatively to a Bulgarian suggestion for opening conversations with a view to the resumption of diplomatic relations. The Greek Ambassador in Paris was under instructions to approach the Bulgarian Chargé in the absence of the Bulgarian Ambassador. However, within the past few days, following the Soviet note to Greece protesting the base rights agreement with the United States,⁵ the Bulgarian Government had sent a protest along the same lines to the Secretary General of the United Nations,⁶ who is now considering whether or not he should circulate it to all member nations.⁷ If this protest is circulated, Ambassador Kyrou will be instructed to protest the Bulgarian violations of the military articles of the peace treaty.

Soviet-Inspired Propaganda

Mr. Stefanopoulos noted that the recent conclusion of an agreement with the United States for military facilities in Greece had made a very good impression on the Greek people. He felt that it was favorably received in France and Great Britain, to which the Secretary added that it had also been well received in the United States. The Foreign Minister said that the Soviet Ambassador, who called on him just before he left Greece with the King and Queen, had brought up the base agreement, claiming (here the Minister smiled) that he was speaking “personally and without instructions from his government.” Mr. Stefanopoulos said he had expressed innocent surprise that the Soviet Ambassador should find anything unusual in this development, which he pointed out was no change in Greek policy but merely a strengthening of unaggressive NATO plans. In fact, he continued, as Greece is faced on the north with armed forces of much greater strength than its own, this development would give Greece a feeling of security in which it could work more confidently toward the development of friendly relations with all of its neighbors.

More seriously, the Minister said that he did fear a buildup of Soviet-inspired propaganda which would exploit the recent earthquake by attempting to convince the Greek people that their government was pouring its resources into a military buildup at the expense of the disaster victims. Such propaganda would also make full play of the United States base agreement by pointing out that the expansion of trade with the Soviet orbit, which would greatly benefit the Greek people, was not possible so long as Greece lent itself to the “aggressive designs of the United States” and permitted the stationing of foreign troops on its soil.

The Minister said he felt certain that the opposition would use certain of these arguments to attack the government. Unfavorable comparisons would be drawn between the United States-Greek base agreement, which could be interpreted as adding to Greek budgetary commitments, and the United States-Spanish agreement,⁸ which was accompanied by substantial economic assistance to Spain. The Minister recognized, of course, that the United States had contributed immeasurably more in aid to Greece during the past years, but attacks on the government along this line would, he feared, be somewhat hard to answer. However, the Greek Government intended to be honest with the Greek people and let them know that economic aid was being sharply diminished and would, in all probability, soon be cut off completely. In this connection, it would be helpful, the Minister stated, if the $20 million of FOA aid for this year could be released as soon as possible. The Secretary said that the Department would look into this question.

Conclusion

Mr. Stefanopoulos then said that he had no further questions to take up at this time. As the Secretary knew, the Minister and his government maintained the closest relationships in Athens with Ambassador Cannon. These close relationships between all friendly NATO powers are the essence of our present position and the strength of the free world. If NATO did not exist, Russia would not be following its present appeasement policy. Conversely, the Secretary added, if the Allies should drift apart, the Soviet appeasement policy would quickly disappear.

As the Minister took his leave, the Secretary reverted once more to the Trieste question, urging that the Greek Government exert all its influence, which he knew to be great, on Yugoslavia to agree to a reasonable solution. The Trieste problem, the Secretary reiterated, must be settled; there can be no security for southeastern Europe until it is settled.

1. Cleared with Roderic L. O’Connor (S), A briefing memorandum, Oct. 30, by Jernegan to Dulles on this meeting is in Secretary’s Letters, lot 56 D 459, “S”.
2. King Paul and Queen Frederika visited Washington, Oct. 28–31. For welcoming remarks by Eisenhower and an exchange of toasts by Eisenhower and King Paul at a White House state dinner, Oct. 28, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, p. 729.
3. Reference is to the decision of the United States and the United Kingdom to relinquish administration of Zone A of the Free Territory of Trieste to Italy at the earliest practicable date. (Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 19, 1953, p. 529)
4. A summary report of the tripartite military talks held in Washington in August 1953 is in file 611.68/8–2453.
5. For the Soviet note, Oct. 26, to the Greek Government, protesting the Military Facilities Agreement between Greece and the United States, see Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1953, p. 284.
6. For text of the Bulgarian note, Oct. 29, by Mintcho Neitchev, Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Hammerskjöld, for transmittal to the Greek Government, see Relazioni Internazionali, Nov. 14, 1953, p. 1111, or enclosure 2 to despatch 334 from New York, Nov. 11. (711.56381/11–1153)
7. Hammarskjöld’s note, Nov. 9, to Dulles, transmitted a copy of the Bulgarian note of Oct. 29 for the information of the U.S. Government. (Enclosure 1 to despatch 334 from New York, Nov. 11; 711.56381/11–1153)
8. For text of the Defense Agreement between the United States and Spain, Sept. 26, 1953, which provided for use of miltary facilities in Spain, see 4 UST (pt. 2) 1895.