Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

711.56381/9–2453

No. 452
Memorandum of Conversation, by the First Secretary of Embassy in Greece (Schnee)

secret

Athens, September 24, 1953.

Participants:

• Ambassador Cannon
• Prime Minister Papagos
• Mr. Schnee—Special Assistant for NATO Affairs
• Mr. Calligas—Embassy Translator

Subject:

• Military Facilities Agreement

References:

• Deptels (a) 960¹ and (b) 962 of September 18.²

Pursuant to the instructions set forth in the telegrams under reference Ambassador Cannon called on the Prime Minister at noon today, and in the course of a 30 minute conversation conveyed the U.S. views regarding the undesirability of submitting the projected agreement to Parliament and reiterated the U.S. view that publicity should be deferred as long as is feasible and that—if and when necessary—the public reference could be limited to a public statement to the effect that action is being undertaken in furtherance of the defense effort.

After Ambassador Cannon had briefly outlined the purpose of the call, the Prime Minister observed that he was leaving for Italy tomorrow (to be gone about 10 days) but that he hoped the agreement could be signed and a public statement issued shortly after his return. He considers it important that a public statement be issued as soon as the agreement is signed.

The Ambassador then took up the problem of parliamentary action, setting forth the basis of the U.S. objections to such action as set forth in reference (a) but neither indicated that the U.S. would be prepared to yield on this matter nor suggested the alternative of general enabling legislation.

The Prime Minister in reply stated that the Constitution required the Greek Parliament to ratify any agreement which provided for the ceding of bases and that, unlike the U.S. position outlined by the Ambassador, the King did not have the power to conclude such agreements without parliamentary action. If he did so, there was a real danger that the agreement would be declared void. Furthermore, the Prime Minister is convinced that it would be very harmful from a public relations point of view if the Government could be accused of having withheld such important information from Parliament and the public. He reiterated fears previously expressed that this subject cannot remain a secret much longer and that if the public were first informed through opposition inquiries in Parliament or through the press, the agreement might appear somewhat sinister to the public. Throughout this portion of the discussion the Marshal kept repeating the phrase, “this can’t go on much longer”, meaning the present secrecy.

Ambassador Cannon pointed out that in the United States a somewhat analogous situation existed between the President and Congress and that we are proceeding on the basis that Congressional ratification of the NATO Treaty—particularly Article III—provided the required legislative action and that agreements of the type under discussion merely implemented the action taken by the legislature when it ratified the NATO Treaty. The Prime Minister replied that legal experts would have to determine whether a similar interpretation would be feasible in Greece, that he thought Article III did not alter the constitutional requirement for legislative ratification but suggested that, in his absence, the subject be discussed with Mr. Markezinis and Mr. Kanellopoulos.

As noted, the question of publicity arose frequently during the discussion of the legislative aspects of the problem but in addition, the Ambassador reiterated the American objections again without indicating that the U.S. is prepared to compromise. It was agreed that the question of parliamentary action might have a direct bearing on the question of publicity and that the legislative question should therefore be resolved first.

Embassy Observations:

The Prime Minister made it crystal clear that he is convinced of the necessity of issuing a public statement as soon as the agreement is signed and that he considers it dangerous to defer public announcement any longer. He appeared equally adamant regarding the necessity for parliamentary ratification. In order to ensure that the Greek Government will make the maximum effort to meet the American viewpoint no reference was made to compromise or alternate solutions set forth in the telegram under reference.

1. Supra.
2. Telegram 962 reviewed arguments against announcing the Military Facilities Agreement, but agreed to yield on that point if the Greek Government remained adamant for an announcement. It also authorized U.S. signature of the agreement and indicated willingness to release 15 billion drachmas of counterpart funds to the Greek Government in fiscal year 1954 for use in meeting the additional financial burden accruing from the agreement. (711.56381/9–153)