Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

711.56381/8–1453: Telegram

No. 450
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece¹

top secret

Washington, August 28, 1953—7:38 p.m.

725. Careful consideration Greek proposal (Embtel 431)² in light anticipated or potential effects on foreign relations US lead us to conclude public announcement this time concerning grant US airbases Greece should not be made. Conclusion based following factors:

. . . . . . .

B. Although there may be some advantages from local Greek point of view in public announcement believe they are counterbalanced or outweighed by attendant disadvantages locally. Announcement very likely create Balkan tensions with resulting undesirable effect on Greek political stability and economy. We have in mind such things as propaganda barrage from Free Greek Radio and Bulgarians, renewed border troubles, increased communist activity Greece, as well as possible disruptive communist machinations along pattern post-guerrilla-war type.

C. Confrontation NATO with fait accompli contrary to spirit NATO cooperation and to established procedures. Consider announcement would tend arouse apprehension among NATO partners that US playing separate game and tend strengthen impression held by some that US policy over-aggressive in sensitive areas. SAC requirements do not require prior notification to NATO although we will inform Standing Group of Agreement when reached. Navy requirements included in 4th slice infrastructure and therefore do not require new approval.

D. We do not concur Greek assessment as to strength British intentions and ability obstruct agreement. In our view fait accompli more likely provoke British interference. We intend inform British re negotiations at an early date (see separate telegram)³ in order allay suspicion or fear which partial information re SAC requirements might stimulate. If British interference develops we prepared make representation UK Foreign Office.

E. We are attempting avoid wherever practicable publicity concerning base arrangements in general in order avoid public speculation and discussion. Certain arrangements are politically sensitive both internationally and within host countries. Also we anxious avoid debate concerning non-registration with UN of agreements which for security reasons are unpublishable.

F. FYI only. Do not believe burden on Greek economy should be great (see separate telegram).⁴ We fear inference that Greeks might use grant base rights as leverage obtain concessions in other fields notably increased aid. Public announcement would strengthen Greek hand this respect. End FYI.

Proposed military facilities actually represent primarily extension physical facilities already constructed under US aid program. Stationing of personnel these locations would be gradual process. As such Department intended it should give appearance at least in initial stages of continuation of previous aid activities, though we cannot publicly and positively identify it as continuation previous aid program. Logical course would seem be maintain secrecy by allowing this impression to prevail as long as possible until tangible evidence should become so apparent or other events make some explanation necessary.

While we appreciate sincerity and enthusiasm Greeks in wishing announcement this decision we convinced that to do so would work to detriment of both US and Greek interests. Embassy should therefore discuss foregoing with Greeks emphasizing points A–E above and obtain assurance maintenance secrecy negotiations.

Dulles

1. Drafted by Dixon and Rogers and cleared with Admiral Smith (Defense), Byroade, Richards, Bonbright, and Matthews. Repeated for information to Paris for USRO and Reinhardt, Frankfurt for USCINCEUR and Satterthwaite, to Rome for Maffitt, and to Valletta.
2. Document 448.
3. Telegram 726 to Athens, Aug. 28, contained instructions to inform the British that exploratory discussions were initiated with the Greeks for acquiring military facilities to fulfill U.S. naval and air requirements in Greece in support of NATO. USAF requirements involved SAC use of airbases in Greece for fighter escort and emergency post strike purposes. (711.56381/8–2853)
4. Not further identified.