747C.00/12–854: Telegram

No. 403
The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations1

secret
priority

Gadel 147. Appreciate success your efforts with British (Delga 357).2 Hope UK Del will be present vote on procedural motion, and we should seek agreement on such motion by negotiation with other delegations, subject to UK concurrence. Agree preferable US should not take motion and suggest Scandinavian NATO member preferable to Pakistan because Commonwealth member.

Motion not to “discuss” preferable as less painful to Greeks, likely to obtain more votes while still contributing to UK objective, and not directly contradictory to GA inscription. You should try ward off any amendments which would expressly or impliedly indicate matter may again be considered by UNGadel 137.3

We should justify our position during lobbying by indicating our belief public debate would only lead three parties concerned to take intransigent positions making eventual solution more difficult. Also, in event procedural motion introduced so late that there is little time for subsequent lobbying, probably desirable we make statement shortly after motion introduced supporting motion on basis best chance lessening Cyprus tension is by direct negotiations between British and Cypriots. Our statement should be phrased to reduce Soviet opportunities to berate us for being against self-determination.

Dulles
  1. Drafted by Tyler and cleared with Wood, Allen, Raynor, and Popper. Repeated to London, Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia.
  2. Supra.
  3. Gadel 137 to New York, Dec. 6, stated that the U.S. main objective with regard to the Cyprus item in the U.N. General Assembly was to avoid a clash between Allies, which consideration of a substantive resolution would entail. The Department of State preferred an alternative, mentioned by Dixon to James J. Wadsworth, U.S. Deputy Representative to the United Nations, in New York on Dec. 4, that a motion be made at the beginning of debate not to discuss the Cyprus item. (320/12–454)