Office of the Historian

760.5/5–2454: Telegram

No. 341
The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Riddleberger) to the Department of State1

top secret
priority
Belgrade, May 24, 1954—8 p.m.

1253. Re Embtel 1246 to Department.2

1.
Foreign Secretary convoked me this afternoon to receive reply to our démarche May 22 which he said had received the approval of the Coordinating Committee of the Federal Executive Council over the week end. As Tito is in Belgrade, probable it has also been discussed with him as well as Kardelj.
2.
Foreign Secretary began his oral remarks stating that Yugoslav Government does not understand necessity of démarche as in effect the question does not arise. I asked him what this meant and he said there was no possibility proclaiming a military alliance of the three Balkan powers during Tito visit to Athens as such an alliance obviously could not be proclaimed in the absence of one of its members. I remarked that while this might be true it had not prevented a declaration of intent during the Tito visit to Ankara with its implication of early implementation which had raised problems with Italy. He said that Yugoslav Government cannot recognize as valid US argument re formalization of alliance as the timing could not be based upon an irresponsible attitude by Italian Government. Furthermore, the development of the alliance could not depend on Italian attitude re Trieste as to accept this point of view would give support to the inimical attitude of Italian Government toward our common objectives. The fact that Italian Government [Page 648] has gone so far in its public reactions cannot modify Yugoslav Government’s views.
3.
On the relationship of military alliance to NATO, Yugoslav Government believes that this question need not be analyzed now as it is irrelevant to the matter of timing. I said that nonetheless the question exists and must eventually be considered to which Popovic agreed but repeated that it need not affect the question of timing at this moment. I remarked this was debatable and might depend upon the kind of announcement made in Athens.
4.
Yugoslav Government maintains its attitude that development of Balkan entente has no relation to Trieste question. Foreign Secretary said he wished to assure us that Yugoslav Government has no intention of utilizing development of Balkan entente to reinforce its position on Trieste. (He then referred to the instructions to Velebit reported separately.) He said that by the same token the Trieste question should not be utilized for the profit of Italy.
5.
Foreign Secretary then said he would speak frankly to me about the nature of the démarche which I had made on May 22. Yugoslav Government thought that démarche did not correspond to the present cordial state of US-Yugoslav relations and that it went a little far in making recommendations, particularly on what should be said in the communiqué. I replied that a careful survey of the totality of my remarks would demonstrate that it had been made in a spirit of amity and friendly counsel and that it should be so regarded. Foreign Secretary said that if US considered exchange of views on development Balkan entente desirable that this could be done in different and, perhaps, a more appropriate manner. I asked him what he had in mind and particularly if he was thinking of some sort of conference in view of the fact that the United Kingdom shared generally our point of view. He said he was not thinking of a conference but the two governments could easily make arrangements for an exchange of views if we thought it desirable.
6.
Foreign Secretary then said that Yugoslav Government would take into account the observations which we had made but did not commit himself as to what might be put in the communiqué.
7.
In order to have Yugoslav Government attitude fully understood, Foreign Secretary has instructed Velebit to explain its attitude to Foreign Office in London without awaiting démarche by British Chargé here. Mates has also been instructed to see the Secretary on this subject.3
8.
Popovic said that the meeting of the Balkan Foreign Ministers would probably be about the end of June rather than in July.
9.
In a general discussion which followed the Foreign Secretary’s reply it was made evident that that part of our démarche which reads “while we do not wish to argue the question of whether or not Italian reaction could be permitted to delay the development of cooperative relations between Yugoslavia, etc.” has touched a very sensitive nerve. Both Popovic and Bebler argued at great length that Yugoslav Government cannot accept implications of this statement as it removes from discussion one of the most important and vital points. I reiterated to them that Italian reaction to the conversion of the entente into a military alliance is a political fact which we must all take into account irrespective of Yugoslav Government opinion on unreasonableness of Italian attitude. My attempt to avoid arguing this point met with little success and evoked from Foreign Secretary caustic remarks re Italian intransigence in attaining our common defense goals.
10.
In contrast to Saturday’s interview we were able to avoid recriminations and my estimate is that some sober second thought has occurred over weekend. In spite of acrimonious exchanges I believe démarche has had good effect and in any case we have received what is tantamount to invitation from Yugoslav Government to continue discussions. If as now appears probable US–UK Yugoslavia agreement on Trieste is concluded in next few days, perhaps we can influence developments re Balkan pact in less heated atmosphere.
11.
British démarche not yet made and this may be dealt with in London with Velebit. Mallet returning to Belgrade 28th. British Chargé informed my interview today.
12.
French Ambassador’s instructions not yet firm but hopes be able approach Yugoslav Government by May 26.
Riddleberger
  1. Repeated for information to London, Athens, Ankara, Rome, Paris, and Trieste.↩
  2. See footnote 2, supra.↩
  3. For an account of Dulles’ conversation with Mates, see telegram 1253 to Belgrade, supra.↩