750G.00/5–2754: Telegram
No. 195
The Ambassador in the United
Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department
of State1
5387. Limited distribution. Pass Defense for Hensel and Lemnitzer. From Thompson. At meeting today Velebit again proposed to send us letter and presented draft containing unacceptable caveats. Was persuaded drop letter entirely in return for our agreement include following sentence at end of first paragraph agreed record. “The Yugoslavian representative made it clear that should agreement not be reached as a result of the current negotiations the Yugoslav Government would not consider itself bound by the provisions of this record”.
Velebit airmailing text Belgrade today and hopes initial Monday2 at latest. Italian holiday Tuesday. Hope inform French and begin negotiations Italians Wednesday.
On question financial settlement Velebit said his government would accept $15 million as partial settlement or $30 million in full settlement payable in goods over three years. (Although this my exact prediction I have never made any suggestion to him as to amount of possible settlement.) Velebit also agreed that Yugoslavia should be satisfied if memo of understanding could contain merely reference to financial negotiations provided we could obtain privately firm assurance from Italians of sum acceptable to Yugoslavs.
Velebit agreed to position on aid contained in my telegram 5106,3 but believe would be useful if this could be followed up by Embassy Belgrade.
Velebit also agreed to my request that no announcement be made completion of talks with them and said was agreed no statement should be made until settlement reached.
Yesterday at social function saw Brosio for first time and told him we had virtually concluded with Yugoslavs. He contemplates long negotiation and remarked hoped we could finish by August. [Page 432] Also said re publicity we could not expect Italians behave so well once negotiations with them start.
Hope reach full agreement over week end with British on tactics. Believe most important that in Rome, Washington and here we convince Italians that while we have been careful leave way open for full consideration their views we are certain that on points covered we have pushed Yugoslavs to maximum position. Should Italians endeavor as Brosio implied pressure or influence us by stirring up public opinion against any essential element of proposal they will only be making trouble for themselves. Believe successful outcome negotiations may depend upon acceptance by Italian Government this basic fact.4
- Repeated for information to Belgrade, Paris (eyes only Ambassador), Rome, and Trieste.↩
- May 31.↩
- In telegram 5106, Thompson suggested that the United States make clear that the question of aid was entirely separate from the question of the Trieste settlement, and that, while the United States would consider sympathetically any Yugoslav request for the use of counterpart funds to construct communications and other facilities which might be considered necessary as a result of the Trieste settlement, it was not making any specific allocation of aid for this purpose. (750G.00/5–1354)↩
- In telegram 6413 to London, May 28, the Department of State reported that the last paragraph of telegram 5387 from London raised an important question of tactics. It expressed the tentative view that if the United States undertook in Washington and Rome to impress upon Italy that Yugoslavia had been pushed to its maximum on the points covered, the discussion would likely involve the substance of the various points. The Department of State felt that Thompson should be the primary mouthpiece for discussion of the substantive elements and that whatever it might prove desirable to say in Washington or in Rome in support of Thompson’s positions, should be carefully and precisely defined in advance. (750G.00/5–2754)↩