750G.00/12–653: Telegram

No. 151
The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Riddleberger) to the Department of State1
top secret
niact

754. Department please pass Bermuda. Re Embtel 753.2 British Ambassador, French Chargé, and I met with Popovic and Bebler and presented latest sounding together with descriptive comment and strong urging that Yugoslav Government accept this proposal as means of convening conference in near future. We emphasized advance which this sounding represented over that of November 13 with particular reference to fact that 1) no transfers were contemplated before meeting, that 2) authority of Zone Commander would remain paramount and that 3) an agreed solution of conference would supersede October 8 decision.

In spite of our best efforts, Popovic replied that our proposal was illogical in that while it addressed itself to procedure we were in effect discussing substance and were prejudging the results of a conference by proposing to transfer posts to Italian officials. He emphasized it was not a question of timing on the transfer of posts but of substance. If a question of substance is to be decided now, he argued, Yugoslav Government might agree to a symbolic transfer of posts provided it were to be part of a general solution. Therefore the proposal we made does not correspond to Yugoslav ideas and is prejudicial to its position. Italian Government has posed “positive conditions” which have made it impossible to agree on idea of a preliminary conference without conditions. In these circumstances Popovic said he would make a counter proposal to that which we had submitted for the transfer of posts to Italian officials. This counter proposal would be in effect an outline of what the preliminary conference could do. The points of this counter proposal follow:

a.
Yugoslavia would only accept transfer of posts for City of Trieste.
b.
Conference should try to find line of demarcation between Italy and Yugoslavia taking account of fact that Yugoslavia would renounce City of Trieste and Italy would renounce Zone B.
c.
As we wish to implement part of October 8 decision by introducing Italian officials, we should also implement another part of [Page 347] October 8 which refers to minority rights, this partial implementation could consist of public action by AMG abrogating Italian Fascist laws and decisions of Italian courts detrimental to Slovene minority. This would include putting Slovene minorities on par with Italians and equal rights for Slovene cultural activities.
d.
Should also announce when conference convenes that both parties would accept as part of final settlement that those territories of FTT which Italy and Yugoslavia would acquire would have an autonomous status within their respective jurisdiction. Extent of such autonomy would be determined at the conference, taking into account the specific characteristics of each state (i.e., the statutes for autonomy could be different in that the statute for Yugoslav zone would take into account the rights of Italian minority while other statute would take into account international role of City of Trieste).

We inquired if this counter proposal could be dropped if it were possible to come to preliminary conference without conditions and received an affirmative reply.

In conclusion, Popovic, whose attitude throughout was cheerful and courteous, suggested that in future we not await tripartite agreement before discussion our ideas with Yugoslavia.

Riddleberger
  1. Repeated for information to Rome, Paris, London, and Trieste.
  2. In telegram 753, Dec. 6, Riddleberger said that he would make the approach to Popović, along with his British and French colleagues, at 5 p.m. that evening. (750G.00/12–653)