Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

Italian Desk files, lot 58 D 357, “Trieste—October 1953”

No. 145
Report of the United States-United Kingdom Working Party¹

top secret

[London,] October 28, 1953.

1. The US/UK Working Party made an exhaustive study of the possibility of handing over the administration of Zone A to the Italians while retaining Allied Forces in the Zone. The military members of the Working Group, including those from AMG Trieste, separately examined all the implications of such a proposal and submitted their views to the Working Party. (See Annex)

2. In the light of these views that this action would present unacceptable difficulties from both the military and administrative points of view, and after further discussion by all members of the Party, the Working Party decided to consider what functions and services of government in Zone A, additional to those listed in the Memorandum of Understanding of May 9, 1952,² could be progressively handed over to the Italian Administration.

3. The Working Party had before them a plan submitted on behalf of the Zone Commander which would provide for a progressive transfer of the administration of Zone A in two stages.³ During the first stage of the plan Allied Military Government would be completely Italianized, with the exception of certain key personnel. The Zone Commander would retain full authority and responsibility in the zone until the completion of the second stage, which would begin a few days before the final Allied withdrawal.

4. The Working Party took account of the view expressed by the Italian Government that the departments reserved to the Zone Commander under the London Memorandum of Understanding should be progressively turned over to Italian administration. The Working Party felt that this process could be geared to the progress of the Five-Power Conference, if held. The Working Party recognized the desirability of convincing the Italian Government of the sincerity of the US and UK Governments in putting into effect the decision of October 8 and of their determination to effect a progressive transfer, bearing in mind that the administration of Zone A must be passed to the Italian Government as a going concern.

5. With these considerations in view the Working Party recommends that the US/UK Governments inform the Italian Government in confidence that the functions and services of the present administration of Zone A would be transferred to the Italians in the following manner, probably commencing as soon as agreement had been reached for the holding of a Five-Power Conference. The Italian Government would:

(a) Provide 8 Majors of Carabinieri to understudy and later replace certain Allied officers in the Venezia Giulia Police Force. Only 6 Allied officers would then remain in command of the Police Force.

(b) Provide a Director of the Port of Trieste, the Zone Commander to retain a residual authority over the port facilities and services for his military needs.

(c) Take over the Shipping Control Office.

(d) Provide 7 officials to take over the administration of displaced persons camps. This would leave one Allied officer in charge of displaced persons until the final Allied withdrawal. The Italian Government would be invited to appoint an officer to understudy this Allied official in order to take over his duties on the date of final withdrawal.

(e) Provide Press and Broadcasting officers to take over these functions of the Allied Public Information Office. The present Allied Director of Public Relations would remain until the final withdrawal but the Italian Government would be invited to provide an understudy to him.

(f) Be invited to appoint an understudy to the Comptroller of Accounts, to take over from the latter on the date of final withdrawal.

(g) Provide officials to take over progressively the internal administration of Allied Military Government (personnel, equipment, stores, buildings, etc).

(h) Be invited to appoint an understudy to the office of the Chief of Staff (A.M.G.) to take over this function on the date of final withdrawal.

(i) Be advised that:

1. The Directorate of Legal Affairs will remain directly responsible to the Zone Commander until the final withdrawal in order to assist the Zone Commander on legal matters. This will involve the retention of 3 officials only and will not affect the Italian legal structure now functioning in Zone A;

2. The Zone Commander will retain until the final withdrawal the present Military Permit Office;

3. While the Post and Telecommunications are turned over to it, it will be necessary in the interest of military security to retain until final withdrawal of US/UK military forces the one remaining Allied official in this organization.

The details of the arrangements in subparagraphs a to h above would be worked out directly by the Italian Government and A.M.G.

6. The Working Party believes that implementation of the above plan would enable the Zone Commander to retain control over the Zone for a reasonable period of time before final authority is transferred to the Italian Government simultaneously with the withdrawal of the US/UK forces.

Note: The Zone Commander is unable to agree to hand over the control of the port during the first stage, as he considers that without this control he cannot ensure the safety of the US/UK forces, particularly during the final stages of the withdrawal. He is, however, willing to admit an Italian understudy to the Director of the Port.

The Working Party gave full consideration to the Zone Commander’s objections to allowing the Italians to provide a Director of the Port of Trieste in stage one. The US/UK members of the Party prefer to leave the wording in subparagraph 5 (b) as now written, for the following reasons:

(1) As long as the Zone Commander retains supreme authority in the Zone, along with command of US/UK forces and the VGPF, he has the means at his disposal to guarantee the use of the port facilities required for the final embarkation of his military units, their equipment and supplies.

(2) In the event Italian naval vessels moved or attempted to move into the Port of Trieste, in violation of the Zone Commander’s wishes, this could not be prevented by any one Allied official as Director of the Port. Rather, the Zone Commander should call upon the US and UK Governments for necessary action.

(3) The retention of residual authority over the port facilities and services should meet the Zone Commander’s military needs.

Annex

Report by the Military Members of the United States–United Kingdom Working Party

top secret

[London,] October 28, 1953.

Military Implications of Proposal To Hand Over Zone A to the Italians While Retaining Military Forces in the Zone

1. The Military members of the Working Party consider that the separation of the Civil administration from the Military command would create the following problems:—

2. Situation with Respect to NATO

(a) Italian Administrative Authority over Zone A while US/UK troops remain in occupation would appear to place the Zone automatically in a NATO status. Any attack on the Zone would thus permit Italy to invoke Article 5 of the NATO agreement. This would seem to place Italy in an ideal position to provoke Yugoslav attack by pursuing an expansionist policy toward Zone B.

(b) There are many ways in which deliberately or otherwise the Italians could create incidents to provoke the Yugoslavs. These could take the form of minority persecutions, inflammatory radio or press attacks, popular demonstrations or mob violence, or border incidents, either within or without the Zone. Thus the Italians would have the power to create situations affecting vital US/UK national commitments even to the extent of open armed conflict.

3. Legal Status of Forces

(a) The situation of US/UK Forces in Zone A under Italian administration would require the legal safeguards of an Occupation Statute to protect both individuals and property. The existing Allied Military Government Courts could no longer operate to furnish this essential protection nor would the NATO Status of Forces Agreement be adequate or applicable. Even should the Pella government be able to pass an acceptable Statute, it is questionable whether time is available for the necessary legislative processes.

(b) Other vital but related legal problems would be created under this proposal for which no solution is apparent within the time available. These include the entire field of fiscal and customs legislation, the rights of military requisition, status of statal and parastatal housing, and criminal and civil jurisdiction.

4. Internal Security

The primary instrument of the Military Commander in the execution of his present responsibility for the maintenance of the internal security of the Zone is the Venezia Giulia Police Force, which would presumably pass to Italian control under this proposal. All existing emergency plans, either for internal or external security of the Zone, are predicated on the use of the VGPF, and would thus be invalidated under the proposal. Therefore if the Italian Administrative Authority should call on the Allied Military Commander to use troops to maintain public order, such action would be without legal basis. Also purely from the consideration of the safety of his own forces, the protection of military property and the accomplishment of his mission, the Allied Military Commander would require certain emergency powers for which no legal provision exists.

5. Morale

(a) There is a great weight of human unhappiness among the US/UK forces as a result of the sudden division of families, particularly so for a period of uncertain duration. To this must be added the considerable financial hardships inevitable when homes are broken up at short notice and officers and other ranks are compelled to make emergency arrangements for their personal effects and for the temporary accommodation of their families in conditions far from satisfactory, and which are aggravated by indefinite tenure.

(b) These factors are bound to have an adverse effect on the morale of the individual soldier. Further factors which may affect morale will be relinquishment of requisitioning powers which will limit facilities for training, organized sport, welfare and amenities.

6. Maintenance

The maintenance of the US/UK Forces in Zone A is dependent upon the availability of essential services, such as transportation, port facilities and public utilities. This would depend upon Italian cooperation both on a local and a national basis. Thus the logistic support and maintenance of the forces would be placed at the mercy of the local or national Governments.

7. General Winterton, who has been Supreme Commander of the AFT for three years, cannot be expected to assume a position of lesser importance in the Zone. It would therefore be necessary to ask General McFadyen or some other general officer to take command of the US/UK Forces remaining in Zone A, under this proposal.

8. As a final consideration it appears that the Military Commander of the US/UK Forces remaining in Zone A, under Italian administration of the Zone, would be placed in the unacceptable position of having responsibility without authority.

1. The United States-United Kingdom Working Group on Trieste met in London at the Foreign Office, Oct. 26–28. The meetings were chaired by Nicholas J.A. Cheetham, head of the three-man British Delegation. The U.S. Delegation consisted of Homer M. Byington, Jr., Director of the Office of Western European Affairs at the Department of State; Maj. Gen. C.D. Eddleman, Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, United States Army; Col. Joseph C. Anderson, Office of the Secretary of Defense; Raymond F. Courtney, First Secretary of the Embassy in London; James L. O’Sullivan, Second Secretary of the Embassy in Rome; and Lt. Col. Richard M. Lee, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, United States Army. Also participating in the meetings was a delegation from the Allied Military Government in Trieste consisting of three military men and one civilian. Copies of the minutes of the Working Party meetings on Oct. 26 and 27 and twice on Oct. 28 were transmitted to the Department of State as enclosures to despatch 1651 from London, Nov. 3. (750G.00/11–353)

   In addition to this report and annex, the Working Group prepared a Position Paper regarding the suggestion to turn over civil administration of the city of Trieste to Italy while the Allied Military Government retained control of the balance of Zone A. The Working Group concluded in this paper that the difficulties in such a course of action would be many and complicated and that, although some of the difficulties could be overcome in time, they were such “as to render such a turnover in the short term both impracticable and dangerous.” A copy of the Position Paper, dated Oct. 28, was transmitted to the Department of State as an attachment to despatch 1616 from London, Oct. 30. (750G.00/10–3053)

2. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, May 19, 1952, pp. 779–780.
3. A copy of the plan has not been found in Department of State files.