Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

750G.00/10–853: Telegram

No. 128
The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Department of State¹

top secret
niact

Rome, October 8, 1953—6 p.m.

1179. Limit distribution. V. Mallet and I met Pella 9:15 a.m. Zoppi and Casardi participated translating verbatim. Mallet opened discussion first reading text public statement (Deptel 1185, October 6²). He then read complete text secret instructions (Deptel 1182, October 6³), afterwards handing copy to Pella, but making very clear we were not leaving official document but simply record of oral presentation of proposed Trieste solution.

In reply Pella thanked us for our visit stating he was well aware our proposal was result of continuing personal efforts to find some solution. He said his first reaction was that he would have preferred if the joint communication had made a direct recognition of his proposal for a plebiscite as this solution was, in his mind, still best solution for Trieste question. Secondly, he pointed out he would have preferred it if our governments, in proposing solution, had not so constantly placed Italy on same footing as Yugoslavia. He said, however, that proposal contained “constructive and positive aspects provided it did not lose its provisional character”. He will immediately refer substance of proposal to proper authorities in Italian Government. Should proposal lose, however, its provisional character when presented to government he felt sure that Italian reaction would be negative, particularly in Parliament, inasmuch as government is bound by Bertole and Cortesi motion (Embtel 1153, October 7⁴). He said all parts of public statement and secret instructions which emphasize the provisional nature of proposal will contribute to achieving final agreement. Other parts however which emphasize the definitive nature of the proposal will make a final solution more difficult. He hoped US and UK will emphasize provisional rather than definitive nature of the proposal in all approaches to problem. Pella stated he would give his definitive answer as soon as possible but emphasized again that in presenting solution aspects of our proposal. He did not indicate whether his government would accept administration of Zone A. I asked Pella whether he would have a plebiscite in Zone A after occupation, or if he would enter negotiations with Tito on a plebiscite in whole FTT area in view of his interest in this type of solution. Pella stated that he continued to consider the plebiscite the best formula but to hold it after Italian entry into Zone A would require the removal of troops by both countries.

In closing the conversation Mallet emphasized that Italian Government must understand that the US–UK decision to withdraw from Zone A would be carried out irrespective of the Italian position. He pointed out that the proposal was more favorable to the Italians than to Yugoslavs and he hoped that Pella would concentrate on its positive and constructive aspects.

The discussion was held in a calm, friendly but not a jubilant atmosphere. My own impression is that Pella will be able to accept our proposal provided British do not continue to overemphasize either privately or publicly final nature of solution. I as well as other Embassy officers have stressed on high level Foreign Office officials the need for positive and favorable reaction to our proposal by Italian Government urging them to take advantage of favorable factors in plan in both their public and private reactions.

Foregoing report of conversation with Pella has been coordinated with British Embassy. While we have not attempted to send identical reports, there is complete substantive agreement with British report.⁵

Luce

1. Repeated for information to Belgrade, London, Paris, Trieste, and Moscow.
2. Not printed. (750G.00/10–653) The text referred to is quoted in Document 130.
3. Document 123.
4. Not printed. (750G.00/10–753)
5. In telegram 1180 from Rome, Oct. 8, Luce reported that after leaving Pella’s office that morning, she had said to Mallet that their chief problem during the next few days would be to keep Pella from overemphasizing the provisional interpretation of the plan, a statement with which Mallet agreed. Both of them thought that it would be best if the United States and the United Kingdom did not overemphasize the definitive nature of the plan. Moreover, they felt that it would be most unfortunate if Tito said publicly that he was making this de facto solution a final one by immediately annexing Zone B and claiming that this action had been suggested to him by the U.S.-U.K. démarche in Belgrade. (750G.00/10–853)