Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

EUR files, lot 59 D 233, “Austria, 1952–1955”

No. 951
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Murphy)¹

secret

[Washington,] December 23, 1954.

Subject:

• Soviet December 21 move on Austria

While it is the opinion of the three Western High Commissioners in Vienna that the Soviet charges and threats in the extraordinary meeting in the Allied Council on December 21² are a part of the current Soviet campaign against ratification of the Paris accords, it would be unwise to ignore broader implications. (Vienna’s 1355, Tab A³). The fact that the Soviet High Commissioner reiterated three times at the AC meeting “the extraordinary importance of the question” and “the serious consequences for the integrity of the Austrian State” if the AC did not accept his proposal (Vienna’s 1354, Tab B⁴) seems deserving of examination.

This memorandum is essentially an analysis for internal Departmental consideration. If, as a result, we should decide to act, we would, of course, have first to consult the British and French, to whom an approach at this time could be a delicate matter.

Some possible Soviet motivations

1. The Soviets may feel the importance of demonstrating by action that their current series of threats is not empty. Such proof of their seriousness could, of course, be reserved for after ratification, but might equally well be employed prior to ratification to create fear of it.

2. Action in Austria might be considered by the Soviets to be the least risky because (a) the Four-Power Agreement on zones of occupation and the Allied Control Agreement provide them with technically legal grounds for almost any action in their own zone; (b) while the situation in Vienna is less favorable (4-power occupation under agreement) than in the Soviet zone itself, there is no tripartite declaration on Vienna such as there is on Berlin, and (c) there have been evidences (most recently the Mendes-France unilateral moves on Austria) about which the Soviets know, of a less staunch attitude on the parts of Britain and France with regard to Austria than with regard to other areas, so that the possibilities of splitting the West may appear greater over Austria.

3. Should the Soviets proceed with their declared intentions, in the event of ratification, to formalize their military bloc, this poses for them immediate decision of the problem of the Soviet zone of Austria which they occupy militarily but do not control. Therefore, the Soviets may feel that in the next few months the stage must be set for incorporating the Soviet zone of Austria more firmly into the Soviet bloc, at least militarily.

Some possible Soviet intentions

1. Not only in the AC meeting of December 21 but in several recent meetings in Vienna and in the Communist press there have been increasing charges of Western, particularly U.S., violation of Four-Power agreements, both the Agreement on Zones of Occupation of July 9, 1945, and the Control Agreement itself. Regardless of the fact that most of the charges are without foundation and the fact that the Soviets have known about the matters concerned for years, the charges still are capable of forming a pretext for Soviet action within or without Four-Power agreements. Another set of pretexts for Soviet action could be derived from their desire to “protect” Austria, or at least the Soviet zone, from renewed Anschluss. In any event, the Soviet pattern of carefully establishing a legalistic basis for unjustified actions is not new.

2. There seem to be three lines of action open to the Soviets that would go beyond mere anti-ratification propaganda; (a) gradual reimposition of strict occupation controls in the Soviet zone, including border controls against personnel and goods, intimidation of the government, assumption of control over local and provincial law enforcement agencies and censorship. Partition could be brought about in this manner, always under the guise of Soviet rights under the Control Agreement or ostensibly to protect Austrian or Soviet security interests, although once the decision is made, the Soviets need not cloak all of their actions in legal respectability; (b) speedy dropping of the iron curtain at the western border of the Soviet zone is possible and would undoubtedly have as its intention the overthrowing or forcing out of the Austrian national government and the setting up of a puppet regime (the small Communist element among Austrians could be used); (c) a blockade of Vienna could be imposed which is a problem of a different order and more difficult to deal with than was the one of Berlin. A Vienna blockade could, of course, be included in b above.

Some possible Western counter moves

1. We could assume that so long as no action is taken to carry out the threat, it is mere propaganda to be ignored, or that it is safe to assume that the Soviets will wish to add to their pretexts before acting.

2. Withdrawal of our approximately 300 troops from the French zone, as the Soviets demand, could be done in such manner as to show how unimportant the Soviet charge is and with a denial of any U.S. violation of agreements. Past appeasements of this kind have had undesirable results, the Soviets could merely find other pretexts and our LOC would continue to run through the French zone.

3. We could assume, as we did last April when the Secretary issued a public instruction to our Chargé in Vienna to counter a Soviet threat (Tab C), that it is better to respond quickly, thereby avoiding the risk that the Soviets will overestimate their ability to move in Austria. On that assumption we could by tripartite notes to Moscow or in the next AC meeting and with suitable publicity, point out that the thinly veiled threat to the integrity of Austria is hardly in keeping with Soviet professions of peaceableness and a desire to reduce tensions, and that not only are the Soviets refusing freedom to Austria but are using it to breed fear in the free world. In such a meeting the West could also renew its demand for a treaty restoring full sovereignty to Austria.

4. As another possibility, but one I would be reluctant to recommend, we could propose the withdrawal of all foreign forces without a treaty. It would, I think, risk being twisted into a proposal either like the Soviet Berlin proposals or merely permit the Soviets to draw us into a further negotiation on the treaty. It could be taken as a sign of weakness, such as we feared would be the recent Mendès-France proposal in his UN speech. I have not checked this with the Defense Department, but I believe it also has strong reservations about withdrawal of U.S. forces while the Soviets retain their powers under the Control Agreement and their economic penetration that could easily be used as cover for military personnel.

5. If further evidence is received of Soviet intentions to take action, we could turn the full light of publicity on the evidence and make clear the strongest possible Western position that the French and British will agree to.

6. In case of the commencement of a gradual cutting off of the Soviet zone we could (a) issue a tripartite declaration concerning the West’s intention to preserve fully its rights under the Control Agreement (particularly in Vienna) and the freedom of the Austrian people; (b) make a show of force both with forces presently in Austria and by increasing our forces in the zones and Vienna, particularly the British and French; (c) bring to bear the maximum power of public opinion; (d) seek and exploit areas of Soviet weakness outside of Austria.

7. Should a quick dropping of the curtain occur either around Vienna or the entire Soviet zone, we could (a) protest directly to the Soviets and in the UN by mobilizing world opinion completely to expose the Soviet intentions and to create the kind of reaction that followed the subjugation of Czechoslovakia and the commencement of the Korean war; (b) make a show of force, including the forcing of the blockade in order to supply Austrian and our own citizens in Vienna; (c) assist the Austrian Government to establish itself in the Western zones and immediately recognize the sovereignty of Western Austria, as in the case of Western Germany; (d) provide economic aid to the Austrians, whose sources of food and much of whose industries are primarily in the Soviet zone.

8. In anticipation of the situation in 6 above, we could make blockade preparations (which might, ironically, require consideration of reestablishing food stockpiles in Vienna) and political plans with the Austrian Government. There are in existence some emergency plans that might be helpful and we are now exploring them with the Department of Defense.

Recommendation:

That we, together with the British and French, declare to the Soviets, with full publicity, the seriousness with which we would regard any attempt against the integrity of the Austrian State, regardless of Soviet pretexts.

1. Drafted by Freund and cleared with Thurston.
2. The minutes of the Allied Council meeting of Dec. 21 are in ALCO records, lot 62 F 6, “Allied Commission Minutes—1954.”
3. Telegram 1355 summarized a meeting of the three Western High Commissioners following the Allied Council meeting on the morning of Dec. 21. They agreed that the form and timing of Soviet actions during that Council meeting were directed primarily at the ratification of the Paris Agreements and that they had effectively rebutted Soviet charges. They also agreed that the Soviets would probably not press the matter any further. (763.0221/12–2154)
4. Telegram 1354 reported the Soviet allegations during the Allied Council meeting of Dec. 21 concerning the stationing of U.S. troops in the French Zone of Austria. (763.0221/12–2154)