Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199, “November 1954”

No. 942
Memorandum of Conversation, by Richard B. Freund of the Office of Western European Affairs¹

secret

[Washington,] November 22, 1954.

Subject:

• The Secretary’s Meeting with the Austrian Chancellor.

Participants:

• Dr. Julius Raab, Chancellor of Austria
• Dr. Karl Gruber, Ambassador of Austria
• Dr. Schoener, Director, Political Dept., Austrian Foreign Office
• Dr. Karasek, Austrian Foreign Office
• The Secretary
• Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson
• Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, EUR
• Mr. John Wesley Jones, WE
• Mr. Richard B. Freund, WE
• Mr. Johannes Imhof, WE (Translator)

The Secretary inquired whether the Chancellor knew if Prime Minister Mendès-France had included in his UN speech today² a proposal for an option to extend post-treaty occupation for one year beyond the 18 months to two years we already know was included in his proposal. The Chancellor replied that he was uncertain on that point, but Ambassador Thompson, who had heard the speech, confirmed that no mention of an option was made. The Chancellor said that he had rejected the idea of an option for an extension when it was raised with him by Mendès-France.³ The Chancellor, referring to Mendès-France’s suggestion, during their talks yesterday, of gradual evacuation of occupation forces, said that he was very doubtful of the value of such an idea as he had doubts about the ability of Austria and the West to control that form of evacuation.

The Secretary read to the Chancellor the press statement the Department is planning to make regarding the Austrian portion of Mendès-France’s UN speech and asked if the Chancellor would wish to include Austria along with the three Occupying Powers where they were mentioned in connection with careful study of the Mendès-France proposal. (Text of press statement attached.⁴) The Chancellor asked that Austria be so mentioned and the Secretary agreed.

The Chancellor expressed the strong desire that in the final draft of a State Treaty, a fixed calendar date be given for withdrawal of occupation forces rather than, as now provided, a number of days from ratification. The Secretary agreed, saying that an early fixed date was most desirable, as the Soviets could delay deposit of their instrument of ratification even after ratification so as to hold back entry into force of the treaty. The Chancellor wished to deprive the Soviets of any excuse for delaying troop withdrawal.

The Secretary explained the difficulty he would have in accompanying the Chancellor to the White House at 12:30 and asked if it would be agreeable if Mr. Merchant and Ambassador Thompson accompanied the Chancellor. He agreed at once.

The Chancellor then remarked that there is considerable feeling on the part of people of both parties in Austria that the anniversary of Austrian liberation should henceforth be a national day of mourning, as the next anniversary would be the 10th without Austrian freedom. This spontaneous movement among the Austrian people is disturbing to the Soviets. The Secretary mentioned the impression he has that the Soviets are now somewhat more disposed to grant a treaty. He mentioned one report recently received, but difficult to evaluate, that supports this impression. The report indicates that if the Soviets proceed with new security arrangements within the Soviet bloc, the arrangements might include agreements on stationing of Soviet forces in the satellites, eliminating the need for the LOC provisions now in the Hungarian and Romanian peace treaties that were contingent upon continued Austrian occupation. That, the Secretary said, might make it easier for the Soviets to agree to an Austrian State Treaty. The Chancellor averred that the legal situation does not seem to be so important to the Soviets who always control the satellite armies and therefore are within 60 kilometers of Vienna in any event.

The Chancellor remarked that Ambassador Thompson could testify to the fact that the Austrians have been behaving quite well. The Secretary hoped that the Chancellor realizes how extremely eager the U.S. is to obtain an Austrian treaty. If from our actions it appears that we are stubborn and unyielding, it is, the Secretary said, a matter of tactics—one of the nations on the Western side needs to be that way to offset Soviet stubbornness. The Chancellor interpreted our conduct as maintaining a straight line.

The Secretary expressed his concern over the Jewish Claims question and hoped that it will be settled at an early date. The Chancellor mentioned negotiations having taken place last week without reaching complete agreement. He assured the Secretary, however, that protection will be provided for those whose livelihood is threatened. He added that the Jewish Committee had asked too large a settlement at the beginning, to which the Secretary replied that he was sure that that did not surprise the Chancellor.

The Secretary asked if the Chancellor had any good advice for him. The Chancellor replied that he wished to reassure the Secretary that the Austrian people were well aware of who was responsible for their failure to obtain a treaty. He wished the U.S. attitude toward Austria to stay just as it is, and hoped that we would bring up the Austrian problem in any conference that should take place with the Soviets and with the Austrian Government represented.

Once the London and Paris accords⁵ are complete to the point where it is clear that there will be no turning back, the Secretary said, it will be more useful to have a conference with the Soviets. He said it is the main Soviet objective to prevent the ratification of those accords and so long as that is possible any conference on any subject would be used by the Soviets only as a means of blocking ratification. After ratification, the Secretary believed that a useful conference on Austria and Germany would be possible. Ambassador Gruber asked whether it might not be possible to have a special conference on Austria after ratification. The Secretary replied that that is a possibility worth thinking about. He thought a separate conference might be desirable, recalling the difficulties that arose at Berlin by having Austria as the third item on the agenda coming after feelings had been aroused over the German question. The Chancellor had stated that he has no objections to a meeting on both questions but does not wish to have the two linked.

The meeting concluded so as to permit the Chancellor’s departure for his meeting with the President at 12:30.⁶

1. A summary of this meeting was transmitted to Vienna in telegram 1401, Nov. 22, repeated to Paris, London, and Moscow. (033.6311/11–2254)
2. In a speech before the General Assembly on Nov. 22, Mendès-France rejected the Soviet proposals for a general conference on European security and suggested the possibility of a four-power meeting in May 1955. He stated that one step that could be taken in order to restore confidence between the four powers would be the signing of an Austrian Treaty. He then proposed that Austria accept a time limit of 18 months to 2 years for evacuation after the signing of a treaty, instead of the 90 days provided in the existing draft of the treaty.
3. Reference to Chancellor Raab’s meeting with Mendès-France in New York on Nov. 21.
4. Not attached to the source text.
5. For documentation concerning the London and Paris accords, which resulted from the Nine-Power Conference at London of Sept. 28–Oct. 3, and the Nine-Power, Four-Power, and North Atlantic Council Ministerial meetings at Paris of Oct. 20–23, see vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1294 ff. and 1404 ff.
6. No record was found of Chancellor Raab’s luncheon meeting with President Eisenhower on Nov. 22, but according to telegram 1401 (see footnote 1 above) this meeting was “friendly but confined [to] generalities.” For text of the White House statement issued following the luncheon, see Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 13, 1954, p. 910.