763.0221/1–1854: Telegram
No. 907
The United States High Commissioner
for Austria (Thompson) to the Department of
State1
1796. Saw Raab today with Figl present. I pointed out that at time of British and French reduction forces Austrian Government had informed us they saw no reason for us to do likewise. The Chancellor in public speech had recently stated that if Berlin conference failed both Russians and ourselves would be asked to reduce to token forces. This statement raised number of problems for us and number of questions which required clarification. I had been instructed to discuss whole matter frankly with him.
Among problems I mentioned difficulty continuing long range military expenditures such as housing in face Austrian pressure reduce. Also problem was possible effect on our plans for defense Europe… . Another problem was to where could we withdraw. Appeared impossible maintain US troops in Italy or Germany for defense Austria whereas Soviets could withdraw only few miles into Hungary.
I inquired what Austrians had in mind re such questions as provision for adequate Austrian security forces. Was four-power agreement anticipated on this subject and would there be any undertaking not to return forces unilaterally. Also did Austrians contemplate our withdrawal while Soviets remained in control large segment Austrian industry.
Raab replied by asking what would happen after Berlin. I said that on military side we hoped to be in position to have serious and fundamental talks. On political side impossible forecast position which would depend on Soviet action. I assured him that we would make every effort either obtain treaty or make clear it was Soviets who were blocking.
[Page 1937]Raab said Soviets had in mind equivalent withdrawal on both sides. He anticipated expansion Austrian security forces along present lines. I pointed out that unless four-power agreement were obtained Soviets could use this as excuse for alleging coalition [violation] control agreement and re-enforcing their troops. I assured him that if there were any way we could work out for Austria to take over her own defense we would be most anxious to cooperate and we realized that after eight years of occupation breakdown at Berlin would face them with dismal prospect of further long continuation this burden. Raab said important thing was for us to have confidence in Austrian Government and said there was no difference between coalition partners on foreign policy. I replied we did have confidence in them and were certain we were working for same objectives but unless we discussed methods frankly misunderstandings were likely to arise. Raab assured me categorically that Austria would take no further action on this subject without full consultation with us. I believe he was impressed by problems and questions I had raised. Believe he is determined, however, to get Russians out and would take some risks in doing so in belief that with Soviet troops gone Austria could maintain her internal security and gradually establish her full sovereignty. Chancellor said he realized Austria was outpost in defense of European civilization and desired remain so, but because it was outpost had to be more flexible in its policy than we. He is extremely sensitive of any implications that he cannot be trusted by West. He said he had little hope for Berlin and remarked that France was the weakness of Europe.
- Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Bonn; pouched to General Arnold.↩