Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

663.001/11–653: Telegram

No. 902
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Austria¹

secret

Washington, November 26, 1953—1:40 p.m.

1581. 1. In early conversation with new Austrian Foreign Minister would seem opportune to stress Western views Austrian neutralism and, therefore, we concur French proposal (Paris’ 1781²). Believe Tripartite position should be developed Vienna now for presentation by High Commissioners (after reference to respective governments) to Raab and Gruber’s successor when latter has taken office. London and Paris should advise Foreign Offices our desire coordinate Vienna.

2. In line with Paris Tripartite recommendations, background Department’s position set forth in PTS Document 20b and Annexes,³ Austrian Government should be informed that if neutralization arises in context possible future treaty negotiations we will take position that:

a. no neutralization provision should be in treaty;

b. statements already made by Austrian Government regarding its neutrality are sufficient;

c. even though Soviets insist on further more pertinent declaration neutrality, Austrian Government should not go beyond statement (separate from treaty) that it will join no organization opposed to UN principles.

3. Austrian Government should also be informed our views neutralization outside context treaty negotiations should question arise in connection with Austrian attempt obtain Soviet agreement negotiate either treaty or pre-treaty bilateral arrangements. Views in this context are:

a. Even though we appreciate domestic importance to Austrian Government of making all possible efforts achieve treaty, Austrian Government should not take initiative in making concessions on neutrality when there is no reason believe treaty could be achieved thereby. When Soviets are ready sign treaty they will make their demands known. Concessions now would only lead to further concessions being demanded at decisive time.

b. Urge Austrian Government not only avoid premature statements on military neutrality but also avoid prejudicing or restricting its post-treaty economic cooperation with West. HICOMs should also consider possible reference to keeping door open for political association at some future time when European integration further evolved.

4. We believe few general observations about dealings with USSR might be appropriate at time of your conversations with Austrians regarding neutrality. Among those which will occur to you we suggest HICOMs consider:

a. stressing that only answer to Austrian problem is restoration of unrestricted sovereignty by State Treaty and that any bilateral dealing short of this with USSR would, even if limited agreements reached, only delay treaty and might well be achieved at price conditions permanently prejudicing Austrian freedom;

b. acknowledging Austria’s inability under occupation to side openly with West but warning that entanglement with East risky and useless;

c. possibly recalling to Austrian Government outcome of efforts their country to negotiate with powerful dictatorship in the 1930’s.

5. Appreciate your consideration and comments above procedure and substance.⁴

Dulles

1. Drafted by Appling and cleared by Freund and Bonbright. Repeated to London, Paris, and Moscow.
2. Telegram 1781 noted the recommendation of the French Foreign Ministry that the Austrians be informed of the views of the three Western powers concerning the question of Austrian neutrality. (663.001/11–653)
3. Reference to the position papers prepared by the Tripartite Working Group in Paris in anticipation of possible talks with the Soviets. Regarding this Working Group, see Document 905.
4. Following a meeting on Dec. 10 with the British and French High Commissioners in Vienna, Thompson reported that Caccia felt that he had been assured categorically by Raab on several occasions that Raab would never take up the question of Austrian neutrality with the Russians without prior consultation with the West and that no commitment of any kind would be made should the Russians raise the subject without prior consultation. For this reason, according to telegram 1501 from Vienna, Dec. 10, Caccia was not willing to join a formal tripartite démarche to the Austrians on this subject. (663.001/12–1053) In a meeting with Thompson on Dec. 14, Raab repeated the assurances he had given to Caccia. (Telegram 1537 from Vienna, Dec. 15, 663.001/12–1553)