Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

663.001/2–353: Telegram

No. 844
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

secret
niact

Washington, February 4, 1953—6:20 p.m.

5177. Dept assumes British, French, and Austrians (Vienna’s 2248²) hope Soviets will attend Feb 6 meeting and prefer tactics at meeting be designed to keep Soviets there. In light of above assumption and Soviet note and letter (London’s 4281³) Dept suggests tactics Deptels 4713⁴ and 4956⁵ should be modified. West Deputies should avoid providing Soviets excuses to walk out and should not introduce abbreviated treaty at beginning of meeting but rather wait until Soviets have demonstrated that they want no treaty at this time.

Dept thinks that if Soviets attend meeting, chairman after a review of treaty history with emphasis on Soviet obstruction and Western interests in quick conclusion of a treaty might ask Soviet Deputy for his views. If he introduces extraneous issues, answer is clear. If Soviets request discussion on basis long draft treaty, you should declare readiness to do so but at same time attempt to center discussions on Article 35 as prime example of outmoded and punitive nature of long draft treaty (para 4 Deptel 4713). Dept considers it would be unwise to become involved in discussion of five unagreed articles before West position on Article 35 has been made clear. Above, of course, will depend upon your ability obtain French and U.K. concurrence in these tactics. However, if at any point Soviets stall on purely procedural point, or in any way clearly demonstrate unwillingness to conclude treaty at this time, or if you are placed in untenable position, or at any time you consider opportune you should take occasion to introduce abbreviated text. Expression of West’s unwillingness to be [any?] longer bound by Article 35 and introduction of abbreviated text are definite objectives to be made before a possible Soviet walkout.

All above subject your discretion.

Foregoing considerations are, of course, purely tactical. US position continues to be based on abbreviated treaty.

Matthews

1. Drafted by Collins and cleared by Land, Roberts, Freimarck, Barbour, E.P. Allen, Byington, and Bonbright. Repeated to Paris, Moscow, and Vienna.
2. Telegram 2248 summarized a meeting between the Western High Commissioners and Vollgruber in which Vollgruber stressed the importance of getting the Russians to the conference table and of not allowing them to break off negotiations on the basis of the Western powers’ insistence on a discussion of the abbreviated treaty. (663.001/2–453)
3. Telegram 4281 transmitted to the Department of State a translation of the text of the Soviet letter of Feb. 3. (663.001/2–353) Regarding the Soviet note of Jan. 27 and the letter of Feb. 3, see the Editorial Note, supra.
4. Telegram 4713 proposed a series of considerations to serve as a guide for Western tactics in the event that the Soviets attended the proposed meeting of the Deputies for the Austrian Treaty on Jan. 30. (663.001/1–1553)
5. Telegram 4956 stated that the Department of State favored the British position that the Western powers press their insistence to talk on the basis on the short draft not only to the point where the Soviets have refused, but also to the point where the Soviets insist that the West withdraw the short draft. It stressed that every effort should now be made to establish positively that the abbreviated treaty represents the present Western position. (663.001/1–2053)