663.001/7–1852: Telegram
No. 810
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Kennan)
to the Department of State
secret
Moscow, July 18, 1952—5
p.m.
129. With regard to possible placing of Austrian Treaty problem before UNGA, wld make fol observations:
- (a)
- Sovs presumably shy at prospect of Aust settlement in advance of Ger settlement for reason that they wld thereby not only lose occupation rights in Aust but also right to milit communication lines thru Rumania and Hungary, whereas we wld continue to sit on Aust border with our forces in Bavaria. Line of communication rights in Hungaria and Rumania are important to them because they have taken public position against milit bases or troops [Page 1771] stationing on foreign soil and wld be embarrassed to find grounds consistent with this position for continued retention Sov forces Rumania and Hungary if communication rights shld cease to exist.
- (b)
- As general proposition, believe Sovs wld like to reserve position on Aust until they know roughly what shape Ger settlement is to take. Their position in Austria represents card in their hand which they might wish to play in final phases of Ger settlement.
- (c)
- Therefore, however disinclined we may be to recognize connection between Aust and Ger problems, Sov will presumably continue to think of them as part of one single problem, and their reactions are not apt to be intelligible unless viewed in this light.
- (d)
- Whether, in light of these facts it is desirable to try to embarrass Sovs and place ourselves in favorable light by raising treaty question in UN is one which cannot be answered from here. Whatever advantages this might or might not hold from standpoint of Western opinion, I see no reason to hope that it wld cause any particular concern to Moscow or to have any appreciable effect on Sov policy. If there are to be any changes in this policy, they will come for other and more practical reasons.
Kennan