663.001/1–1152: Telegram
No. 783
The Chargé in the United Kingdom
(Penfield) to the Department of State
1
3059. Aust Amb Wimmer has expressed to Emb officer hope of his govt that west powers will be prepared concede Sov wording or at least will be prepared to go a long way in making concessions to Sov views, of disputed arts to draft treaty in interests of securing Sov agreement at forthcoming Aust deps meeting. He said that while he had no illusions as to likelihood that Sovs are yet ready to sign a treaty in any form his govt believed that time had robbed issues involved in disputed arts of most of their substantive importance and that Sov texts of these arts cld now be conceded without undue damage to Aust and west interests. As example he pointed out there remained only between 10 and 15 thous DP’s including less than 2,000 Sov nationals, in which Sovs might be interested [Page 1722] under Art 16 and that it shld be possible to find means of caring for them before treaty came into force.
Wimmer emphasized that it was very difficult for persons who are not as close to “the front” as Aust are to realize effects of seven years of occupation, and implied that he hoped greater weight wld be given to views of those at the front by those behind the lines. In this connection he mentioned that altho burden of Sov occ forces was by far most onerous, burden of Fr and Brit occ costs also had its effects. He earnestly hoped that west powers wld feel able to make concessions necessary to meet Sov position on disputed arts.
Comment: Appears Wimmer wished impress US that morale of Austs will suffer if concessions are not made in effort to secure agreement, and that there will be some popular resentment against US (since willingness of Brit and Fr to make concession will probably become known). For latest Brit views see para 6 Embtel 3055 rptd info Vienna 132, Paris 1414, Moscow 62, Bonn 183.2
- Repeated to Bonn for Reber and to Vienna.↩
- Telegram 3055 noted in paragraph 6 that the Foreign Office was disappointed with the unwillingness of the Department of State to make concessions on the unagreed articles to the Soviets. It was the belief of Foreign Office officials that without concessions there would be no basis for the resumption of the negotiations or the achievement of a realistic Western policy. (663.001/1–1052)↩