Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

611.62B/10–2753

No. 760
Memorandum by John C. Ausland of the Office of German Political Affairs to the Director of the Office (Morris)¹

confidential

Washington, October 27, 1953.

Subject:

• U.S. Policy Toward Soviet Occupied Germany.

Now that we have completed much of our preparations for the Paris talks and have the note to the Soviet Union out of the way,² I have had a little time to give some further thought to our policy on Soviet Occupied Germany:

1. Our objective in Soviet Occupied Germany, as set forth in NSC 160/1,³ is the reduction of Soviet power. We have learned several things in this regard in the last few months. The demonstrations in Soviet Occupied Germany in June indicated that it is possible to defy Soviet power. Unfortunately, however, they also showed (as has been generally recognized all along) that successful revolt against a communist regime backed up by Soviet armed forces is not possible without support from the outside. Even within these limits, the June events indicated that we are in a position to influence significantly—under certain circumstances—what happens in Soviet Occupied Germany. While we knew before June 16 that RIAS was an important factor in East German life, it is now pretty clear that it played a major role in spreading the demonstrations from East Berlin to the Zone. The food program has also made it clear that the right program at the right time can redound to our benefit. In other words, the Soviet position in Germany is by no means impregnable, and western actions can take advantage of its weaknesses.

2. In considering U.S. policy toward Soviet Occupied Germany, however, I believe that we must be careful to take into account the effect our actions will have on other U.S. policies. Soviet Occupied Germany happens to be the point at which two U.S. policy areas—the satellites and Germany—overlap. This picture is further complicated by the fact that our policy on Germany as a whole is linked to our policy on the Federal Republic, which is directed toward its integration with the West. (I might point out also that in the middle of Soviet Occupied Germany is Berlin, a factor which further complicates the situation.) I believe that U.S. policy toward Soviet Occupied Germany should, therefore, be conceived in terms of these three interlocking policy areas: eastern Europe, Germany and Western Europe.

3. From time to time a question will arise as to the relative priority among our various policies on these areas. I think it pretty clear that if there is any conflict between our policy of reducing Soviet power in Soviet Occupied Germany (as well as the other satellites) and our policy of integrating the Federal Republic with the West, our policy of integration should be given priority.⁴ To take one example, we might find that a given course of action regarding eastern Europe would arouse so much opposition among our allies in western Europe that it would seriously jeopardize progress on the EDC, in which case we might have either to abandon or postpone this course of action.…

While the main conflicts that will arise in the near future will be between our policy regarding the Federal Republic and our policy of reducing Soviet power in Soviet Occupied Germany and eastern Europe, eventually a conflict may also arise between our policy of unifying Germany and that directed toward the development in eastern Europe of governments independent of the Soviet Union. While our policy on Soviet Occupied Germany can profitably be considered in relationship to our policy toward the eastern European satellites, we should not forget that Soviet Occupied Germany introduces policy considerations not applicable to the eastern European satellites.

4. Another point that we should keep in mind is that we are not likely to achieve the reunification of Germany on terms acceptable to the West in the near future. The courses of action directed toward the reduction of Soviet power in Soviet Occupied Germany should, therefore, be formulated with the long pull as well as the short run in mind. Although recent events have served to weaken dramatically the Soviet position in Germany, these past months have probably been unusually propitious.

If our current note exchange is terminated or talks take place and are fruitless, we may be presented with quite a different situation. We may then find ourselves primarily concerned with reconciling the east Germans to a protracted struggle. Our primary problem then will be keep hope alive, without arousing unwarranted expectations of early unification. While to pose this problem is not to solve it—and I wonder whether there is any ready formula for its solution, we can at least keep in mind that the reduction of Soviet power is an objective requiring constant medication—rather than occasional shots of adrenalin.

1. Marginal comments on the source text indicate that this memorandum was read by Laukhuff and Merchant.
2. For documentation concerning the Tripartite Working Group meeting in Paris Oct. 21–Nov. 2 and Dec. 16–21, see Documents 312 ff. For documentation concerning the exchanges of notes between the United States and the Soviet Union, July 15, 1953–Jan. 1, 1954, see Documents 257 ff.
3. Document 214.
4. In the margin next to this sentence, Merchant wrote the words: “I agree!”