Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

Department of the Army files, 338–78–0071, 337/1, B/P 7

No. 736
Record of the Seventh CINCUSAREUR–HICOG/Commanders Conference, Heidelberg, July 27, 1953, 1 p.m.

[Extract]

secret

Heidelberg, July 27, 1953, 1 p.m.

. . . . . . .

Dr. Conant:

General Bolte, gentlemen, when I reported a month ago¹ I spoke of the rapid changes which had occurred in regards to the Soviet attitude toward the inhabitants of the East Zone and the East Sector in Berlin and the significance of the events which had taken place there on June 17th. I think today I will say a word or two about the situation as it has been affected by those events on the international level and something about the internal political situation in the Bundesrepublik. Going back to when we were here a month ago, at that time the Bundestag was still in session and they had just passed the electoral law and set the date for September 6th for the federal election. As I remember correctly I pointed out that all the discussions of international affairs in Germany until September 6th would be heavily conditioned by the forthcoming election and that has proved to be the case already, I think, and we will expect before we meet again at the end of August, the last day of August, I believe it is, to hear a good deal from the leaders of the different parties here in Germany about the pros and cons of the Chancellor’s policy. I take it that the election will be fought largely on what might be called foreign policy, although basic differences in regard to domestic policy also separate the major parties—the CDU, the Chancellor’s party, the SPD, the Socialist Party, the chief opposition, and the FDP and DP to other members of the coalition. The debate in the Bundestag on July 1st, just after we last met showed the explosive nature of the international problem in relation to the German political scene. This debate which I think was precipitated in part by the events in the East Zone of June 17th was directed at the whole question of the best policy which could be pursued by the Federal Republic in advising the occupying powers in the three western zones as to the attitude toward the fourth occupying power, the Soviet, in regard to the policy in the East Zone. The government’s position, as stated by Chancellor Adenauer, had been to set forth clearly the six conditions which were essential for free elections. Before that the Bundestag had repeated the conditions necessary for getting ahead with a unification of Germany, the four-point program, which was not very different from the position of the three allied occupying powers of a year ago. But to these now the Chancellor added six points which were essential if free elections were to be carried out—free interzonal crossings, removal of the dead zone along the border, freedom of movement for all Germans throughout Germany, freedom of all political parties in the East Zone, freedom of press and assembly, and the creation of a democratic system of justice and defense against tyranny and terror. The last is a little vague but I guess it might apply to repealing many of the laws decreed now in force in the so-called Democratic Republic in the East Zone. It was clear, I am told, from those that followed the debate that the SPD, the main opposition, the Socialist Party, tried to force the Chancellor to adopt a motion calling for a Four-Power talk and their motion was just defeated by close vote and the government’s motion, which was in a more general term, was accepted. It was made quite plain, however, by the Chancellor at that time and by leaders of the CDU Party, that they were not opposed to a Four-Power conference if it had any chance of success in whatever framework might be possible to insure that it would have some success. And then as you know, the Bermuda conference was given up, the idea of it, or if not given up, indefinitely postponed and instead of it on rather short notice the three foreign ministers met in Washington early in July²—July 11th, if I remember the date—and there was much speculation as to the attitude they would take in regard to this whole problem: a. German unification and b. the relation of that problem to the EDC Treaties still hanging fire in all countries except Germany. What was said was a restatement about the importance of EDC, about putting less emphasis on the military aspects and more on the aspects of its part of overall plan for European unity between the six nations, of which the Schuman Plan is the first step. But nevertheless the fact that it was indorsed by Bidault, the French, is not without significance, concerning the crop of pessimistic rumors that one always hears from Paris, namely, that the EDC Treaties are dead. Furthermore, I have been told, though I can’t give you the exact proof of this statement, that Bidault in a press conference stated after the meeting something to the effect that he hoped to be able to introduce the EDC Treaties into the French parliament sometime shortly after the parliament reconvened in the fall. In short, the communiqué³ was an endorsement of the EDC and the concept back of it and it was also a statement of the importance of German unity through the road of all German elections, the position really held by the three occupying powers a year ago, the same position as that spelled out in the four points of the Bundestag debate but with special reference to the conditions necessary for free elections, somewhat similar to the Chancellor’s position in his statement before the Bundestag the 1st of July. It asked, as you know, that the Russians have a Four-Power conference at the ministerial level—not at the top level. It has generally been stated in the press, and I think it can be stated here to be a fact that the Chancellor had a great deal of influence on this decision. At the last moment he sent a representative to Washington, Mr. Blankenhorn (?) with a message which has not been made public but a good deal of which has been said about it, which was to the extent that he urged a Four-Power conference at the foreign ministers level and that his general point of view, so the papers say, was effective in persuading all concerned to the communiqué that was issued. So I think that the upshot of the Washington meeting in terms of German internal situation would be a triumph—I think that’s not too strong a word—for the Chancellor. I think it is very hard for his opposition—the SPD—now to throw in his face what they have for the past that he never did want a Four-Power talk, he never did want German reunification, that he put EDC ahead of the reunification of Germany. It seems to me that the net result of what has occurred since we last met here and of the Washington conference has been to turn the flank pretty effectively of the opposition. This is further emphasized by the note which you may have read in yesterday’s Stars & Stripes from President Eisenhower to Chancellor Adenauer summing up the way the President sees the outcome of this Three-Power conference in Washington, in which the President flatly made the statement that there is no contradiction to his mind between EDC on the one hand and German unification on the other. It has been stated by some observers, and thus I make the statement in confidence, that possibly the communiqué stating as it did that the Four-Power conference would not be held until the end of September was too obvious support of the Chancellor for it clearly would have been to the advantage of the SPD to have Four-Power conferences in the midst of the elections, hoping that the Russians could cause enough trouble to cloud the issue. Some newspapers have said this is supporting the Chancellor a little too obviously; perhaps some papers will say the same thing about other things that have been done; even possibly about the President’s letter. I wouldn’t want to pass judgment on that but clearly the policy of the Chancellor has been so much the policy of the governments of the United States, Great Britain and France that it would be pretty hard to see why those governments wouldn’t be anxious for a continuation of that same policy. Officially, HICOG, and all of us are neutral in this election. We might even do harm to people that we were for if we took any other position. Nevertheless, we are supporting the Chancellor’s position and his success, I think, is quite clear and the papers of the opposition will have to make the most of it. So much for the German internal situation. I won’t pass on the outcome of the election. It would be unwise from more points of view than one. We meet again before we know the results of the election. Let me say just a word or two about the situation in the East Zone in Berlin. General Timberman will report in more detail on that situation. Among the unexpected things that have happened is the fall of Beria and the question in everybody’s mind how does that affect the attitude of the Soviets in regard to a. an answer to this communication from the three foreign ministers and b. their handling of affairs in the East Zone—in the East Sector in Berlin. I have heard many speculations about the relations for example of my opposite number there, Semioniv, to the new powers in the Kremlin, if the new powers be actually in the saddle, and for the present again I make no prophesy. It seems to me the situation uncertain and possibly the failure of the Russians to make any clear-cut answer to this proposal of a Four-Power talk on the foreign ministers level, the failure to date, is a reflection of their uncertainty and the fact they haven’t organized their forces themselves to a clear-cut policy. It is interesting that they haven’t quickly come back with either an acceptance or a rejection or any bold offers. We were told about a month or more ago that they were certain to make some great offer, such as the unification of Germany if we would all withdraw our troops. On the contrary, from the articles I have seen published in Pravda rather indicate they were taking a rather carping line about this communication—why did we put it forward in this form, etc., raising small objections. Again, we may find a bold statement from them before we meet again. For the moment Semioniv has taken much the same view with regards to events in the East Zone June 17th. As you know, blaming General Timberman and myself for having stirred up the trouble there and then this offer of food which was made a short time ago and rejected and then that has been tied into alleged action of sabotours and criminal elements in Berlin, etc., and in a recent note Semioniv accused us of fomenting trouble in his sector of Berlin by means of giving away food in the West Sector of Berlin. So the attitude seems to be not part of any peace offensive, but rather one of dragging their heels in all matters connected with any cooperation with the west. Actually, the food situation today is in an interesting state. We can’t tell what is going to happen. As you know, we made the offer of food; it was rejected by the Soviets and then Washington stated the food was coming anyway and correspondence with Chancellor Adenauer at his request the food was turned over to his government. The first shiploads are being unloaded in Hamburg today and will be taken over by his representatives with the understanding that they will make it available to inhabitants of the East Zone and the east Sector of Berlin in whatever way may prove to be feasible. Therefore, the problem is in the hands of the government of the German Republic. What way will prove feasible remains to be seen if the Russians refuse to cooperate as they have to date. One method that is being tried is the method that started this morning of the people coming from the East Zone and East Sector and get a coupon if they prove they are from the East Zone and they can pick up a package of food and return. This food is for the moment coming from the stockpile but will be replaced by food which is being transferred from US custody to the Federal Republic custody which will then go to Berlin. The Russians have indicated that they are objecting to this very strongly, they have threatened reprisals, they have threatened to cut Berlin in half, they have threatened to take away the food when the people return; for the moment the problem is up to them. We will see what they will do. As of noon today I believe the food distribution was going orderly and the Russians have taken no action. That this has caused some difficulty, along with their other troubles in the East Sector seems quite clear. What they will do to resolve those difficulties, how they will relate them to their possible answer to the note of the Three Power foreign ministers remains to be seen. I think those were the high points for the last month. A great deal has happened. I thought July was supposed to be a quiet month here but it hasn’t proved to be, even if the Bundestag has recessed.…

. . . . . . .

1. For a record of the sixth conference, see Document 721.
2. The Foreign Ministers met in Washington July 10–14.
3. For text, see vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1703–1706.