Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

762.022/6–654: Telegram

No. 693
The Under Secretary of State (Smith) to the Department of State¹

secret
priority

Geneva, June 6, 1954—11 a.m.

Secto 392. Limited distribution. Reference: Tedul 156 (Paris 4411, Bonn 3418, London 6570).² In conversation with Bidault yesterday I observed that in opinion my government Saar agreement³ reached at Strasbourg between Teitgen and Adenauer probably best that could be obtained, adding we believe it most important that final agreement be achieved soonest and solicited his views. Bidault stated categorically he did not believe that Strasbourg agreement was best obtainable adding he felt pressures he was receiving from Paris to see Adenauer Monday were “madness” which might well cause downfall French Government. He did not feel that Saar issue should be raised until after Indochinese debate in Parliament had been terminated. He connected Saar and EDC questions very closely and added that French Parliament could not swallow too much (Indochina, Saar, and EDC) at one time. He, Laniel and Pleven, had too many enemies on all these issues to make it wise to present them to government in quick order. He felt it preferable to stagger them in order to divide opponents. He said after reflection he would advise me his best estimate on timing.

He said many of his colleagues and friends were showering him with messages pressing for a Saar settlement in two or three days, which he knew was impossible. I replied that the US was not pressing to this extent, but that we had pressed the Germans very hard as we were acutely aware of the importance of an early settlement. I sincerely hoped that our French friends, who were very good traders, would not let their desire to obtain the best possible bargain obscure the vital matter of timing, particularly in relation to EDC, for which Bidault had fought so courageously and skillfully.

He indicated he would be willing for Laniel to introduce three issues as a package only on understanding that if Parliament voted against them, M Laniel would agree to dissolution Parliament. Bidault seemed quite confident on results new elections being of opinion his party would gain more than 50 seats in Parliament, but he remarked that some of these would probably be at “the expense of Mr. Laniel”. He spoke in very complimentary way of Laniel, for whom he seems to have considerable regard.

Smith

1. Repeated to London, Bonn, and Paris.
2. Tedul 156 reported that Teitgen planned to meet Bidault on June 6 in Geneva and that Bidault might then see Adenauer on the following day. Smith was instructed to tell Bidault, if an appropriate occasion arose, that the United States considered the Saar agreement the best that could be obtained and that the United States believed that a final agreement should be achieved quickly. (762.022/6–454)
3. Transmitted in Coled 249, Document 688.