Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

762.022/5–2554: Telegram

No. 691
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State¹

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Bonn, May 25, 1954—5 p.m.

3661. Paris pass Bruce. Blankenhorn informed us this morning that Berard brought Sauvagnargues to call on Chancellor last night with message from Laniel requesting that German Cabinet action on Strasbourg agreement regarding Saar² be postponed until after May 30.

Sauvagnargues went on to say that Schumann was prepared to accept general lines of Strasbourg agreement, but that French would have several proposals for modifications. Of these, only changes he was in position to present to Germans at present were as follows:

(1) Replace first sentence of Art 1 by following: “Le statut europeen de la Saar n’est define de la facon suivante.” There would, Sauvagnargues added, also be some revision of the language describing the three phases.

(2) Regarding Art 12(B), replace words “Sous reserve de l’article 13” by “Dans le domaine des echanges” and add to second phrase “comprenu de l’evolution economique europeenne.” In fourth sentence, insert “L’interet de la Saar.”

(3) Regarding Art 12(C), replace word “immediat” by “immediatement,” and replace rest of sentence by third sentence of paragraph 8 of Schumann memo of March 8.³

Chancellor said he would have to study French request, whereupon Berard asked for German acceptance of other revisions set forth in enclosure to Schumann’s letter of May 6.⁴ Chancellor said he could not accept these, pointing out that to reopen Strasbourg agreement in this manner could only lead to requests for revisions from German side also. He went on to say, however, that rather than attempt refinement of agreement now, German Govt would be prepared, once EDC is ratified, to discuss with French, even prior to European conference on Saar, any suggestions which latter might wish to raise which would make van Naters plan more precise.

Blankenhorn said Chancellor was disturbed by this French move, which he interpreted as Quai d’Orsay’s first step in moving away from Strasbourg agreement in order to prolong Saar negotiations as pretext for further postponement of EDC debate. Chancellor felt he could not accept changes in agreement as set forth above, and while he had decided reluctantly to wait until after May 30 to bring agreement to his cabinet, he could go no further in meeting new French demands.

We believe this decision absolutely correct and suggest Dept consider advisability informing French of our inability to support their efforts to reopen negotiations.

Chancellor negotiated a formal written agreement with representative of France whom he understood to have full powers to negotiate ad referendum.

This agreement reached in presence of (and in close association with) two representatives of neutrals, Spaak and van Naters. New French approach to Germans is at too low a level and it seems advisable any further discussion should be with participation of Spaak and van Naters or raised to level Bidault–Adenauer.

Conant

1. Repeated to Paris and London.
2. Transmitted in Coled 249, Document 688.
3. The text of this memorandum was transmitted in telegram 3278 from Paris, Mar. 9. (762.022/3–954)
4. The text of the letter and the enclosure were transmitted in telegrams 4281 and 4282 from Paris, May 8. (762.022/5–854)