Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

762.022/5–654: Telegram

No. 682
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State¹

secret
priority

Paris, May 6, 1954—1 p.m.

4224. I had a long interview with Maurice Schumann late Wednesday² evening regarding Saar. Schumann states that new German proposal is completely unacceptable as a basis of negotiation. He says it is too brief, too general, and attempts to bury fundamental differences of views in general terms, which is not acceptable. He pointed out that while the German proposal claimed on its face to be in accordance with van Naters report, it omitted the content of at least 12 paragraphs of the van Naters report,³ including in particular Article 19. He was particularly upset by Hallstein’s proposal to make the Saar commissioner a tenth member of the High Authority of the Coal and Steel Community. He said that this was utterly impossible because there would be a basic conflict between the duties of the Saar Commissioner, as the representative of the Saar for defense and foreign affairs matters, and his duties as a supranational member of the High Authority. He likened the situation to one in which the Secretary-General of NATO was at the same time the foreign minister of one of the NATO countries. He also commented that this suggestion would require the revision and re-ratification by the six nations of the Schuman plan treaty, which was obviously out of the question.

As a result of this, he said, he had regretfully come to the conclusion that he could no longer trust Hallstein’s personal good faith in this matter. He said he had enough difficulty with some of his own people in the Quai d’Orsay, who were working against the EDC, to be able to recognize the same thing when showed up in other places. Schumann now feels that Hallstein belongs to the group in the German Govt who are secretly working against EDC. He then said that Gerstenmaier, some time ago, had warned him against Hallstein. In spite of this feeling he was prepared to make one last attempt with Hallstein. If this did not succeed, he felt there was nothing left except an appeal to Adenauer which he was prepared to make. He expressed full confidence in Adenauer. I said nothing to discourage Schumann in his feelings about Hallstein as it seems that they may well be of service in breaking down the resistance on the French side to a meeting between Bidault and Adenauer in the near future.

Schumann then read me the draft of a letter which he is sending Hallstein today, Thursday.⁴ He said that he would furnish me with a copy as soon as the letter had been actually delivered to Hallstein. I cannot help but note this strict observance of diplomatic amenities as compared to Blankenhorn’s performance in giving MacArthur a copy of German proposals prior to their submittal to the French.

Schumann’s letter to Hallstein was couched in polite terms, but firmly rejected possibility of the use of the latest German proposal as a basis for negotiation. The letter then went on to say that the French felt that the only real basis of negotiation should be the van Naters report itself, as approved by General Affairs Committee of Council of Europe, and they proposed that be adopted as nearly as possible in toto with only such modifications as might be mutually decided upon. Letter concluded by stating that aide-mémoire was enclosed, giving the French views on the van Naters Plan.

Aide-mémoire states that the French propose minor changes in Articles 9, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 27, and 28 (subparagraph “c” only). The changes suggested are in each case spelled out in detail and on hearing them read it appeared to me that they were truly minor and should not cause difficulty. Aide-mémoire then states that France will require modifications substantial enough to require further negotiations in Articles 1, 7, and 12. The remaining 17 and two-thirds articles of van Naters report are accepted by France verbatim. The aide-mémoire then requests the Germans to indicate which articles in their view require substantial modifications and goes on to suggest a further meeting between Hallstein and Schumann, which should be limited to negotiations on the articles still in dispute.

Schumann then told me that the French considered there was a direct link between Article 1 and Article 19. From previous information, they were sure the Germans could not accept the portions of Article 19 and regarding assurances or assents to assurances by the FedRep. (Hallstein confirmed to me that this portion of Article 19 was totally unacceptable to Germans.) Schumann told me that if by any chance the Germans would be willing to accept full text of Article 19, France in return would accept Article 1 in its present form. However, if Germans objected to Article 19, French were prepared to grant their objections and make necessary changes and, in return, would insist on a change in Article 1.

French suggestion for Article 1 was as follows: Since FedRep cannot accept an agreement which states that Saar becomes European territory at once and French Govt cannot accept an agreement that says Saar becomes European territory at some time in future, French propose that nothing whatsoever be said about when the Saar becomes European territory. Article 1 should merely state that when the EPC comes into existence it will control Saar Govt.

Changes in Article 7, while substantial enough to require negotiation, did not appear, in Schumann’s view, to constitute any real difficulty. There remains only Article 12 covering economic settlement. Schumann said that this article as drafted is unacceptable to France because it is too general in nature and contains within it the possibility of drawing completely contradictory conclusions as to its meaning and intent. French would require further precisions and clarifications. These precisions will bear primarily on the form of controls that must be set up to prevent German goods flowing into France duty free. French can in no case accept any form of control which will require reinstitution of a customs organization on Franco-Saar border. In effect that means that only form of control possible will be the quota system for German-Saar trade, which the French have had in the back of their minds for a long time.

I am informing British Embassy of this development which apparently goes beyond the information received by Jebb in his talk with Schumann yesterday morning, because at that time Schumann’s counter-proposal was not yet ready. It seems to me that new French position represents a real advance as it in effect accepts, in a very concrete manner, Adenauer’s proposal of last March 9.⁵ By emphasizing van Naters report it follows directly the line which US and UK Govts had intended to take in their joint representation. In view of this I feel HICOG should be prepared to support strongly with German Govt the acceptance of van Naters report as the sole basis of negotiation and the limitation of negotiations to disagreed articles.

Dillon

1. Transmitted in two sections and repeated to London and Bonn.
2. May 5.
3. Regarding van Naters’ report, see Document 640.
4. Translations of the letter to Hallstein and the enclosed aide-mémoire were transmitted in telegrams 4281 and 4282 from Paris, May 8. (762.022/5–854)
5. Regarding Adenauer’s meeting with Bidault on Mar. 9, see Coled 175, Document 668.