Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

762.022/4–2254: Telegram

No. 678
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State¹

top secret

Paris, April 22, 1954—3 p.m.

4011. Limit distribution. I had an hour’s talk Wednesday morning with Maurice Schumann in which he gave me his view of the results of his latest talks with Hallstein on the Saar.² He said that the formal meetings which were attended by four or five experts on each side had made very little, if any, progress and had ended with both sides deadlocked.³ Therefore, he had determined to see if further progress could be made by an informal talk between himself and Hallstein. He had asked Hallstein to lunch with him alone at Versailles on Sunday, April 11. Hallstein had accepted and asked if he could bring Ophuels⁴ with him. Accordingly, Schumann, Hallstein and Ophuels met at lunch and afterwards walked in the park at Versailles and discussed the Saar for four hours. No record or notes of any kind were made and it was agreed to keep this conversation in greatest secrecy. On the French side only Bidault and Berard have been fully informed. Laniel has been briefly informed.

Maurice Schumann during this conversation made the following proposals as his view of what could be done to reach settlement. He said that these proposals were acceptable to Bidault and that he was confident that they would also be accepted by a majority of the French Cabinet. He said that naturally a settlement along these lines would be bitterly attacked in the National Assembly by the opponents of EDC.

The proposals to Hallstein were as follows:

1. France will withdraw its request for a pledge by the Federal Republic to support the Saar agreement as long as the Federal Republic remains in existence. Schumann pointed out that this pledge was a vital element of the Van Der Goes report⁵ and was the very basis on which Van Der Goes had asked for French concessions. This is spelled out in the Preamble to the Van Der Goes report. He emphasized that the French had never suggested that the hands of a future all German Government should be tied in any way, and that what they were not willing to give us was a pledge by the Federal Republic. Schumann said that this concession by France would cause difficulties in the National Assembly, as it would enable enemies of EDC to attack the permanence of the Saar settlement. However, Schumann said that he had told Hallstein that, as a politician, he realized that it would be politically impossible to ask the Bundestag to vote such a pledge. Therefore, France would drop its request.

2. Schumann also said that France would drop its request that the European Commissioner for the Saar have a full voice in all European Ministerial organs. France will agree to the consultative status desired by the Germans and contained in the Van Der Goes report with one exception. This exception would apply only in case arrangements are made in the future for the Saar to join the EDC in some manner. Schumann felt that if this came about and the lives of Saar citizens were at stake, then the European Commissioner should have some sort of voice on certain of the problems that come up in the Council of Ministers. He said that this voice should in no event be able to hold up or block action in the Council of Ministers, and should not be a full voice for all problems.

(Comment: I discussed this again later in the evening with Schumann and Alphand. Schumann apparently is not very clear as to what he has in mind here and it may well be that this thought could be omitted from the Saar agreement and covered in a separate Franco-German understanding.)

3. The French will agree that when, and if, EPC comes into effect, the Saar, as European territory, will be controlled by the organs of the EPC. However, it is necessary that the status of the Saar be settled permanently now and not be subject to future negotiations. Therefore, the French are asking German agreement to immediate Europeanization of the Saar under the auspices of the Council of Europe, as provided in Van Der Goes report. They wish this agreement to Europeanize under the Council of Europe to be so worded that no delay in the coming into force of EPC could be used by the Germans as a pretext to reopen and renegotiate the status of the Saar. Thus, Europeanization would be initially under the Council of Europe, but would be shifted to the EPC when, and if, the EPC comes into effect.

In this connection, Schumann emphasized the importance of the French proposal to increase democratic controls for the Coal and Steel Community, and the EDC. He said he hoped that the Germans would realize the importance of the French willingness to support a universally elected Assembly to control these two institutions. He stated further that it must be obvious that once such an Assembly had been elected and had met, the European Political Community would inevitably come into being in a very short period of time.

4. Schumann then talked about the economic problem. On this, Schumann pointed out that there were two things which the French could not do. One was to agree to a system of trade equality for Germany in the Saar that would give German goods the opportunity to come into France duty free. Such an eventuality, which could lead to the dislocation of the whole French economy, would be against the interest of the movement for European unity. Secondly, the French could not agree to any form of control of German imports into the Saar which would require the setting up of a customs organization on the Franco-Saar border. Schumann said that Hallstein had suggested that German goods entering the Saar be labeled as such to prevent their re-export into France. He said that he told Hallstein this would be unacceptable because it would require the setting up of an organization on the Franco-Saar border to check labels on all goods crossing from the Saar into France. Schumann said that what the French were prepared to do was to so liberalize German-Saar trade that Germany could, over a gradual period, hope to obtain the same opportunity to sell in the Saar as it had had when the Saar was German territory. German-Saar trade would be controlled by a series of quotas.

(Comment: This is the same suggestion as the one made to me earlier by Bidault for a series of upset figures for German-Saar trade.)

Schumann said that he told Hallstein that if the Germans would once accept the principle that all they desired was an equal opportunity to sell goods solely in the Saar, and once they showed that they understood the problem that would be caused by German goods flowing into France duty free through the Saar, and agreed to control of such traffic by a series of quotas, the French would be most flexible in dressing up the language of the agreement to make it appear that it was in fact, full free trade for Germany in the Saar. Schumann told me that it might even be possible to label the agreement as an agreement for eventual free German-Saar trade, although this would undoubtedly cause difficulties in the French Parliament.

Schumann then told me that he was not at all certain that the Germans had given up the idea of using the Saar as a means of extending their markets within France and the French Union.

(Comment: This fear of German goods flowing duty free into France through the Saar seems to be the basis of the French distrust on this subject.)

5. Schumann then mentioned one economic problem which was new to me. He said that there were certain industries in the Saar whose competitive position would be so improved if they could obtain duty free new equipment from Germany and duty free raw materials for manufacturing that they would then be able to dislocate whole segments of French industry. He referred particularly to a china and pottery manufacturer by the name of Bock (spelling uncertain) which, he said, had the capacity to supply the entire pottery and porcelain needs of metropolitan France and the French Union. If this company were to be allowed to operate on a favored basis with duty free German raw materials it could put the whole French porcelain and pottery industry out of business. Schumann said that some way must be found to guard against this.

(Comment: I am not clear as to whether Schumann had any other companies or industries in mind in this category and it may well be that this is an isolated, but important situation.)

6. Schumann finished by saying that he is now waiting to hear from Hallstein who had been absent on his Easter holiday. He understood that Hallstein had returned on Tuesday night, April 20, and that Berard was seeing him on Wednesday, the 21st. The next step will be for Hallstein to inform Schumann privately of Adenauer’s reactions to Schumann’s proposals. Hallstein is expected in Paris this weekend for a meeting of European leaders. Schumann has asked for a meeting with him at that time, provided Hallstein is ready to talk. Schumann said that he hoped that in view of the concession which he had offered to make, that Hallstein would be able to offer German concession at this new meeting that could enable them to rapidly reach an area of general agreement close enough to warrant a meeting between Bidault and Adenauer to arrive at a final solution.⁶

Schumann emphasized that the technical experts in the Quai d’Orsay knew nothing of this conversation and that it was his understanding with Hallstein that the German Government experts would also not be informed of this talk.

Schumann later Wednesday afternoon during a courtesy call by Jebb informed him along these same lines in a considerably briefer conversation.

Dillon

1. Repeated to Bonn and London eyes only for Conant and Aldrich.
2. A memorandum of this conversation, which is almost a verbatim copy of the text transmitted here, is in PPS files, lot 65 D 101, “Germany.”
3. Talks between French and German officials on the Saar had continued in April, but Bidault and Adenauer had not met. Documentation on these talks is in file 762.022.
4. Carl F. Ophuels, lawyer and minister in the Federal Republic.
5. See Document 640.
6. On Apr. 26, HICOG reported that Hallstein had met with Berard on Apr. 22, but had not advanced the discussion of the Saar materially, and that he had not seen Schumann in Paris during the week of Apr. 24, but had arranged for a meeting with him in Paris on May 3. (Telegram 3285 from Bonn, 762.022/4–2654)