Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

762.022/9–1453: Telegram

No. 644
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State¹

secret
priority

Bonn, September 14, 1953—8 p.m.

1027. Reference Paris telegram Department 1044, repeated Bonn 190, London 172; Paris to Department 1046, Bonn 191, London 173.² We believe French reply to Adenauer note of June 25, 1953³ may well prejudice favorable outcome of Saar negotiations. While we fully expected that French will enter negotiations with stand to maintain present status quo in order to drive best possible bargain, there is considerable difference between doing that at conference table and serving advance notice as French now intend. German reaction can only be stiffened attitude, even before conference table reached.

We cannot help feeling that French engaged in effort to commit United States to support of policy aimed at something like present status quo. While we cannot predict German position and tactics in coming negotiations, we believe that no German agreement can be obtained to such settlement, even if garbed in “European” cloak. Best line seems to get Germans to renounce sovereignty over Saar against concessions regarding trade and customs, mining management and Roechling Steel Works. Therefore, if we are ever called to intervene our position would need to be at some distance from present French stand. To comment on substance of present French note would impair our future usefulness.

We recommend that consideration be given to pointing out to French that our objective as expressed in our reply to Adenauer’s note of June 25⁴ was not only to maintain moratorium on Saar debate during German elections, but that we hoped “that all parties concerned will refrain from taking any action which might prejudice these negotiations or fail to improve the atmosphere in which they will be resumed”. Should the French Government deem it necessary to answer Adenauer’s letter of June 25 before negotiations start, the United States Government does not feel able to make comments on the draft note which it considers essentially a matter between the French and German Governments.

Conant

1. Repeated to Paris, London, and Strasbourg.
2. Telegram 1044, supra. Regarding telegram 1046, see footnote 3, supra.
3. See telegram 1044, supra.
4. On July 25 Conant advised that he had sent Adenauer a note which expressed the hope of the United States that the Franco-German talks on the Saar would be resumed quickly and that in the interim neither side would take any action that would prejudice the negotiations. (Telegrams 387 and 113 from Bonn, July 25 and 7, 762.022/7–2553 and 7–753)