Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

762B.00/2–953: Telegram

No. 567
The Director of the Berlin Element, HICOG (Lyon) to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn¹

secret

Berlin, February 9, 1953—5 p.m.

1269. Re Bonn’s 3463 to Department repeated Berlin 428, London 690, Paris 942, Moscow 190.² We still have seen no clear-cut indication that Soviets intend de jure incorporation Soviet sector into GDR within near future. Since de facto incorporation already reality we feel they are likely to take such action only if they feel some gesture of defiance is necessary, e.g., as reaction to ratification contractuals, or if they specifically desire provoke change in Berlin status quo. This last possibility particularly can never be ruled out and we, therefore, agree that general Allied reaction should, if possible, be promptly agreed upon.

In considering possible de jure integration East Berlin into GDR we have attempted set forth considerations favoring action on our part to give Tenth Land status to Berlin and those which would point toward maintenance of semblance of status quo. Our conclusions are the following:

A. In favor de jure integration Berlin into Federal Republic

(1) De jure integration would, by making Federal Republic’s responsibilities clear, ensure Federal Republic’s continuing interest in and support of Berlin. Berlin’s representatives fortified with power of vote would be able influence Federal Republic policy in favor Berlin and result might eventually be slight reduction US outlay necessary maintain Berlin.

(2) Integration would eliminate minor but constant sources friction between Berliners and Allies which result from Berlin’s largely fictional independent status.

(3) Berliners and Berlin Government may probably be expected push strongly for Land status if East Berlin included in DDR. To refuse will certainly cause misunderstanding and may prompt impression that Allies too weak or divided to take positive action.

(4) In general, Berlin’s electorate appears more reliably democratic and politically mature than that of Federal Republic. Therefore, integration Berlin might have desirable result of reducing effect future electoral gains of right radicalists in Federal Republic.

(5) Prompt action to make Berlin Tenth Land would be clear indication to Soviets of resolute and bold Allied policy and might discourage them from further actions which would have more serious effect on West Berlin than de jure incorporation East Berlin into DDR.

B. Against de jure integration of Berlin into Federal Republic

(1) Any move to integrate Berlin into Federal Republic might encourage Soviets to interfere with free access to Berlin by destroying final semblance quadripartite status of city since they would be offered tempting justification that communications between Federal Republic and Federal Republic exclave not guaranteed by quadripartite agreements.

(2) We do not feel that vis-à-vis Soviets we remain in Berlin today because such provided for in quadripartite agreements. We feel, however, that these agreements have been influential in keeping our Allies in Berlin. In our opinion, the stronger our legal basis for being in Berlin, the less danger there will be of serious differences with our Allies on the advisability of remaining in Berlin in time of crisis.

(3) By integrating Berlin de jure into Federal Republic, we would inevitably lose our sovereign powers in Berlin as Allies. Thus we would no longer be in position to control actions of Germans in Berlin (except perhaps in time of ultimate emergency). There seems considerable disadvantage in losing basic control in situation so danger-ridden as Berlin, particularly in view our commitments to defend it by war if necessary.

(4) If we should ape illegal act of Soviets in integrating East Berlin, we would find ourselves in difficult position effectively to protest measures which would logically follow assumption of sovereignty by GDR. As example, if following integration East Berlin, East Germans refuse recognize validity Allied-issued interzonal passes, we would undoubtedly be in stronger position take effective countermeasures if Soviets cannot claim that we ourselves have recognized end of quadripartite agreements on Berlin by making it part of Federal Rẽpublic.

(5) Finally, if Soviets should institute measures approximating blockade, we believe Allies would be in slightly stronger position to restore access by force if it is clear we are doing so to supply our troops who are in Berlin in accordance still valid quadripartite agreements and German population for whose welfare we are directly responsible.

We are unable judge one important consideration from Berlin, namely, what attitude of West Germans and Federal Government would be in event consolidation East Berlin into GDR.

Without taking this latter factor into consideration we have weighed (A) and (B) above against each other and have tentatively concluded that considerations working against de jure Tenth Land status for Berlin are overriding. We believe that in long run no matter what status of East Berlin is, a firm legal basis for presence Allies in Berlin is more important than all factors listed under (A). In fact, we feel that primary purpose any Soviet move integrate East Berlin de jure into GDR might well be to entice us to do likewise with West Berlin. Soviets might hope in this manner achieve more maneuverability than they have had since blockade.

We do not mean by above that we should sit idly by if East Berlin incorporated. We tend believe that we should utilize such move to eliminate as many differences between Berliners and Allies which result Berlin’s independent status as possible. We should drop objections to Constitutional Court, forget about wording of Mantelgesetz, participation Berlin in Federal elections, activity Federal agencies in Berlin and insist only on two things as proof Berlin’s independence:

(1) Federal laws cannot apply directly in Berlin;

(2) Berlin representatives may not vote in Bundestag. Moreover, we should scrap revised statement of principles or declaration, whichever happen to be in effect, and replace it with brief declaration making Allied sovereignty clear, providing for broad emergency powers and nothing else. Allied Kommandatura should promptly become as nearly dormant as possible. Finally, serious consideration should be given to allowing recruitment in West Berlin for European Army. If this could be done, we believe pressure from Berliners for Land status will not be overwhelming and that Berlin will be losing very little, if anything, through its “independent status”.

Obviously, as tactical move to get British and French to go along with above, initial US position might well be in favor de jure Land status for Berlin. As of moment, however, we feel that Tenth Land status for Berlin would be bigger gain for Soviets than for Berliners or Allies.

Lyon

1. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Washington; the source text is the copy in Department of State files.
2. Telegram 3463 stressed the need to have formulated a U.S. position if the Soviet Union incorporated the Eastern Sector of Berlin into the German Democratic Republic. (762B.00/1–2753)